Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the Manuals of Byzantine Rhetoric

Aristotle was the first ancient philosopher to draft a manual of rhetoric containing the definition of rhetoric, its relation with dialectic, the norms of rhetoric, rhetorical techniques, the presentation of the orator’s personality, the psychological and logical persuasion required of an orator, as well as his communication skills, both verbal and non-verbal. The content of Aristotle’s rhetoric, despite the harsh criticism of Byzantine philo-Platonist Theodore Metochites, constituted a source of inspiration for the Byzantines, who wrote few commentaries on Aristotle’s rhetoric, but adopted many elements from his manual in order to express their socio-political ideology through the perception of the aesthetically verbally beautiful. Particularly significant is the fact that the Byzantines inherited from Aristotle the first communication model that was based on the threefold use of language: the theoretical, the practical and the productive or artistic. Frequently, Aristotle’s theory about language in relation to that of Isocrates is found in Byzantine manuals of rhetoric. Aristotle’s rhetoric had a significant impact on the Byzantine perception of the aestheticality and practicality that must imbue the orator’s speech in order that the communicative interaction with his audience to be improved. In this way, communication in its modern form was polished by the Byzantine’s contemplation on aesthetically beautiful speech in style and verbal forms.

Introduction

Rhetoric rapidly occupied a significant position in Byzantine literature and in the life of the Byzantines, because the Byzantines used rhetoric to externalise their spiritual world and manifest their aesthetic perceptions of art.[1]

Some Byzantine scholars drew up manuals of rhetoric based mainly on Hermogenes’ rhetoric, as well as that of Aristotle. Many commentaries were written on Hermogenes’ rhetoric, which was the most basic source for the Byzantines. From the fourth to fifth century, interest in Hermogenes’ rhetoric was strengthened by commentaries written by neo-Platonists, such as Syrianos. The representatives of the Alexandrian School displayed particular interest in Aristotle’s rhetoric.[2]

In Byzantium, flamboyant rhetoric became the most thriving form of rhetorical art. Already from the third century B.C., this kind of rhetoric had become very popular in Christian circles, with the main representative being Gregory the Miracle-Worker (Gregory Thaumatourgos). The panegyric speeches of Eusebius of Caesaria, Gregory Nanzianzen, St Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, St Athanasius the Great, and John Chrysostom were also of great importance. The Fathers, with their speeches, were the model of Christian eloquence, and they elevated rhetoric to the level of high rhetorical art.[3] At the same time, they had a great effect on subsequent Byzantine scholars, who drew on the speeches of Christian fathers and composed flamboyant speeches referring to emperors and members of the imperial family.

Rhetoric went through a gradual expansion, which the Byzantines considered primarily as ‘paideia’, adopting Isocrates’ view.[4] From the early Byzantine period through to the tenth century, manuals of rhetoric did not exist. However, the art of reason and the effects of ancient Hellenic, Hellenistic, and Christian rhetoric on the works of the Byzantines were intense. From the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, many commentaries on rhetoric were written, mainly on the Progymnasmata of Aphtonius and Hermogenes, as they were considered to be authorities on the formation of rhetorical speech regarding the technique system.

Furthermore, Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus were known, as well as Aristotle’s rhetoric.[5] Rhetoric attracted more Byzantine interest than did Aristotle’s Poetics[6]—which did not have a prominent position in Byzantine literature, something that is demonstrated by the fact that the Byzantines did not write commentaries on it.[7] The fewest commentaries have been written on Aristotle’s rhetoric.

Commentaries on Aristotle’s rhetoric

The only surviving commentaries on the rhetorical art of the great philosopher is a fairly extensive anonymous commentary, and one attributed to an unknown person, Stephanos. Both commentaries are dated back to the second half of the twelfth century.[8]

In the first commentary (1126 AD), the anonymous commentator wrote, preferably, on passages from all three books of Aristotle’s rhetoric. Specifically, he started from the point that links rhetoric to dialectic, which constitutes the most important purpose of both arts. He clarified that neither rhetoric nor dialectic examine what is credible in certain persons, but they examine rather what appears credible in persons in a particular situation. This fact implies that both employ syllogisms for matters that should remain under the control of logic. At this point, the commentator indirectly wanted to separate and distinguish the role and purpose of rhetoric from dialectic. He laid stress on the function of rhetoric, that deals with those issues that defy technical solutions. This indicates the involvement of rhetoric with issues that apply to the general public and for which issues public argumentation is carried out in front of a popular audience.

Consequently, the issues under discussion have two opposite solutions, that are analysed through syllogisms that are sometimes easily comprehended by commentator and sometimes are not.[9] The anonymous commentator analysed the available means of rhetoric and its kinds. In the second book, he commented on morality and passion as a means of persuasion and entered into the analysis of two types of logical arguments: conclusion gathering, which is accomplished by the use of example, and secondly abduction, which is the use of rhetorical syllogism, which Aristotle named enthymeme.[10] His commentary was completed by the anonymous author, who commented on the style and layout of rhetorical speech.

