Nicholas Zernov: Political and Historical Continuity with the ‘Third Rome’ Theory in our Times
Visiting Early Career Fellow, University of Winchester
This article examines the idea of Moscow as Third Rome as it was advocated by Nicolas Zernov, a twentieth century Russian Orthodox ecumenist. It is promoted by many, mainly by members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but also contested by many Orthodox as fallacious, problematic, and not in keeping with the tradition of the Orthodox Church. It is a topic that has been advocated for centuries up to the present day. With the migration of the Russian intelligentsia to the West, this idea travelled with them, promoted now not only to the Orthodox but also to other Christians, who accept this idea as fact. But how does it affect current ecumenical relations? Nicolas Zernov promoted this idea to Orthodox and non-Orthodox Christians in Great Britain through his own academic work and through the work of the Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, an ecumenical body located in Great Britain, but which has numerous branches around the world. Whether this theory creates problems for modern-day Orthodoxy will be analysed in this article.
Is there a Third Rome? What does this mean for inter-Orthodox relations? What does this mean for modern-day Orthodoxy? Is it an important belief or idea? Who believes it? These and many more questions arise when one thinks of Moscow as the Third Rome. It is promoted by many, mainly by members of the Russian Orthodox Church, and also contested by many Orthodox as fallacious, problematic, and not true to the tradition of the Orthodox Church, as will be evident in this article. It is a topic which has been promoted for centuries up to the present day. With the migration of the Russian intelligentsia to the West, this idea travelled with them, promoted now not only to the Orthodox but also to other Christians, who accept this idea as an established Orthodox belief. But how does it affect current ecumenical relations? Nicolas Zernov promoted this idea to Orthodox and non-Orthodox Christians in Great Britain through his own academic work and through the work of the Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, an ecumenical body located in Great Britain, but which has numerous branches around the world.
The Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius is an unofficial body promoting relations between Anglicans and Orthodox; ‘it numbers among its members some eminent theologians and Church leaders’[1] and is therefore considered to be ‘one of the most important international forums for Orthodox theology’.[2] It does not ‘conduct any official negotiations; its members are not committed to any particular scheme of reunion. Its purpose is to help Christians to acquire mutual trust and understanding’,[3] and thus prepare the way for the future union between East and West. ‘The Fellowship shows the one life of the Church overcoming division’.[4] It is a sign of future unity, desired by everyone involved in the Ecumenical Movement.
The Fellowship is one of many organisations that promote relations between the two Christian traditions. However, its membership, its traditions, and its achievements within the Ecumenical Movement make it, if not the most important organisation, then one of the most significant bodies promoting Anglican-Orthodox relations. Importantly enough, it is a society in which members of both churches have the opportunity to discuss reunion.
The topic examined in this article is enormous. Therefore, this article will only deal with the views and work of Nicolas Zernov on the topic of Moscow as the Third Rome to understand how an Orthodox theme can travel and still be promoted in both the East and the West due to the movement of the Russian intelligentsia. Nicolas Mikhailovich Zernov (1898–1980) was a Russian theologian and a great pioneer in the Christian Unity movement, especially in respect to Anglican-Orthodox relations, as well as relations between the Eastern Orthodox and the Syrian Orthodox of the Malabar, India. He was one of the founding members and undoubtedly one of the most significant figures of the Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius.
Zernov had two passions, which he retained throughout his life: Russia and Orthodoxy. He was, thus, an ‘ikon of Russian Orthodoxy’.[5] His life story, especially in regards to his ecumenical work, makes clear that Nicolas was ‘a man of destiny’.[6] This belief is also supported by C.S. Lewis, who stated that Nicolas was ‘“an institution” in Oxford life’.[7]
Understanding what Zernov understood by this belief is a first step in comprehending the complexity and enormity of the theory of Moscow as the Third Rome. Nicolas Zernov’s first published book was entitled: Moscow, The Third Rome (1937). Zernov insisted on promoting and maintaining a Russian-centred understanding of the world. Despite leaving his country during the Bolshevik Revolution, Zernov always felt a connection to Russia, its history, its culture, its ideas, not referring of course to its communist history and ideology. This connection was maintained and strengthened through the existence of the Orthodox Church in the West. For the Russian émigrés in the West, ‘the real link with the mother country was the Church’.[8] As Nicolas explained, ‘it was my generation that discovered in new depth the true face of Russian culture, and this came about because we saw the Church in its true light’.[9] His Russianness became synonymous with Orthodoxy. This was also the case especially during the first years of the Fellowship (with the existence of the Anglo-Russian Conferences, meaning the Anglican-Orthodox Conferences).
