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Anelogia

Philosophical and Theological approaches on War & St Gregory Palamas



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Analogia is a peer-reviewed academic journal dedicated to the scholarly exposition and discussion of the theological principles of the Christian faith. A distinguishing feature of this journal will be the effort to advance a dialogue between Orthodox Christianity and the views and concerns of Western modes of theological and philosophical thought. A key secondary objective is to provide a scholarly context for the further examination and study of common Christian sources. Though theological and philosophical topics of interest are the primary focus of the journal, the content of *Analogia* will not be restricted to material that originates exclusively from these disciplines. Insofar as the journal seeks to cultivate theological discourse and engagement with the urgent challenges and questions posed by modernity, topics from an array of disciplines will also be considered, including the natural and social sciences. As such, solicited and unsolicited submissions of high academic quality containing topics of either a theological or interdisciplinary nature will be encouraged. In an effort to facilitate dialogue, provision will be made for peer-reviewed critical responses to articles that deal with high-interest topics. *Analogia* strives to provide an interdisciplinary forum wherein Christian theology is further explored and assumes the role of an interlocutor with the multiplicity of difficulties facing modern humanity.

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Guest Editor

Constantinos Athanasopoulos

NOTE
FROM THE GUEST EDITOR

In this volume, we present a collection of papers from participants at the July 2023 Veroia Conference (Holy Monastery of Theotokos at Kallipetra, Veroia).

This was a three-day conference (7–9 July 2023), which took place at one of the historic monasteries in Central Macedonia and the world famous Skete of Veroia , with its long heritage and presence. There are historical records that confirm that the Skete of Veroia (of which part is the Holy Monastery of Theotokos at Kallipetra) was a centre for monks from as early as the fourth century. According to the local tradition, St Paul visited the area when he came to Veroia, and at every place where he rested, a monastery was built. At its peak, there were around fifty monasteries in the geographical area of the Skete (the Skete is found around the river of Alliakmon and particularly in the area between the Mountains of Vermion and Pieria). One of the Monasteries with the longest presence in the area is the Holy Monastery of St John Baptist, with a remarkable history and many relics of saints. St Gregory Palamas (1296–1359) was one of the many saints this Skete produced (St Gregory Palamas found refuge at the Skete as a monk in 1326 for a few years with his brothers Theodosios and Makarios, while the Ottoman Turks were attacking the monastic communities of Mt Athos).

The Conference was organised by the Palamas Seminar, which was founded in 2013 by Dr Constantinos Athanasopoulos (Greece and UK), Professor Dan Chitoiu (Romania), and Professor Oleg Dushin (Russia) to promote international scholarly studies of St Gregory Palamas. The Palamas Seminar has organised or co-organised more than 10 international conferences in Greece, Romania, Russia, Portugal, and Cyprus.

The 2023 Palamas Seminar Conference was the fourth Palamas Seminar in Veroia with the blessing of His Eminence Metropolitan Panteleimon of Veroia, Naoussa, and Campagnia (2015, 2018, 2021, and 2023). We owe our deepest gratitude not only to His Eminence, Metropolitan Panteleimon for his abundant blessings, but also to the Abbot Archimandrite Palamas of the Holy Monastery of Theotokos at

Kallipetra, the Fathers and brothers at the monastery, and his wonderful team of helpers who—with Abrahamic hospitality—provided for our nourishment and other organisational needs. We also owe our many thanks to the Pilgrim Centre of the Holy Monastery of Theotokos Soumela for our accommodation there. During our stay in Veroia, our Conference participants visited the many archaeological sites of Central Macedonia and the Museums in Veroia (most notably the Archaeological site of Aigai or Vergina with the famous tomb of King Philip II of Macedonia and the Veroia Byzantine Museum) and the Holy Monastery of St John the Baptist at Skete Veroias.

The programme of our 2023 Conference started with a welcome from his Eminence, who gave his blessing and eloquently described the importance of Skete Veroias for Orthodox history and the future of all Orthodoxy. He referred to many saints that the Skete has nurtured and harboured from the many adversities of life and persecution. He highlighted the importance of the family of St Gregory Palamas and the distinct character that it has provided to the monastic life and practice at the Skete. He also mentioned the key elements of the ascetic life of the monks at the Skete that has supported the people of Veroia, Naoussa, and all of Central Macedonia during times of persecution and political and social turmoil. He emphasised the Christian approach to times of war and violence and the hesychastic attitude to life's adversities.