In the same line as the anonymous commentator, Stephanos (1151–1154) commented fragmentarily on all the books of Aristotle’s rhetoric, selecting specific passages. Stephanos extracted a proposal from Aristotle’s text and attempted through combined syllogisms to interpret it. Stephanos started his annotation with a significant argument referring to the direct relation of rhetorical art with philosophy. Stephanos considered there to be similarities between the structure of philosophical and rhetorical speech. In philosophy, syllogism, which constitutes a form of argument, corresponds to rhetoric with enthymeme. The distinction of philosophical reason in proving and in dialectical reason, which results from the creation of necessary and possible syllogisms, applies to rhetoric as well.[11] Stephanos indirectly took a stand against the timeless problem of the contrast between rhetoric and philosophy,[12] and supported the reconciliation and coexistence between philosophical and rhetorical speech by identifying their similarities. In his annotation, he highlighted the issue of independence or dependence of rhetoric from dialectic. Moreover, he did not consider philosophy necessary for the formation of rhetorical speech and likely expressed his opposition to Hermagoras, who supported the autonomy of rhetoric on stasis-theory, establishing it as antagonistic to philosophy.[13] In the epilogue of the commentary, Stephanos referred to the verbal and specifically to the phrasal modes of speech.[14]

According to G. A. Kennedy, both the anonymous commentator and Stephanos tried to combine Aristotle’s thought with Hermogenes’ teachings.[15] Besides the above two commentaries, a Byzantine scholar of the eleventh century, John Italos, wrote a concise manual on rhetorical art, titled: Του αὐτού φιλοσόφου μέθοδος ῥητορική ἐκδοθείσα κατά σύνοψιν.[16]

The impact of Aristotle’s rhetoric on John Italos

Italos was student of Michael Psellos and an adherent of Plato. Italos was familiar with dialectic and he wrote his manual, based on Aristotle’s rhetoric. He used Aristotle’s rhetoric attentively as a guide and/or as a draft in the formation of his thought and the writing of his treatise.[17] Through study of his brief manual, it becomes clear that Italos in many parts reconciled Aristotle’s with Plato’s views regarding the character and the art of rhetoric, which Plato analysed thoroughly in Phaedrus and Gorgias dialogues.[18] Italos probably wanted to write and deliver to his students a concise manual of rhetoric equal to that of Aristotle, in which he highlighted the Platonic background of his syllogism as well.[19]

Italos defined rhetoric, stressing that this definition derived from Aristotle himself, according to whom rhetoric is the most glorious and important of all other methods, because it can find the perceived probable on the topic under discussion, namely convincing arguments. Italos reconciled Aristotle’s with Plato’s view, and he illustrated that there is a relation between rhetoric and dialectic. This relation is founded on the cooperation between persuasion and teaching. His view is contrary to that of Aristotle, who attributed the above definition exclusively to the method of rhetoric.[20]

Italos points out the differences and similarities that exist between rhetoric and dialectic. He mentions the kinds of rhetorical speech and briefly referred to forensic speech. Italos paid particular attention to the content of political rhetoric, which deals mainly with issues that concern political virtue, as it is the foundation of political life, cohabitation, and the society of citizens among themselves, as well as the preservation of law and obedience to it. The political orator, who must have the appropriate verbal style, undertakes the dissemination and comprehension of issues of political virtue, which are discussed in public, and he aims at the prosperity and affluence of the state, as well as at the common interest of the citizens.[21] Italos adopted Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought, and he considers the orators’s skill in rhetorical art to be made apparent in the communication with his audience. Italos stressed that the foundation of this communication is the combination of perfect knowledge of the issue under discussion, the listener’s psychology, and the orator’s verbal skill.[22]

Italos appropriated the Aristotelian view regarding the inseparable relationship between rhetoric and politics and he stressed the points that prove this relationship. He pointed out the importance of political speech, illustrating that rhetorical art can be a useful tool for a genuine political orator, who seeks the most direct way of communication with his audience. In Italos’ syllogism, a politician without oratorical skill seems passive and helpless. Italos emphasised political speech, on the one hand to serve the political ideology of each era, on the other hand to constitute a significant communicative factor, which inseparably links philosophy and politics to the personality of the political man.[23]

The fourteenth-century Byzantine scholar, humanist, and erudite, Theodore Metochites, who in his voluminous work Υπομνηματισμοί και Σημειώσεις γνωμικαί, which contains a small chapter titled: Ότι διὰ τὴν πρὸς Πλάτωνα μάχην σπουδάζει ἠξίωσεν Ἀριστοτέλης περί ταὴν ῥητορικήν,[24] strictly criticized Aristotle’s personality and treatise on rhetoric.

Theodore Metochites’s criticism in Aristotle’s rhetoric

Metochites, in a small chapter preceding this chapter, pointed out the aversion the great philosopher of ancient times, Plato, showed to rhetorical method. Specifically, he pointed out that even Plato himself as an orator, even though his speech was considered to be sufficiently enlightened, avoided the orator’s method from the beginning, refraining from rhetorical wiles in parliamentary and judicial games, and at the same time accusing other orators of concealing the truth.[25] Metochites indirectly highlighted a highly significant issue, which Platonic criticism touched upon: the division and distinction between truth and plausibility. The roots of their causal connection are found in Plato’s cosmological system, and specifically in the division and reduction of the perceptible from the conceivable world. However, Metochites considered the Platonic position extreme, regarding the interest of rhetoric in the knowledge of the truth— if we take into consideration the fact that in Plato’s Phaedrus, the deception of the audience does not constitute the basic touchpoint in the Platonic criticism of rhetoric. Moreover, according to Plato, the knowledge of the truth does not oblige the orator to avoid techniques that contribute to audience deception.[26]

The reader, through the study of the subsequent chapter that concerns us here, will understand the reason why Metochites presents, in an exagerrated way, Plato’s acute criticism of rhetorical art. Metochites, known for his erudition and philo-Platonism,[27] laid the appropriate foundations to show the reason for Aristotle’s engagement in rhetoric. At the same time, he attempted to illustrate the verbal weakness of the Stagirite philosopher, as well as his lack of rhetorical skill.