His Russianness is also evident in his publications. He devoted a number of important books and articles to Russia, to Moscow as the Third Rome, to the Russian intelligentsia and Russian Orthodoxy.[10] Zernov’s first book, Moscow, The Third Rome sought to point out the continuity of the Byzantine belief in which Constantinople was known as the New Rome, a title maintained to this day. However, the Russian belief in Moscow as the Third Rome does not have the full support of the Orthodox world. This argument is examined here to point out that a belief of one part of the Orthodox Church or its members might not reflect the belief of another.
Nicolas Zernov begins explaining that Moscow is ‘the Third and last Rome, the successor and spiritual heir of Rome and Constantinople’.[11] He asserts this belief without, however, providing a convincing analysis to justify it. He gives no theological argument or explanation, presenting it merely as a certainty accepted by all. Additionally, Nicolas Berdyaev, when referring to Moscow, explains ‘the doctrine of Moscow the Third Rome became a basic idea on which the Muscovite state was formed’.[12] He proclaims the Third Rome idea as a doctrine; however, there is no mention of whose doctrine. Is it considered a doctrine of the Orthodox Church as a whole, or only of the Russians? On the other hand, Zernov attempts to point out the distinctiveness of the Russian Church within the Orthodox world. He explains: ‘their [Russian] Church held a singular position among other Christian bodies, her approach to religion being neither Greek nor Latin . . . she has always followed her own path, interpreting for herself the common traditions of Christianity’.[13]
Zernov gives a brief explanation of this Russian theory. Following the Byzantine belief in an Imperial city with an Emperor who, with the Patriarch of the city, is instituted by God and protects the Orthodox faith, Zernov wishes to continue this structure in Russia. Nevertheless, he identifies an inconsistency in this new rebirth of Rome through the idea of the Third Rome, or more accurately, the continuation of Byzantium within Russia. This new idea was not only based on ecclesiological matters; the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome owes its existence to the political rise of Moscow. Zernov explains that from 1480, when Moscow was liberated from the Tartars, ‘Russia had been expanding and this growth of political power was accompanied by a sense of special vocation associated with the belief in Moscow as the third and last Rome’.[14] Therefore, the Russians took upon themselves the continuation of Byzantium; however, they could not repeat and replicate the Christian, Greek, and Oriental aspects of civilisation that had been achieved by the Byzantines. ‘They did not belong to the Mediterranean commonwealth; they had never stood before the majestic ruins of bygone empires; they had never read the annals of their victories, crimes and achievements’.[15] On the other hand, Russia wished to follow its own distinct and unique path.
Historically, according to this argument, the old Rome fell as a political power to the invading Goths and in this way gradually severed its spiritual links with the East whilst New Rome became the centre of Christianity, being acknowledged as the capital of the Christian Empire. However, this new capital was established for political reasons. The Church established its centre in Constantinople in order to maintain political stability and good relations with the Emperor. Moreover, Old Rome was not abolished; it still existed. Nevertheless, with the fall of Constantinople (1453), a new centre had to be found, according to Zernov, inevitably producing the idea of an ‘Orthodox kingdom’.[16] However, can we speak of a united Orthodox kingdom after Byzantium? Zernov believed that the Church of Christ ‘was not left without protection’.[17] A new power was establishing itself in the North. He points this out by claiming:
Moscow, the new capital of the resurrected Russia, was the only important city left in Eastern Christendom which was ruled by a Christian prince, in which the Christians were unmolested and Divine worship could be carried on undisturbed.
Russia was no longer a metropolitan province, but she was the heir and successor of Byzantium. Moscow was not another daughter to Constantinople, but the new mother city of all the Eastern Christians; she was to become the third and the last Rome.[18]
Therefore, the belief of Moscow as the Third Rome formed itself after the fall of the Byzantine Empire. How could God allow for the Turks to invade his Great City? The only explanation, which later was used by the Russians to validate their belief in the Third Rome, was that the Greeks betrayed their faith during the Council of Florence (1439), where ‘they had entered into communion with the Latins on the basis of the submission of the Orthodox Church to the Papacy’.[19] The Russians, therefore, ceased to consider the Greek Church a true Orthodox Church; ‘they began to regard it as a crippled expression of the true faith’.[20] According to Berdyaev: this created an interesting notion whereby the Russian Church arrogantly believed that ‘the Orthodox faith was the Russian faith; what was not Russian faith was not Orthodox faith’.[21] Additionally, the Russians, despite not taking part in the conflict between Rome and New Rome, identified the ‘Western Christians as apostates’.[22]
An additional explanation can be given to the catastrophe that occurred in Constantinople. It was believed that ‘the Empire had not been destroyed: its centre was simply transferred to the north’.[23] This was verified with a marriage in 1492, in which Ivan III, Grand Prince of Moscow, married Sophia Paleologos, the niece of Constantine XIII, the last Emperor of Byzantium. Interestingly enough, a new Russian television series that came out in 2016, entitled Sofiya, examines the life of Sophia Paleologos. The first episode of this series began with the words: ‘The Roman Empire fell because it was full of heretics. The Crown was then transferred to Constantinople, also known as Second Rome. Moscow is the Third Rome and there will be no other’. This clearly is repeating Philotheos’ belief and statement about the status of Moscow. The fact that this is broadcasted today in Russia evidently shows that this idea of the Third Rome still exists in the minds and the hearts of many Russians.