The Abbot of the Holy Monastery of Theotokos at Kallipetra (Archimandrite Palamas) referred in his welcome to the many martyrs of the monastery, most of whom were slaughtered by the Ottoman Turks during the persecution of 1822 (the Ottoman Turks destroyed many of the Skete Monasteries and ruthlessly killed hundreds of monks for their participation in the Greek uprising in Naoussa). During our stay at the monastery, the Abbot showed us the Osteofylakion of the Monastery (the place where the relics of all the martyr monks are kept at the monastery) and we venerated the martyrs' remains.

The 2023 Palamas Seminar Conference attracted more than forty participants (with presentations in a hybrid manner, some in person and some online). It would be beneficial to refer briefly to some of the contributions of the participants whose papers are not included in this volume for various reasons. Viktar Niachayeu (Göttingen University, Germany) discussed the views of Evagrius of Pontos from

the psychological standpoint and their impact on contemporary methods of anger management. Stefan Soponaru (Romania and Greece) discussed the Burning Bush of Prayer and its use in our dealings with war and violence. Dr Cristian Andrei Themistocle (Romania and Greece) referred to the Homily of St Gregory Palamas on Peace. Viktor-Wojciech Mical (Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland) discussed natural cognition of God in St Gregory Palamas. George Stoukis (Greece) discussed the contribution of Orthodox Church in the Greek National Liberation struggle of 1821 with a specific reference to the case of the Holy Monasteries of Boiotia and the Bishop of Salona. Dr Spyros Panagopoulos (Greece) referred to the many new martyrs of Macedonia during the Ottoman Turkish rule. Cécile de Jaegher (Belgium) discussed Vladimir Solovyov's views on War and Christianity. Elena Dulgheru (Romania) discussed the way Orthodox cinematographers viewed war, violence, and conflict resolution. Professor Oleg Dushin (one of the three co-founders of Palamas Seminar) discussed the questions of War and Peace in Aurelius Augustine's 'City of God'. Dr Anca Popescu (Romania) discussed Constantin Noica's views on Christianity and War and Peace. Professor Daniel Chitoiu (one of the co-founders of the Palamas Seminar) referred to the movie production that he and Professor John Farina (USA) made about the Neamt Monastic Hesychastic Community (in Romania).

After the end of the conference, the male conference participants visited the Holy Monasteries of Vatopedi, Pantokratoros, and Iviron, receiving the abundant blessings of the Fathers of Mt Athos, the Garden of Theotokos. This was a fitting close to a rather stimulating and rewarding Conference. We are all deeply grateful to His Eminence Panteleimon, Metropolitan of Veroia, Naoussa, and Campagnia, the Monastery of Theotokos at Kallipetra—Abbot Archimandrite Palamas, the Fathers of the monastery, and their many helpers—and the Pilgrim Centre of Panagia Soumela Monastery, its Managing Committee, and its Director Mr. Antonios Dallas for allowing us to make this Conference a success. We ask them to keep us in their prayers.

– Constantinos Athanasopoulos

Table of Contents

Contemporary War Ethics: Quest for a Metaphysical Solution to the Problem of Moral Value in recent debates. An Answer in Orthodox Theology and Philosophy.

CONSTANTINOS ATHANASOPOULOS
Open University UK, FHEA

After a review of some of the key problems in modern ethical theory as relates to war and violent state conflicts, I will focus on St Gregory Palamas' views on War and Peace and what we can learn from Palamas' hesychastic approach regarding the social and political phenomenon of violence and war. My discussion will close with a brief examination of the problems related to the perspective termed 'political hesychasm' (which is used in the debates related to the recent war in Ukraine) and how this political and cultural perspective bears no relevance to the true hesychastic approach (and Palamite hesychasm in particular).