Metochites claimed that Aristotle clearly engaged in rhetoric, wrote his treatise on rhetoric, and, as its master, used to receive money for his engagement in it. Thus, he really showed himself opposed to the negative attitude his teacher Plato displayed to rhetorical art.[28] In a masterful way, Metochites demonstrated[29] Aristotle’s spiritual inferiority to Plato. In particular, he pointed out that Aristotle went forward to his self-demotion through his actions and his immeasurable behaviour, which he characterised as ‘anti-praxis’ against Plato.[30]

Metochites contrasted the noble and gentle language that Plato used in his arguments with the rhetorical method and the improper handling of language from Aristotle in his conflict against social criticism on rhetoric. Metochites characterised the Aristotelian speech as untrue and unpracticed. It is obvious that Metochites was also trying to belittle the tone and style of Aristotelian speech, and the quality of Aristotle’s rhetorical writing, perhaps even indirectly, using as a weapon the—directly hostile—argument of the ‘Stagerite’ against Plato, which diverged from the technical norms of rhetoric. Metochites pointed out that, although Aristotle studied rhetorical art, with his misuse of language, he appears incapable of learning. On the contrary, Plato, who strictly criticised rhetoric, used its weapons, such as eloquence.[31]

From the arguments above, it becomes clear that Aristotle’s rhetoric was not read sufficiently by the Byzantines. Moreover, it was subject to harsh criticism, particularly from Plato’s adherents, such as Theodore Metochites. This criticism applied to both personality and Aristotle’s work. In addition, as previously mentioned,[32] the Platonic dialogues Phaedrus and Gorgias constituted a subject of study at schools of philosophy more so than Aristotle’s rhetoric.

Despite Theodore Metochites’ harsh criticism about Aristotle’s way and method of writing, certain Byzantine scholars, such as John Doxapatris (first half of the eleventh century), specifically in his work on Περί το ευρέσεως Ερμογένους βιβλίον, may have infrequently used Platonic and Aristotelian elements in their commentaries, drawn from subsequent Alexandrian commentators of Aristotle, such as Olympiodorus, David and Elias.[33]

The influence of Aristotle’s rhetoric on the Byzantines is revealed through the correlation of language with rhetoric. Four theories of language have been formulated to highlight this correlation and the most prevalent among Byzantines scholars was that of Isocrates and Aristotle.[34]

The Aristotelian view of language and the effects on Byzantine rhetoric

Language is a significant factor in the discussion process. It is the means of rhetoric, the instrument of communication, as well as the motive for action. Rhetoric cannot exist without language. According to Aristotle, all linguistic practices have a fundamental place in the discussion process, (i.e., in the social activity of forming opinion and making collective choices). Regarding language, there are four theories, that highlight its correlation with rhetoric.[35]

According to the Sophists, language is the orator’s weapon, he wields it to influence human souls, to lead them to good or evil, and to persuade.[36] The Sophists tried to establish their rhetoric on the empirical and autonomous use of language.

Plato claimed that knowledge of things precedes language. In his work ‘Sophist’, he observes objects and researches their essence, regardless of language and without its contribution.[37] He does not acknowledge the autonomy of language, because its dynamic, unbreakably linked to his idealistic view, is based on the rise of the metaphysical reminiscent truth. The ensuring of moral and gnoseological points of rhetoric is based on the uniqueness of truth, given by philosophical speech.[38]

Isocrates, in his theory about language, understood this as a fundamental element and power that is considered necessary for the foundation and consolidation of human civilization. Isocrates presented the general perception about rhetoric as a reason that leads to coordinated activity for the benefit of the city. With this perception about the art of rhetoric, he stood out from other orators. Isocrates had the temperament of the practical orator, making rhetorical art an art of public conversation regarding city issues.[39]

Aristotle, on Ῥητορική, created a strong bond and a strong relationship between speech, morality and passion. He considered the linguistic and syllogistic skills of the orator as a source of projection of his morals and as an effect on the passions of the audience. Aristotle understood language as a natural phenomenon, as a tool of knowledge, as an exhortation to action and as a means of artistic expression. According to Aristotle, language has three uses: a)- the theoretical that serves as an instrument of knowledge, b)- the practical that functions as a means of communication, and c)- the productive that appears as a form of artistic expression. Language functions as a material, with which the artist builds words, aiming at the audience’s pleasure.[40]

Aristotle stressed the practical use of language at the level of communication. He understood, on the one hand, consensus as a common semantic definition of a word, which concerns its esoteric mental state, and, on the other hand, the differentiality in language, which regards its exoteric state. A fundamental element in communication is the point, concerning the exact meaning of word, which makes language the basic instrument of communication.[41] Language is the orator’s weapon, that he should be able to handle it with ease, in order to conquer the psychology and acceptance of the audience. It is not enough for the orator to be eloquent, but the right use of language is required as well: a clear articulation, a strong and pleasant voice, appropriate pacing, being neither too loquacious nor too brief.[42]

Aristotle defined the semantic purpose of language, concentrated his interest on the common semantology of words, and introduced the basic purpose of language, which is communication.[43]

The theories of Isocrates and Aristotle prevailed in Byzantine rhetoric. Michael Psellos (1018–1072), in his concise treatise about rhetoric,[44] considered rhetoric as a tool of the politician and politics. Rhetoric, with its aesthetic quality, achieves through the variety of shapes, words, and sentences the formation of argument as a result of the free personal expression of the orator, who constantly changes masks to persuade, through the alteration of content and style of his arguments. Psellos seems to have adopted the Aristotelian notion that ‘rhetoric appears with the clothes and masks of politics’.[45] Psellos adopted the Aristotelian view about the productive use of language and highlighted the aesthetically high through the modes and stylistic and verbal forms, such as modesty, roughness, and brightness. The aesthetic dress of sound, style, rhythm, and content embellish and prettify every political speech, that stands out for the specific style and is characterised by morality, truth, abundance, swiftness, clarity, roughness, vigour, modesty, brightness, skill and methods.[46]

Michael Psellos’ thought is dominated on the one hand by the aesthetic perception of a self-made speech, which is distinguished for its beauty and artistic value, which appears in the selection and variety of beautiful words and phrases, with the orator’s main goal being to attract the audience. On the other hand, it becomes clear that the syllogistic proof, which substantiates the arguments, is more stable and by no means questionable with respect to political speech. He advises to put the words with relevance to political style at the end of arguments, in order to highlight the inspiration and autonomy of the artist-orator, seeking to embody the ideal orator.[47] In his rhetoric, Psellos conspicuously supported the Aristotelian productive use of language as a condition of a dynamic self-made and inspired speech.