Ivan’s casting off of the Tartar yoke in 1480 and adoption of the title of Tsar, or Emperor, with the Byzantine double-headed eagle as his emblem, collectively suggested the restoration of the Empire in the North.[24] ‘The Russians attached supreme importance to the preservation of a link of succession from Constantinople to Moscow, for it brought their new capital under the Biblical promises and blessings’.[25] This distinct vocation of Moscow can be found in the Old Testament, the book of the prophet Daniel (2:27–49, 7:1–28, 9:24–27). The acknowledged exegesis given for these passages was that the First and Second Coming of the Messiah would happen during the hegemony of the fourth great Empire (i.e., Rome, the Eternal City). According to St Hippolytus, the four Empires are identified as ‘Babylon, Persia, the Empire of Alexander the Great, and Rome’.[26] However, Rome is not understood as constricted to one location; it can move, as it has from Rome to New Rome, and, according to this view within the Russian Church, also to Moscow, the Third Rome. Zernov’s understanding goes even deeper. He explains: ‘Thus the Moscow sovereigns claimed that their crown, which they had received from Byzantium, was even more ancient than the Eastern Empire, for it belonged originally to the great Biblical despot’.[27]
After the Council of Florence, relations between Constantinople and Moscow were briefly halted, the latter believing that New Rome had fallen into heresy. Therefore, the Russians considered themselves to be ‘the chosen nation, their orthodoxy and their devotion to the Church being superior to that of their Greek teachers, since they alone remained uncompromisingly hostile to Rome’.[28] This last statement is later contradicted by Zernov when looking at the history of the Russian Church. If the latter truly believed it was superior to their Greek teachers, then there would have been no reason for the Metropolitan of Moscow to receive the title of Patriarch (1589) from Constantinople. A question arises from this elevation: if they received it from a ‘daughter Church,’ how then is Moscow the head of Orthodoxy, the ‘mother church,’ when Constantinople is still New Rome, still maintains the faith and still elevates churches from one rank to the other? This question is not examined by Zernov. He merely passes over it.
The first mention of this new title was by a monk named Philotheos, who had made a statement to the Grand Duke Basil III (1505–33), writing:
The first Rome collapsed owing to its heresies, the second Rome fell a victim to the Turks, but a new and third Rome has sprung up in the north, illuminating the whole universe like a sun . . . The First and second Rome have fallen, but the third will stand till the end of history, for it is the last Rome. Moscow has no successor; a fourth Rome is inconceivable.[29]
This statement, despite being an ‘ode’ to a political leader, creates a number of questions that are not dealt with by Nicolas Zernov in any of his books or articles. He maintains this belief without further examining its convictions. For example, he does not explain why Moscow is the final Rome, apart from his Trinitarian analogy, which again is not convincing in explaining why there cannot be a fourth? He merely uses the Trinity analogy due to his belief in three Romes. Additionally, he does not point out the political reasons for such a move, which can be understood as giving a prestigious status to Russia in respect to its relations with the European monarchs of the time.[30] Zernov merely claimed that Moscow is a distinct part of Christianity, in regards to Rome and Constantinople. He gave an interesting comparison, whereby he acknowledges what all three Romes have given to Christianity, claiming:
Rome bequeathed to mankind the idea of law, discipline and order, and these elements of her civilisation were later incorporated in the imposing system of the Roman Catholic Church. Constantinople introduced into the life of Christendom the unique intellectual and artistic achievements of Greece; and the gift of the Second Rome was the formulation of Christian doctrine. Moscow could not compete in either of these spheres with her great predecessors. Her special domain was the art of Christian living; the application of Christianity to the corporate daily life of the people. And here her contribution was of the first importance. Her ideal was that of a Christian State living as one family . . . The sense of being one community experienced by the Russians was spontaneous and organic. It arose not from obedience to authority, nor from the idea of duty, nor from intellectual agreement: it was due to a pattern of life, a rhythm of existence which was lovingly designed, built and followed by the entire population. Innumerable Church customs and home traditions provided the content of that ritual of daily life which was the most distinctive mark of Russian culture.[31]