Introductory remarks: key points on terminology

Today, 79 years after the most bloodstained world war on our planet with the 75 million deaths, with the resulting foundation of the United Nations (a union of nations that now has 193 member states and was created for the achievement of world peace), we are farther away than ever before from any hope of achieving world peace. Two major wars with the potential to evolve into global or world wars are now ongoing (in Ukraine, which started in 2022 and in Gaza, which started in 2023) together with other ongoing and potential explosive conflicts; currently, from only these two wars we have tens of thousands who have been killed and wounded already and millions of refugees. Advances in technology and political institutions have not helped much. It is now, more than ever,

obvious to many that the adoption of new technologies and 'smarter' weapons (which were developed partly to the perceived need to limit in a 'smart' way casualties of war) made war related decisions more ruthless, uncontrollable, unchecked, unjust, and stupid; we are living in times where real war has gained virtual reality dimensions, causing intense real pain and real deaths to the many powerless and weak in this real world. Warmongers and big corporations are making more profit from trading weapons, oil, liquified gas, and other commodities during today's conflicts than ever before (e.g., in a recent report, four major western oil companies made more than $200bn in profit from the war in Ukraine in just one year).[1] Unfortunately, all these facts about war are known and well documented in human history; some have been analysed in detail for centuries. It seems however, that the more than two thousand years study of war by social science related disciplines has not made us wiser.

Philosophers, poets, historians, social analysts, and theologians have discussed these facts (i.e., previous versions of the facts under consideration today) from time immemorial. Those that believe that war is inevitable have developed rules of war to keep war within moral checks and make peace possible again, after a war is finished. They have also developed arguments about what kind of reasons can be used to initiate or engage in war. In European literature, we see first evidence of this in Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Herodotus' *Histories*, and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. In medieval Europe, Augustine and Aquinas developed this topic further (formulating the basics for making a distinction between *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello*), and the Byzantines also developed similar arguments in the many surviving texts of political philosophers and historians like Psellus, Choniates, and Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus; they tried to combine Ancient Greek and Roman thinking on war, enriching them with relevant discussions in earlier Jewish and Christian scriptures and other patristic texts.

[1] Sweney, Mark, 2024, 'World's largest oil companies have made $281bn profit since invasion of Ukraine: Global Witness says the five "super-majors" are the "main winners of the war" while many struggle to heat their homes', *The Guardian*, 19/02/2024, (https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/feb/19/worlds-largest-oil-companies-have-made-281bn-profit-since-invasion-of-ukraine), accessed 12/07/2024

Related ideas have been proposed in all human languages, cultures and civilisations: in Chinese literature we have the writings of Confucius and Sun Tzu; in Japanese we have the *War Tales* (*gunki monogatari) and* in Sanskrit we have the *Rig Veda* and *The Bhagavad Gita*, which provide detailed discourses on the meaning, purposes, and uses of war and ways to achieve peace. It seems that this condition of human existence (i.e., being violent and at war) has been with humanity from very early and this has been recorded in most (if not all) literary, historical, and theological writings (examples of early theological writings discussing the conditions and morality of war are the Books of *Joshua*, *Kings*, and *Chronicles* in Hebrew scriptures).

Mapping current debates on the Philosophy and Ethics of War seems a difficult task, taking into consideration the proliferation of theories and perspectives. It is widely accepted that the two extreme (and less popular) positions in these debates are pacifism and realism. Pacifism seems unrealistic to most, and some moral philosophers and theologians have even claimed that it is morally wrong. Its commitment to peace and opposition to war leaves unresolved issues in relation to the causes for armed conflict found in ongoing social and political justice disputes; these issues sometimes are even further exacerbated during armed conflicts or after these have ended.[2] Pacifism is seen as means of establishing injustices and to further consolidate a morally wrong *status quo* (see for example the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish Army in 1974 and the unresolved conflicts that the UN-backed attempts to end this war have created until now). Some philosophers and theologians have actually claimed that pacifism produces a vision of our material world where salvation becomes superfluous or obsolete (some may even claim that in this way pacifism is quite challenging to theologically minded people).[3] Realism on the other hand is regarded as equally extreme: with its insistence on the competitive and conflictual aspects of politics and violence that it promotes, it makes it rather difficult to achieve any long-lasting peace; it is a vision of society and politics in which a Machiavellian perception of human society as a

[2] Fiala, Andrew, 2023, 'Pacifism', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pacifism (accessed 20/07/2024).