John Tzetzes (1110–1185) wrote a concise manual of rhetoric with the title Ἐπιτομὴ ῥητορικῆς.[48] The technical use of rhetoric was fundamental for Tzetzes, particularly when it serves the interest of the city and is defined by city’s laws in force. The practical use of rhetoric is made indisputable when the orator argues and obeys his city’s law, thus simultaneously accomplishing the one and basic gift that Aristotle had already stressed with regards to rhetoric, namely the orator’s moral through his character.[49] Tzetzes tried to define a stable, strong, and communicatively practical rhetorical speech.[50] The originality in Tzetze’s thoughts is revealed in his mixing of forensic with panegyric speech, consultative with panegyric, as well as with the mixture of three kinds of speech, the forensic, consultative, and panegyric.[51] With the mixture of three kinds of speech, Tzetzes emphasised the second basic principle, that provides the orator with the capability to create his speech and the character of his style autonomously, exercising his synthetic ability as well.

In this way he combines the speeches, while simultaneously altering them according to the circumstances, which are associated with persons. Tzetzes wanted with the mixture of three kinds of speech to make the sensibility and practicality of speech possible, considering that both two elements strengthen orator’s verbal skill.[52]

Joseph Rakendites (1280–1328) attempted to highlight the self-reliance of speech, which pervaded the relativistic perception of the Sophists, through the Aristotelian perception about the practicality of speech. Rakendites wrote the Σύνοψις τῆς ῥητορικῆς,[53] which is included in his extensive work Εγκυκλοπαίδεια. It is a concise display of rhetorical art, in which he sought to highlight the value and importance of rhetoric for the Byzantines.[54] Rakendites stressed the power of persuasion, which he subordinated to the orator’s self-reliance of speech. He made rhetorical political speech communicative, and placed it at the level of the orator’s psychological comprehension of the audience’s emotions. The public’s acceptance of an argument relies basically on its nature, which is psychology. As such, amongst two means that render an orator’s argument acceptable by the public—intellect and will—he emphasised will. Consequently, the good orator and politician base the persuasiveness of their speech on what is likeable, and not too much on what is proved. The formation of speech is attributed to the orator’s will, who appears as a thinker of the time of ‘στοχαστὴς γὰρ τοῦ καιροῦ ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ’,[55] and he influences the public in order to express the views, ideas and feelings of his people.

The most important element in Rakendites’ manual is that it combines all three uses of language: a)- The theoretical, where language functions as an instrument of knowledge transfer, which the orator should have in order to compose the reasoning processes, arguments, and evidence. Thus, the knowledge of history constitutes an inexhaustible source of evidence that the orator uses as an example in his speech.[56] b)- The practical, which is communicative with the help of verbal and stylistic forms.[57] The orator’s speech takes into account the psychological state of the audience, following the Aristotelian combination of the psychological and logical persuasion. c)- The productive use of language, consisting of the artistic style of speech and highlighting its aesthetic perspective, Rakendites pointed this out, delivering along with the preamble in epitome and written in iambic verse the content of rhetoric, which he then analysed in prose.[58]

The post-Byzantine philo-Platonist George Gemistos Plethon (1360–1452) attempted to invoke the practical and productive use of language. Plethon borrowed many elements from Aristotle’s rhetoric. Despite the fact that in a large part of his thought he disapproved of the Aristotelian philosophy, he adopted positions of Aristotelian rhetoric, with the ultimate goal of raising rhetoric to a kind of political consciousness.[59]

Plethon adopted the division of Aristotelian rhetoric and separated speech into forensic, which is based on the category and plea with a purpose of ensuring the law· consultative, which is based primarily on exhortation or dissuasion, with common interest as a goal, and into panegyric or rigorous, which moves towards praise and blame, with good being the ultimate goal.[60] Plethon indicated that the orator must be trained: a) in how to use the rhetorical forms, in order to persuade, communicate with his audience and to contribute to the progress of rhetorical art and b) in how to correctly express with words his thoughts, feelings, arguments, morality, and passion. Plethon presented the rhetorical method by which the aesthetic element in language formation is projected, in order to responsibly achieve political oratory, which is determined by the practical separation of rhetoric in the above three kinds. The orator is obliged to know the content and purpose of each kind. The orators are trained in a system of cultural communication, which is directly related to their personal benefit and their need for fame and glory. This was proved by Plethon’s emphasis on the purpose that each of the three kinds of speech serves.[61] He pointed out the degree of psychological encouragement and political communicative speech with the masterful use of verbal forms, which were subdivided into categories.[62]

In Plethon’s thought, the Isocratic and Aristotelian view of speech was established, which seems to serve many purposes, such as: to renew the ancient form of rhetorical art, which was graced by elegance, beauty and accuracy—to train the youth at the time of Plethon in a rhetoric free from any religious evidence—to incite the orators to highlight the social and political role of rhetorical speech, in order to be instructors towards a democratisation of the institutions, which, at that time, were being subjected to the divine right of kings, which was often equivalent to the profound esoteric and exoteric oppression of human personality.[63]

Conclusion

Aristotle’s rhetoric was a source of inspiration for the Byzantines, at times demanding their interest and at other times inciting their criticism. The Byzantine rhetoric inherited from Aristotle the first communicative model, which was based on the threefold use of Aristotelian view about language that the Byzantines often adopted with respect to Isocrates’s theory. The present historical-philosophical review constitutes a brief deepening of the degree of influence of Aristotelian rhetoric in Byzantium. The Byzantine interest in Aristotelian rhetoric is highlighted in many ways, either by the Byzantine commentaries on his rhetoric, the adoption of elements, that concerned mainly verbal, stylistic forms and basic points of orator’s personality, which should characterise the emperor as well, or the combined use of Aristotle’s tripartite perception of language. Aristotle’s rhetoric created a favourable ground for the development of the social and political role of rhetoric in Byzantium. In this context, Byzantine rhetoric emphasised the communicative role of the orator, and, through the aestheticality and practicality underlying the orator’s speech, significantly contributed to the evolution of communication, based on the two-way relation and interaction of the orator with his audience.