Zernov, therefore, wishes to point out the significance of the Russian Church within the global context of Orthodoxy and to show its contribution to the Orthodox Church. In his book, The Russians and their Church, Zernov presents the interesting idea of the ‘three distinct stages in the evolution of the Church’.[32] Explaining the distinctive gifts and contributions Rome, Constantinople, and Moscow have given to Christianity, he also corresponds each city to a Trinitarian hypostasis; therefore, Rome ‘reveals to mankind the Fatherhood of God’,[33] New Rome ‘reveals the Second Person of the Trinity – the Logos’,[34] and finally, Moscow ‘praises the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth and Giver of Life’.[35] Thus, Zernov acknowledges Russia as the successor of Byzantium, protecting the Orthodox Church worldwide. However, he also understands that ‘the great vision of Russia’s universal mission became the source of an extreme national pride, which isolated the country from the rest of the world’.[36] Therefore, theoretical beliefs did not coincide with the practical side of events. Zernov believed that ‘the message of the Russian Church still is that Christians must trust and obey the Holy Spirit, “the Comforter, the Giver of Life,” the source of unity and freedom’.[37]
If his previous idea of Moscow representing the Holy Spirit is accepted, then Moscow should be considered the Church that can bring unity. However, as is evident through the ecclesiastical history of Russia and the Ecumenical Movement, this objective has not been achieved. Additionally, on a Pan-Orthodox level, we see that the Russian Church today seems to promote disunity, as was evident in its stance towards the Holy and Great Council in Crete in 2016—together with other churches, of course[38]. On the other hand, Russian isolation was further demonstrated when the Tsar sought to undertake the liberation of the Orthodox peoples who were under Ottoman rule. This was a continuation of a conviction people had in Russia whereby they ‘believed that a leading role is assigned to them in the history of mankind’.[39] However, Russia could not achieve this objective when, at the same time, it would despise those Orthodox who did not follow the Russian traditions. Zernov explains that ‘if she was to become the political centre of the Orthodox world she had to enlarge her vision and conquer her national pride’.[40] This, evidently, goes against what St Sergius, the Builder of Russia, believed, in regards to the Church’s role. ‘St Sergius saw and realized a glorious vision of the Oecumenicity of the Church. He understood that every nation and race has its own contribution to bring into the life of the Church Universal’.[41]
This fact points out the reality that Russia was unable to lead the Orthodox world, despite its desire for ecclesiastical primacy in Orthodoxy. Additionally, Moscow could not maintain this role since ‘the Russia of Moscow was a Christian outpost of the Asiatic world’,[42] giving a new and very different character to Christianity in comparison to its predecessors, Rome and New Rome. However, Zernov arrives at an interesting conclusion whereby he claims that ‘neither Constantinople nor Moscow lived up to their ideal; but their failure does not rob them of significance, for they beheld a great vision, ennobling and uplifting mankind’.[43]
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Third Rome idea ‘circulated among churchmen, and even in clerical circles it was not popular and received no substantial development’.[44] Peter the Great (1682–1725) was against the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome. Peter saw Russia progressing only if it left behind its ‘Messianic dreams and her exclusiveness’.[45] The idea, however, revived in the 1860s ‘for the mundane reason that the texts containing the idea [Philotheos’ letters] were published for the first time’.[46]After the 1860s, could we truly refer to Moscow as the Third Rome? If we are to bring it closer to the modern epoch, can Moscow be the Third Rome when at the same time it became the centre of communism, of Soviet power? Intriguingly, ‘“Communist” imperialism, it seemed, could be understood as a modern reflection of the long-time Russian aspiration to be the “Third Rome”’.[47] Additionally, can we maintain the idea of a Third Rome when at the same time there is no Tsar, no protector of the faith? Is every political leader in modern Russia to be considered a Tsar for the Orthodox world? Interestingly enough, ‘the advent of Communism in Russia gave “Third Rome” new and unexpected relevance’.[48] The idea of a Third Rome coincided with Lenin’s Third International.[49] Therefore, it is apparent that the belief in Moscow as the Third Rome had a troubling history, not only outside of Russia, but also within the Russian Empire. Thus, it is invalid today to talk of a Third Rome. It existed as an idea not accepted by many, especially outside Russian circles; however, the troubling Russian history of the twentieth century promotes the view that this is an anachronistic idea, not able to exist today. Additionally, this examination creates a number of questions. Why was Zernov promoting an idea of Moscow as the Third Rome at a time when the Russian capital was the centre of communism? Was it to be understood that Moscow, even under its Soviet existence, was to be considered the Third Rome? And, therefore, the leader of the Communist party taking the role of Emperor/Tsar as the protector and head of the Orthodox Church? Identifying the practice of the Orthodox countries in the East, it seems anachronistic to endeavour to promote and establish the idea of Emperor, since no monarch exists in the East. Therefore, today the head of the Church is not a king, emperor, or tsar, but the respected patriarch or archbishop or synod.