 

^[1]  Hans Georg Beck, ‘The Byzantine rhetoric as an expression of the Byzantine spirit’, Journal of Research in Philosophy 9 (1965): 102.

 

^[2]  George L. Kustas, Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric (Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute of Patristic Studies, 1973), 7–8. Kustas also mentions that there were Byzantines who commented on Apthonius’ Progymnasmata, who was student of Libanius (second half of the fourth century).

 

^[3]  George Kennedy, Ιστορία της κλασσικής ρητορικής, trans. in Greek by Νίκος Νικολούδης (Αθήνα: Παπαδήμας, 2000), 414–20.

 

^[4]  George Kennedy, ‘The Byzantine rhetoric as an expression of the Byzantine spirit’, (1965): 106.

 

^[5]  George Kennedy, Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 291–2.

 

^[6]  Aristotle, On poetics, trans. Σίμος Μενάνδρου, ed. Ιωάννης Σικουτρής (Αθήνα: Εστία, 1995).

 

^[7]  Regarding Byzantine poetry, see Norman H. Baynes and Henry St.L.B. Moss, Βυζάντιο, Εισαγωγή στο Βυζαντινό πολιτισμό, trans. in Greek by Δημήτριος Ν. Σακκάς (Αθήνα: Παπαδήμας, 1986), 340 et al.

 

^[8]  Kennedy, Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors, 318. Cf., Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 356.

 

^[9]  Anonymi in Aristotelis Rhetorica, CAG, vol. XXI (Berlin, 1896), I 2, 1 [Arist. P. 1356b34–1357a1].

 

^[10]  Anonymi in Aristotelis Rhetorica, vol. II, 20–24 [Arist. P. 13931–1402A16].

 

^[11]  ‘Έτερα σχόλια του κύρου Στεφάνου’, CAG, vol. XXI (Berlin, 1896), I 2, 263 [Arist. P. 1357a22]: Ἐπεὶδ’ ἐστὶν ὀλίγα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Ἅπαξ εἰπὼν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν παρεοικέναι τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ (συλλογισμόςτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐνθύμημα. ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῇ ῥητορικῇ παράδειγμα) νῦν πάλιν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ φιλοσοφίας κοινωνίαν καὶ ῥητορικῆς πολυπραγμονεὶ καὶ λέγει ‘ὥσπερ παρὰ τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ συλλογισμοῖς ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἐξ᾽ ἀναγκαίων καὶ γίνεται ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἡ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίνεται ὁ διαλεκτικός, οὕτως εὑρήσεις λοιπὸν καὶ παρὰ τῇ ῥητορικῇ προτάσεις οἷον ἐνδεχομένας τὰ εἰκότα, οἷον δὲ ἀναγκαίας τὰ τεκμηριώδη σημεία’. τριχὼς γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον.

 

^[12]  Kennedy, Ιστορία της κλασσικής ρητορικής, 18. Kennedy points out that the enmity between rhetoric and philosophy existed during the entire period of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, he mentions that some contemporary readers support philosophy in its dispute with rhetoric (see p. 19).

 

^[13]  Παντελής Μπασάκος, Επιχειρήματα και κρίση (Αθήνα: Νήσος, 1999), 46–51. Basakos mentions that the Hermagorian model died out as a general theory of the use of speech. However, it sealed the Roman, post-Hellenic and Byzantine theory of forensic argument, and from there, the entire tradition of forensic thinking.

 

^[14]  ‘Έτερα σχόλια του κύρου Στεφάνου’, III 9, 321 [Arist. P. 1410a17–26]. Regarding the verbal part see Δημήτριος Σταμούλης, Βασικοί κανόνες ρητορικής και ρητορείας ομιλίας και επιστολογραφίας (Αθήνα, 1972), 84 et al.

 

^[15]  Kennedy, Ιστορία της κλασσικής ρητορικής, 356. Specifically on his book f.n. 239.

 

^[16]  John Italos, Του αυτού φιλοσόφου μέθοδος ρητορική εκδοθείσα κατά σύνοψιν (ed. G. Ceretell, Tphilislis, 1924), 33–46.

 

^[17]  Regarding the life and work of John Italos see: Wolfgang Buchwald, Armin Hohlweg, and Otto Prinz, eds, Tusculum. Λεξικόν Ελλήνων και Λατίνων συγγραφέων της Αρχαιότητας και του Μεσαίωνα, vol. 1, trans. in Greek by Αθανάσιος Φούρλας (Αθήνα: Αθανάσιος Φούρλας, 1993), 256–7. See Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους, vol 9 (Αθήνα: Εκδοτική Αθηνών, 1980), 350–1. Cf. Βασίλειος Τατάκης, Η Βυζαντινή Φιλοσοφία, trans. from French by Εύα Καλπουρτζή (Αθήνα: Εταιρεία Σπουδών Νεοελληνικού Πολιτισμού και Γενικής Παιδείας, 1977), 201–7. Furthermore see Σωτηρία Τριαντάρη-Μαρά, ‘Η ρητορική στο φιλόσοφο Ιωάννη Ιταλό’, Βυζαντινός Δόμος 13 (2002–2003): 13–25. In Σωτηρία Τριαντάρη-Μαρά, Θέματα φιλοσοφίας: Αρχαία, βυζαντινή και νεότερη φιλοσοφία. Κοσμολογία, λογική, αισθητική, πολιτική, ρητορική, εκπαίδευση (Θεσσαλονίκη: Σταμούλης, 2007), 372–387.

 

^[18]  Plato’s Gorgias or ‘Περί ρητορικής ανατρεπτικός και του ιδίου Φαίδρος’, trans., research, and comments by Παναγιώτης Δόικος (Θεσσαλονίκη: Ζήτρος, 2001).

 

^[19]  Τριαντάρη, ‘Η ρητορική στο φιλόσοφο Ιωάννη Ιταλό’, 372–373.

 

^[20]  John Italos, ‘Του αυτού φιλοσόφου μέθοδος ρητορική εκδοθείσα κατά σύνοψιν’, 33, 1–3: Ἡ ῥητορικὴ μέθοδός ἐστιν ἐξ’ ἐνδόξων τοῦ περὶ ἕκαστον θεωρήσαι τὸ πιθανόν, διο καὶ ἀντιστρόφως ἐστὶ τῇ διαλεκτικῇ, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης’. Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric Α, 1355b, 32–34 and Plato, Gorgias, 453e, 454b. For the thorough analysis of this subject see Τριαντάρη, ‘Η ρητορική στο φιλόσοφο Ιωάννη Ιταλό’, 374–375. Regarding the power of persuasion in Plato see Χλόη Μπάλλα, Πλατωνική Πειθώ (Αθήνα: Πόλις, 1997), 111–12. Μπασάκος, Επιχειρήματα και κρίση, 49. Regarding the relation between rhetoric and dialectic in Aristotle see Amélie O. Rorty, Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 7 et al.

 

^[21]  Ιωάννης Ιταλός, Του φιλοσόφου μέθοδος ρητορική εκδοθείσα κατά σύνοψιν, 35, 7–12: Πολιτικὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνα ῥητέον, ὅσα περὶ ἀρετῆς ἔχει τὴν ἐξέτασιν οὐ πάσης, ἀλλὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς, καθ’ ἢν καὶπολιτεύεσθαι εἰώθαμεν, ἤτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους συναναστρέφεσθαι καὶ σῴζειν ἕκαστα τῶν τῳ νόμῳ διατεταγμένων, ὡς ἑνὶ μάλιστα… Ὧν δὴ τὴν ἀκριβὴν κατανόησιν ἔχειν ἔργον μὲν οὐ ῥητορικῆς πλὴν τῶν ὧνπορρητικὼς ἔχομεν. Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric Α 1357b, 39–40 και 1359b, 19–23.

 

^[22]  Ιωάννης Ιταλός, Του φιλοσόφου μέθοδος ρητορική εκδοθείσα κατά σύνοψιν, 35, 16–23: Ἐπεί διχῶς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐγγίγνεσθαι φάσιν…οὐκ ἀργὸν ἔδοξενεἶναι οὐδ’ ἀπὸ λογισμῶν λόγω τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν ταῖς δεχομέναις ψυχαῖς ἐμποιεῖν καὶ ἄγειν πρὸςτὸ καλόν. Ἐν δὴ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἡ ῥητορικὴ κέκτηκαι, κατηγοροῦσα μὲν ὧν δεῖ κατηγορεῖν, συμβουλευομένη δὲ τὰ εἰκότα καὶ ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων ἑκάστοις τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένη ὡς εἴρηται. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 269d–272b and Aristotle Rhetoric Α, 1356a, 21–26. Regarding the necessary knowledge of the technical norms of rhetoric from the politician, as it is presented by Plato see Alfred Edward Taylor, Πλάτων, Ο άνθρωπος και το έργο του,  trans. in Greek by Ιορδάνης Αρζόγλου (Αθήνα: Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης, 2000), 364–5. Regarding the art of rhetoric and orator’s verbal skill in Aristotle see Ingemar Dűring, Αριστοτέλης, Παρουσίαση και ερμηνεία της σκέψης του, trans. in Greek by Παρασκευή Κοτζιά-Παντελή (Αθήνα: Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης, 1994), 233.

 

^[23]  Regarding John Italos’ views on rhetorical art, as well as the views he drew from Plato and Aristotle, see Τριαντάρη, ‘Η ρητορική στο φιλόσοφο Ιωάννη Ιταλό’, 377.

 

^[24] Theodore Metochites, Υπομνηματισμοί και Σημειώσεις γνωμικαί [Miscellanea Philosophica et Historica Graece] (Amsterdam: M. Th. Klessling, 1966), 155–59, 167–73.

 

^[25] Θεόδωρος Μετοχίτης, Ὅτι διὰ τὴν πρὸς ῥητορικὴν πόλεμον εἰ διάλογος ὁ Πλάτων χρῆται, 167: Θαυμάσαι τις ἂν ἴσως εὖ μάλα ξυννούμενος τὸν εἰς τοσούτον τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος πρὸς ῥητορικὴν πόλεμον, καὶ τὴν κήρυκτον, ὡς εἰπεῖν, καθάπαξ ἄσπονδον μάχην, ὅτι καίτοι ῥητορικὸς ὡςὁ ἀνήρ… καὶ τὴν γλῶτταν εἰς ἄκρον πεπαιδευμένος διὰ τὴν κατὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐκτόπως ἐπ’ αὐτοῦπρόθεσιν κρατοῦσαν παντάπασιν ἀπέστη τοῦ καὶ ὀτιοὺν ἐξ ὀρθοῦ συγγράψασθαι κατὰ τὸ τῶν ῥητόρωνἔθος ποτάδην οἴκοθεν συνεχῆ καὶ ἀδιάκοπον τὸν δρόμον ποιούμενος. 167–68: Καὶ φεύγειν (sc. Πλάτων) τὰ ῥητορικὰ μήκη, καὶ τοὺς διαύλους τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν λόγων, ἐξ ὧν ἐν τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις τεκαὶ δικαστηρίοις εὐδοκιμεῖν, μᾶλλον ἐξ ὧ ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς βούλεται, συστρέφειν τοὺς ἀκροωμένους καὶσυγχεῖν καὶ κλέπτειν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλήθειαν.