An answer to these questions is that Zernov was merely promoting the significance of Russia in the Orthodox Church and on a global scale, maintaining a ‘theocentric position’.[50] It was a way of promoting his Russianness. Through this we may be able to maintain that ‘Zernov had no illusion about the condition of the Moscow Patriarchate but supported it out of feelings of solidarity with the believers in the Soviet Union’.[51] However, raising the idea of the Third Rome during a Communist era in Russia could be also understood as propaganda, as a way of trying to bring others closer to an imperialistic and pan-Slavic understanding of politics, religion, and church relations. Therefore, it can be stated that in advancing this idea during a time when Russia was not a Christian state, Zernov created problems. How can Zernov and others maintain this idea when, as a result of communist Russia, the Russian Church saw a schism within itself, giving thus birth to the Russian Church Outside of Russia, also known as ROCOR.[52] Therefore, despite this ideology attempting to unite the Orthodox under one centre, Moscow, it is apparent that this was not possible to be realised, especially when the Russian Church was, in fact, being dismembered from within.
Zernov’s belief could be accepted by Orthodox and non-Orthodox. However, the argument leading to this belief can be considered false and void, especially when looking at it from a non-Russian point of view. In order to understand it a comparison needs to be undertaken, referring to the Tradition and the practices of the Orthodox Church.
The Third Rome idea is problematic for many outside Russian Orthodox circles. The difficulty arises from the wording used to express this new idea. Many Russians, such as Zernov, promote the idea of the Third Rome, presupposing that there was a First and a Second Rome. However, if we are to be faithful to the terminology used by the Church in its Canons, then we cannot speak about First, Second, Third, but about Old Rome (Rome) and New Rome (Constantinople). We find this in the Second Ecumenical Council (381), Canon 3, where we read: ‘The Bishop of Constantinople, however, shall have the prerogative of honour after the Bishop of Rome; because Constantinople is New Rome’.[53] In the Fourth Ecumenical Council (451), Canon 28, we read:
Following in all things the decisions of the holy Fathers, and acknowledging the canon, which has been just read, of the One Hundred and Fifty Bishops beloved-of-God (who assembled in the imperial city of Constantinople, which is New Rome, in the time of the Emperor Theodosius of happy memory), we also do enact and decree the same things concerning the privileges of the most holy Church of Constantinople, which is New Rome. For the Fathers rightly granted privileges to the throne of old Rome, because it was the royal city. And the One Hundred and Fifty most religious Bishops, actuated by the same consideration, gave equal privileges to the most holy throne of New Rome, justly judging that the city which is honoured with the Sovereignty and the Senate, and enjoys equal privileges with the old imperial Rome, should in ecclesiastical matters also be magnified as she is, and rank next after her . . . [54]
These examples point out the fact that the canonical terminology is Old and New Rome and not First, Second, and Third. Additionally, it clearly shows that a status is given to a Church after the whole body of the Orthodox Church decides upon this, through an Ecumenical or Local Council. In regards to the Third Rome ideology, a few within Russia promoted this idea, on their own, without it being decided upon in a Council.
A further reason for the insistence on the terms used by the Ecumenical Councils is the fact that the transition from Old to New Rome happened, in fact, within the same Empire. Byzantium was founded within the Roman Empire, relocating its capital to the East. It later highlighted its Eastern and Greek character; nonetheless, it did begin as a continuation of its Roman history, culture, political entity, and law. This, however, did not happen in the case of Russia. According to Dr Marios Begzos, professor at the University of Athens School of Theology, Moscow’s persistence on this new idea could be acknowledged as an establishment of ‘the tsarist theocratic pan Slavic ideology, namely the establishment of a politico-religious totalitarianism based on Orthodoxy and a strong arm of the Slavic core of the Russian Empire in the autocracy of the Tsars’.[55]
Additionally, in an official capacity, the title of New Rome is still maintained to this day as one of the titles of the Ecumenical Patriarch whereby he is known as Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome, and Ecumenical Patriarch. On the other hand, the official title of the Patriarch of Moscow is His Holiness the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. No mention of Third Rome. This emphasises the fact that, officially, the Moscow Patriarchate does not use the title or the term Third Rome when referring to Moscow, going against the belief of a few Russians who maintain this idea. Furthermore, when looking at the diptychs of the Orthodox Church,[56] we identify the fact that the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia maintains the fifth place, whilst the Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome, and Ecumenical Patriarch upholds the primacy of honour. Therefore, the Russian idea of Third Rome seems to be voided by the practice of the Orthodox Church.
This argument might be understood as a competition between the Greek and the Russian Churches. This can be verified by the Moscow Council of 1666–67, where the disputed issue of Constantinople and Moscow’s primacy was discussed. The Old Believers[57] asserted that ‘the superiority of Moscow was manifest in the existence of an Orthodox monarch, whereas the Greeks, having lost their State, were deprived of their superiority’.[58] Significantly, and this is not expressed by Zernov, the Russian Church at this Council ‘had to submit itself at least theologically and canonically to the Greek Church and had to declare that the literary sources of the idea of the Third Rome were fabrications’.[59] However, even within Russia, this idea is not followed by all. ‘Scholarly opinion concerning the doctrine is divided: though many specialists argue that “Third Rome” was never very important in Old Russia;’[60] nevertheless, it is still believed that Philotheos’ conviction was the official doctrine in Moscow. In the post-Communist era, many non-academics in both Russia and in the West maintain this idea, ‘in search of a post-Communist “Russian idea”’.[61]
The importance of the Third Rome idea is understood by many within the Orthodox Church in terms of the political, financial, and, most importantly, ecclesiological complications it produces. Despite not being a formal belief, it is acknowledged as an informal reality, which many in the Russian Church wished to believe and maintain even during its Soviet era, as did Zernov, and during the current post-Soviet epoch. It can also be understood as the rise and prevalence of Russian nationalism, an ‘increased confidence of the Russian Church’.[62]
It is important to stress that some people might not agree with this examination. Perhaps I have, in my research, interpreted this idea in a direction Nicolas never wanted to take it. Maybe I misunderstood him. Maybe he strove for something else. During a discussion I had with Fr Andrew Louth, who knew Nicolas Zernov, in a conference on the Russian Diaspora in Winchester 11–13 January 2018, Fr Louth stated that Nicolas Zernov might simply have wished to express his nostalgia for Mother Russia, which he had lost due to the revolution. Zernov did not wish to express a conquering atmosphere or promote the idea of primacy within Orthodoxy. I would understand and sympathise with this idea. However, I cannot acknowledge it in this manner. It is difficult to accept such a dangerous idea, which he might have promoted by mistake (or not). He did contribute to its continuation and promulgation not only to the Orthodox but also to the non-Orthodox through the work of the Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius.
Where is the Russian Orthodox Church today after the fall of communism and the freedom within which she now lives? What theories and ideas does it promote? It is apparent to many Orthodox around the world, especially the non-Russian Orthodox, that the Russian Church today wishes to show her power to other Orthodox and unofficially promote the belief of the Third Rome more through action than statements. The Holy and Great Synod in Crete is a great example of this. Unfortunately, it seems that the Moscow Patriarchate wished to ‘sabotage’[63] the Council together with Antioch, Bulgaria and Georgia, despite agreeing on the topics and giving the go-ahead a few months beforehand.[64] Dr Brandon Gallaher gives an excellent exegesis of this in an article in Sobornost,[65] where he states:
What was clear at this point was that many local churches, led above all by Moscow, were attempting to sabotage the Council. . .
Moscow sees itself as the largest and the wealthiest of the Orthodox Churches and so on this basis the natural leader of the Orthodox world. It cannot abide the fact that the primacy of the Orthodox Church falls on Constantinople and since 2009 it has developed under Patriarch Kirill I (Gundaev) (b.1946) a quasi-phyletist form of symphonia to support its vision of the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin as the beacon to the West of Christian majority and rectitude: Ruskii mir (the Russian world). The great tragedy of contemporary Orthodoxy is the re-sovietization (or perhaps more exactly: ‘putinization’) of the Russian Church.[66]
As is evident in this article, inter-Orthodox relations are at times problematic, based on various ideologies that exist within the national churches. Maintaining a belief such as Zernov did creates problems for Orthodoxy, especially when Orthodoxy endeavours to move forward together. The reason I wished to examine this topic was inspired by my involvement in the Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius and my research on its history and theology.[67] This idea is still promoted to the non-Orthodox as an Orthodox fact and belief. The London Branch of the Fellowship had organised a talk in 2015 on ‘The Early History of the Russian Church’ given by the current Secretary of the Fellowship, Fr Stephen Platt. At this event Fr Stephen explained this belief in Moscow as the Third Rome. Unfortunately, the fact that we Orthodox have very different understandings about ourselves seems to confuse what we should be saying to the non-Orthodox. We do not have a united voice because of our nationalistic differences, which dictate what we should or should not believe. It is ironic that we endeavour to speak to non-Orthodox—to find common ground and understanding—when we have not done this within our Orthodox family. That is why this issue of Moscow as the Third Rome is being promoted to the West as an Orthodox belief. What we need to understand is its weaknesses and the fact that Orthodoxy as a whole never promoted this idea.