 

^[26] Regarding platonic criticism in rhetoric Μπάλλα, Πλατωνική Πειθώ, 98–99.

 

^[27]  Σωτηρία Τριαντάρη-Μαρά, ‘Ο “σκεπτικισμός” στους Βυζαντινούς διανοητές του 14ου αι.: Θεόδωρος Μετοχίτης – Νικηφόρος Γρηγοράς’, Βυζαντινά 20, n. 1 (1999): 45.

 

^[28]  Θεόδωρος Μετοχίτης,‘Ὅτι διά τήν πρός Πλάτωνα μάχην σπουδάζει ἠξίωσεν ‘Αριστοτέλης περί τήν ῥητορικήν’, 170–71: Καὶ οἱ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διάλογοι πιστούνται, καὶ πολύ γε μηδὲν ἧττον, ὅτι μὴ καὶμᾶλλον ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ κατὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι, καὶ τρόποις πᾶσι, καὶ χρήσει πολέμιον Ἀριστοτέλους, ὅς γε καὶ μὴ πεφυκὼς περὶ τὴν γλῶτταν, εὖ μηδ’ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀσκήσας εὐστομίας ἐνέργειανῥητορικός τις εἶναι βούλεται, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς εὖ μάλ’ ὡς βελτίστου κατὰ τὸν βίον χρήματος, αὐτόθενἄξιοι δάσκαλος εἶναι, καὶ βιβλία τῇ τῶν λόγων τέχνη συντάττει… Μηδ’ ἐξὸν ἴσως αὐτῷ κάλλιστ’ἐνταῦθα σπουδάζειν καὶ δείκνυσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἡ μόνον δι’ ἐναντιότητα καὶ πόλεμον πρὸς Πλάτωνα.

 

^[29]  See Θεόδωρος Μετοχίτης, 170: Καὶ πολλῷ γε πλέον θαυμάζειν ἔχομεν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὴν μετρίαν αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος, τοῦ πάσης τῆς σοφίας ἡγεμόνος αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ πάντων ἀντιπολιτείαν πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ ἀντίπραξιν ξυνορᾶν βουλόμεθα πάντως, καὶ γνώμης οὐ χρηστῆς καὶ φιλοσόφου τιθέμεθα.

 

^[30] Θεόδωρος Μετοχίτης,‘Ὅτι διά τήν πρός Πλάτωνα μάχην σπουδάζει ἠξίωσεν ‘Αριστοτέλης περί τήν ῥητορικήν’, 170: Καὶ πολλῷ γε πλέον θαυμάζειν ἔχομεν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὴνμετρίαν αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος, τοῦ πάσης τῆς σοφίας ἡγεμόνος αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ πάντων ἀντιπολιτείαν πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ ἀντίπραξιν ξυνορᾶν βουλόμεθα πάντως, καὶ γνώμης οὐχρηστῆς καὶ φιλοσόφου τιθέμεθα.

 

^[31]  Θεόδωρος Μετοχίτης,‘Ὅτι διά τήν πρός Πλάτωνα μάχην σπουδάζει ἠξίωσεν ‘Αριστοτέλης περί τήν ῥητορικήν’, 171: Καὶ τὸ μὴ χαρίεν ἐκεῖνος (sc Ἀριστοτέλης) μὲν κατὰ τῆσ εῥητορικῆς εὐγενῶς τῇ φωνῇ χρώμενος καὶ συγγράφων, οὗτος δ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διὰ πάντων ρρητόρευτος τὴν γλῶτταν καὶ τοῦ λέγειν ἀνάσκητος. 172: Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν (sc Ἀριστοτέλης) μὲνἴσως, προσποιεῖται δ’ ὅμως κατολιγωρεῖν, περὶ ἃ μαλιστ’ ἐσπούδακεν, ὁ δὲ (sc Πλάτων) μηδὲν ἧττονδικῶν τα ἀληθές, ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖται καὶ σοφίζεται, πὼς ἂν ἐπιεικῶς εἴποιμι: ὧν αὐτῷ μὴ μέτεστι.

 

^[32]  ibid f.n. 4

 

^[33]  Kustas, Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric, 24. Cf. Χριστίνα-Παναγιώτα Μανωλέα, ‘Ερμηνευτικές προσεγγίσεις του Ιωάννη Δοξαπατρή στα έργα του Ερμογένους’, Λακωνικά 192, (2000): 27–28.

 

^[34]  Σωτηρία Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας από την Αρχαιότητα στο Βυζάντιο, Η επικαιροποίηση της ρητορικής και η εξέλιξή της (Αθήνα: Σταμούλης, 2016), 67 et al.

 

^[35]  Regarding the analysis of the three classical theories about the relation of language with rhetoric, I used the valuable and very significant study of John Poulakos, Takis Poulakos, Classical Rhetorical Theory (Boston-New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 89–118.

 

^[36]  4. Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen, & 8, 330–331. ‘ο λόγος δυνάστης μέγας είναι, που με το πιο μικρό και το πιο αφανές σώμα θειότατα έργα επιτελεί. Μπορεί καιφόβο να παύει και λύπη να διώχνει και χαρά να φέρει και συμπόνια περίσσεια μέσα μας να γεννά’. For the translation of this passage, see Τ. Pentzopoulou -Valala, 1999, 331.