[1] Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius Booklet, Fellowship Archives, 4.
[2] Anastasy Brandond, Gallaher, ‘“Great and Full of Grace”: Partial Intercommunion and Sophiology on Sergii Bulgakov’, in William C. Mills, ed., Church and World (Rollinsford: Orthodox Research Institute, 2013), 69–121; at 81.
[3] Nicolas Zernov, The Reintegration of the Church (London: SCM Press, 1952), 118.
[4] Patrick Thompson, ‘The Prayer of the Fellowship’, Sobornost 17 (1939): 17–22; at 20.
[5] Nicolas Zernov, Sunset Years (Oxford: Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, 1983), 13.
[6] Ibid., 12.
[7] Ibid., 16.
[8] Ibid., 22.
[9] Ibid., 21.
[10] These include the following titles: Moscow, The Third Rome (London: SPCK, 1937); St Sergius Builder of Russia (London: S.P.C.K., 1939); ‘The Christians of Russia and the Christians of Great Britain’, Sobornost 26 (1942): 4–8.; The Church of the Eastern Christians (London: SPCK, 1946); The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1963); The Russians and their Church, (London: S.P.C.K., 1978); ‘The significance of the Russian Orthodox diaspora and its effect on the Christian west’, in Baker Derek, ed., The Orthodox Churches and the West (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976), 307–327; Three Russian Prophets (Florida: Academic International Press, 1973).
[11] Zernov, Moscow, 7.
[12] Nicolas Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1972), 10.
[13] Zernov, Moscow, 9.
[14] Nicolas Zernov, Eastern Christendom, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), 139.
[15] Zernov, The Russians and their Church, 49–50.
[16] Zernov, Sunset Years, 70.
[17] Zernov, Moscow, 31.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., 34.
[20] Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism, 11.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Zernov, Moscow, 34.
[23] Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, 25.
[24] The double-headed eagle is also evident in the current Russian flag as a coat of arms used in a number of instances. Additionally, it seems to be a pan-Balkan phenomenon, where a number of modern Balkan states have the double-headed eagle either on their flags or on coats of arms (e.g., Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and in a number of flags within Greece), thus showing a connection with Byzantium and that they are all ‘spiritual successors’ of Byzantine culture and ideology; therefore, this is not unique to the Russian paradigm.
[25] Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, 25.
[26] Zernov, The Russians and their Church, 48.
[27] Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, 27.
[28] Zernov, Moscow, 35.
[29] Ibid., 36.
[30] For more information on the political side of this belief and elevation see: Alar Laats, ‘The Concept of the Third Rome and its Political Implications’, accessed: 19/03/2015, 17.32,
http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/KVUOA_Toimetised_12-Laats.pdf,
[31] Zernov, The Russians and their Church, 50.
[32] Zernov, The Russians and their Church, 179.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 180.
[36] Zernov, Moscow, 53.
[37] Zernov, The Russians and their Church, 183.
[38] This has been the belief of a number of Orthodox Churches since the synod took place. Some sources which understand this idea of disunity and sabotage can be found here: The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s current Archbishop of America, Elpidoforos Lampriniadis, examines the various reasons why some Orthodox Churches did not attend. In regards to Russia, he claims that they had no ecclesiastical and canonical reason…explaining how we probably need to find secular and foreign (to the canon laws) reasons which would explain their withdrawal. For more information: Ελπιδοφόρου Λαμπρινιάδου, ‘Η επόμενη Αγία και Μεγάλη Σύνοδος Θεματολογία — Προβληματισμοί,’ accessed 05/11/2019, 19.04 https://www.romfea.gr/images/article-images/2018/5/Elpidophorow_Agia__Synodos.pdf
A very lively and important account of the Synod is given in: Brandon Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment: The Holy and Great Council in Crete and Orthodoxy’s Encounter with the West: On Learning to Love the Church’, Sobornost 39:2 (2017): 26–70. Here, Gallaher is critical at points towards the Russian Church, explaining how their previous actions foretold their future withdrawal.
Russia might have given other reasons for not attending, however, they were not accepted by many from other Orthodox Churches, especially from a number of representatives from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Even non-Orthodox understood this move, by supporting the beliefs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (e.g.:
‘The Russian Orthodox Church is still attached to a sense of imperial grandeur and is not backing the universal mission advocated by Bartholomew’). Andrea Tornielli, ‘Here is why the Russian Church is not attending the Council in Crete.’ La Stampa, accessed 04/11/19, 22.04, https://www.lastampa.it/vatican-insider-en/2016/06/15/news/here-is-why-the-russian-church-is-not-attending-the-council-in-crete-1.34987047?refresh_ce
[39] Zernov, The Russians and their Church, 176.
[40] Zernov, Moscow, 68.
[41] Zernov, St Sergius Builder of Russia, 109.
[42] Zernov, Eastern Christendom, 141.
[43] Ibid., 142.
[44] Marshall T. Poe, ‘“Moscow, the Third Rome” The Origins and Transformations of a Pivotal Moment’, accessed 02/09/2015, 20.48, http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/1997-811-25-Poe.pdf, 1997 (Massachusetts, Harvard University, 1997): 1–22; at i.
[45] Zernov, Moscow, 76.
[46] Poe, ‘Moscow, the Third Rome’, ii.
[47] Ibid., 14.
[48] Ibid., 12.
[49] More on this is examined by Berdyaev in his book: Nikolai A. Berdyaev, The Russian Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971).
[50] Antoine Arjakovsky, The Way (Notre Dame — Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 440.
[51] Christopher Birchall, Embassy, Emigrants, and Englishmen — The Three Hundred Year History of a Russian Orthodox Church in London (Jordanville: Holy Trinity Publications, 2014), 340.
[52] For more information on ROCOR please visit: Russian, Orthodox Church, accessed 25/08/2015, 17/08, http://www.russianorthodoxchurch.ws/synod/enghistory/enhis_rocor.html,
[53] Αγαπίου Ιερομονάχου, Νικοδήμου Μοναχού, Πηδάλιον (Αθήνα: Αστήρ, 1982), 157. Translation mine.
[54] Ibid., 206
[55] Μάριος Μπέγζος, ‘Η Αθήνα απέναντι στην “Τρίτη Ρώμη”’, Social Opinion, in: Dimitrios Filippos Salapatas, The Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius — Orthodox and Anglican Ecumenical Relations 1927–2018 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Publishing Scholars, 2018), 171.
[56] The diptychs of the Orthodox Church consist of a list of names of the primates of the Orthodox Church worldwide, showing unity in faith, doctrine, and worship between the Orthodox churches.
[57] The Old Believers are members of a group of Russian religious dissenters who did not accept the liturgical reforms, which were forced upon the Russian Orthodox Church by the Patriarch of Moscow Nikon (1652–58).
[58] Zernov, Sunset Years, 72.
[59] Wil can den Bercken, Holy Russia and Christian Europe — East and West in the Religious Ideology of Russia (London: SCM Press, 1999), 166.
[60] Poe, ‘Moscow, the Third Rome’, 14.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Rowan Williams, Appendix 2, in Dimitrios Filippos Salapatas, The Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius: Quest for Truth, Quest for Theology, Quest for Unity – An Exploration of Eastern Orthodox and Anglican Ecumenical Theological and Ecclesiological Relations from 1927 until 2012 (PhD diss., University of Winchester, 2016), 13.
[63] Brandon Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment: The Holy and Great Council in Crete and Orthodoxy’s Encounter with the West: On Learning to Love the Church’, Sobornost 39:2 (2017): 26–70; at 58.
[64] Closer to the Holy and Great Council at the Orthodox Academy of Crete, June 2016, Moscow withdrew its participation claiming, among other things, the fact that other Orthodox churches will not be present. This reminds any reader on the Council the phrase which was supported by Moscow (i.e., that the Council would take place ‘unless impeded by unforeseen circumstances’). Ibid., 40. In hindsight, one can see why the Russian Church wished to include this phrase, which was not accepted by other Orthodox Churches, hence why the Synod actually took place. However, during the Synaxis of Primates, ‘Patriarch Kirill insisted that we should do everything we can to try to assemble every Church. . . If one or more Churches do not attend, then we can decide at the Synaxis about how to proceed without one or more churches at the Council.’ Bishop Maximos of Western America, ‘Diary of the Council’ (Alhambra, CA: Sebastian Press, 2016), 9.
[65] Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’, 26–70.
[66] Ibid., 58.
[67] Dimitrios Filippos Salapatas, The Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius — Orthodox and Anglican Ecumenical Relations 1927–2018 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Publishing Scholars, 2018).