 

^[37]  Plato, Sophist 263e3. Introduction, translation, comments Δ. Γληνός, (Αθήνα: Ζαχαρόπουλος, 1971)

 

^[38]  Poulakos, Classical Rhetorical Theory, 13, 92.

 

^[39]  Takis Poulakos, Speaking for the polis. Isocrates’ Rhetorical Education (California: University of South California Press, 1997), 10–11. Cf. Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 74–75.

 

^[40]  Poulakos, Classical Rhetorical Theory, 114. Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 107.

 

^[41]  Regarding the interest of Aristotle in the importance he gave to words, see Deborah K.W. Modrak, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 13–23.

 

^[42]  Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 78–79.

 

^[43]  Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 111–12.

 

^[44]  Michael Psellos, On Rhetoric, vol. III, ed. Chr. Walz (Rhetores Graeci, 1834),

687–703.

^[45]  Aristotle, Rhetoric Α, 1356a. Cf. Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας,128–29.

 

^[46]  Michael Psellos, On Rhetoric, 702–3: ‘ὁ λόγος δ’ ὁ πολιτικὸς πᾶσι μὲν κεκοσμείσθω. τὰς δε γε κατ’ ἐξαίρετον ἐχέτω τὰς ἰδέας. τὸ ἠθικὸν, τὸ ἀληθὲς, τὸ περιβεβλημένον· γοργότητα, σαφήνειαν, τὸ τραχὺ, τὸ ἀκμαῖον. Σεμνότητα, λαμπρότητα, δεινότητα, μεθόδους’. Nf. Jeffrey Walker, ‘Michael Psellos on Rhetoric: A Translation and Commentary on Psellos’ Synopsis of Hermogenes’, Rhetoric Society Quarterly 31 (2001): 27.

 

^[47]  Jakov N. Ljubarskij, Η προσωπικότητα και το έργο του Μιχαήλ Ψελλού, trans. in Greek by Αργυρώ Τζέλεσι (Αθήνα: Κανάκης, 2004), 207, 217.

 

^[48]  Ιωάννης Τζέτζης, Ἐπιτομὴ ῥητορικῆς, vol. III, ed. Christianus Walz (Stuttgartiae et Tubingae, 1834), 670.

 

^[49]  Aristotle, Rhetoric Α, 1356a.

 

^[50]  Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 138.

 

^[51]  Ιωάννης Τζέτζης, Ἐπιτομὴ ῥητορικῆς, 671: ‘δικανικοῦ παράδειγμα συμμίκτου πανηγύρει … τῆς συμβουλῆς παράδειγμα μικτῆς τῇ πανηγύρει …τῶν δὲτριῶν παράδειγμα εἰδῶν συμμεμιγμένων δικανικοῦ, τῆς συμβουλῆς, τοῦ πανηγυρικοῦτε’.

 

^[52]  Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 141–42.

 

^[53]  Ιατρός Ιωσήφ Πιναρός Ρακενδύτης, Σύνοψις της ῥητορικῆς, ed. Christianus Walz (Rhetores Graeci, 1834), 467–68.

 

^[54]  Σωτηρία Τριαντάρη, ‘Η Ρητορική ως εγχειρίδιο πολιτικής αγωγής στον Ιωσήφ Ρακενδύτη ή φιλόσοφο’, Παρνασσός 41, (1999): 343–61. Cf. Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 144.

 

^[55]  Ρακενδύτης, Σύνοψις τῆς ῥητορικῆς, 505, 3–9.

 

^[56]  Ρακενδύτης, Σύνοψις τῆς ῥητορικῆς 492, 4–6.

 

^[57]  Ρακενδύτης, Σύνοψις τῆς ῥητορικῆς, 497, 3–7, 16–18, 25–27: ‘τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα πρώτην ἔχει ἰδέαν τὴν σεμνότητα, ἧς ἔννοιαι μὲν αἱ περὶ θεοῦ καὶὡρῶν καὶ κτισμάτων καὶ περὶ νόμων, καὶ περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ πραγμάτων μεγάλων, σεισμοῦ τεκαὶ χειμῶνος, καὶ τῶν ἐξῆς … σχήματα δὲ σεμνά, εἴπερ καὶ καθαρά, τὸποφαντικῶς ἐκφέρειντὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀναφέρειν τὸ ῥηθησόμενον … ὁ δὲ σεμνῶς λέγων περιαργεῖν καὶ βεβηκέναι καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ὀφείλει, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δῆλος καὶ ὁῥυθμὸς τῆς σεμνότητος’. Cf. Hermogenes, Prolegomenon Sylloge, ed. H. Rabe (1931), 241, 10–24, 242, 1–20, 21–22, 388, 8–10.

 

^[58]  Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 146.

 

^[59]  Τριαντάρη, Η ρητορική, Η τέχνη της επικοινωνίας, 168.

 

^[60]  Aristotle, Rhetoric Α, 1358b. Cf. Plethon or Gemistos, Σύντομη περί τινων μερῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς, vol. 1, ed. Christianus Walz, (Rhetores Graeci, 1832), 546–98, 546–47.

 

^[61]  Γεώργιος Ξ. Τσάμπης, Η παιδεία στο Χριστιανικό Βυζάντιο (Αθήνα: Γρηγόρης, 1999), 307. According to those mentioned by Tsampis, Plethon adopted this part from Kamariotis.

 

^[62]  Plethon or Gemistos, Σύντομη περί τινων μερῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς, 562–66.

 

^[63]  Sotiria Triantari, ‘Plethon’s views on rhetorician’s education: Brief interpretation of the parts of Rhetoric’, Skepsis (2009): 296–97.