[3] Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981. 'War and Murder' in *Ethics, Religion, and Politics*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

jungle prevails and where traditional morality is meaningless.[4] If we are to identify where the majority of today's debates move, we would have to recognise that they lie within the spectrum of the Just War Theory arguments, which are used from both sides in an armed conflict to justify equally unjustified actions, such as killing civilians and prisoners of war, bombing hospitals and destroying infrastructure (note that all of these actions are condemned by established *Jus in Bello* rules, cited in the Geneva Conventions and the UN Protocols on War). Before we embark on our investigation into key problems in these debates, it is important to discuss some key distinctions between the main terms: *Just War Tradition* (JWTr) and *Just War Theory* (JWTh).

By *Just War Tradition*, we usually mean the moral theory, principles, and rules on what constitutes morally justified and morally acceptable warfare. The JWTr has a long history and has culminated into some sharply defined rules of war, collectively defined and systematically expressed in modern times in the form of the Geneva Conventions. Today, we can say that the Geneva Conventions and the UN Protocols on War contain the essentials of this Just War Tradition. Examples of prescriptions found in these documents are the protection of hospitals, civilians, prisoners of war, and children during war.

By *Just War Theory*, we usually mean a philosophical approach to moral problems in war, which, even though based on JWTr, sometimes goes beyond and outside its prescriptions. There is a wide spectrum of philosophical positions on Just War. It is not rare to see Just War Theorists going against the established rules of Just War Tradition. They consider the justifiability and ethics of war and killing within given contexts (sometimes rather complex) and conclude that there are occasions when it may be justified to go against the rules of war accepted by the JWTr. Most of the philosophers who debate moral issues of war have either JWTr or JWTh inclinations (or both). But there is a smaller group of philosophers who prefer to be Realists about war (i.e., that war is an unavoidable fact of the human condition) and either accept some of the JWTh in specific contexts (a route that they believe serves their interests, as in the case of Contingent Realists), or absolutely reject both JWTr and JWTh as naïve and morally wrong (because they

[4] Korab-Karpowicz, W. J., 2023, 'Political Realism', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/ (accessed 20/07/2024).

consider moral rules as hindering social progress and the consolidation of human power, as in the case of Absolute Realists). There is also another small group of moral philosophers who are Pacifists (i.e., they reject war and violence as a way to solve conflicts and social/political problems); here we have the division between Contingent Pacifists (who accept that sometimes war is necessary and thus, rules of war are necessary, for example in cases of defending one's country, and, in this case, they will accept JWTr or JWTh considerations) and Absolute Pacifists (who absolutely reject all war and violence in all its forms even in cases of defending one's country, and they usually support forms of non-violent active or passive resistance).

Christian philosophers and theologians through the centuries have chosen one or more from the above outlined spectrum of relevant philosophical positions. The more radical have chosen to be either Realists or Pacifists, and the less radical have chosen to follow theories within the JWTr.: Augustine's and Aquinas' writings are two of the most widely cited Christian discussions of rules of war in medieval and early modern times, and are still studied by most JWTr theorists.. However, a common element in both Christian and non-Christian debates on the morality of war is that there is no single moral theory or perspective that can help us deal with all the complex problems that arise in armed conflicts. There have been many solutions that have been proposed (consequentialist and/or non-consequentialist in nature), but none successful enough to form the basis of a common solution to the problem of war.

Note that the above mapping of positions and distinctions is one of many possible attempts to map the territory covered by Ethical Theories of War. I provide it here to enable the reader to follow my argument. My classification of relevant theories outlined above differs significantly from Lazar[5] and Orend[6]. Note, however, that Lazar's article on 'War' at the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (SEP 2016) differs significantly in terms of the provided distinctions from Orend's earlier article on 'War' at the same authoritative online philosophical resource (SEP 2005)

[5] Lazar, Seth, 2016, 'War', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (SEP), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/ (accessed 12/07/24).

[6] Orend, Brian, 2005, 'War', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (SEP), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/war/ (accessed 12/07/24)

without providing any justification for this difference in approach. I do not believe that this is by accident. The careful reader in philosophical bibliography will find a number of similar attempts to classify and re-classify important philosophical positions on war into 'friends and foes' accordingly. For example, in my case, I differ significantly from both Lazar and Orend, because I reject their classification of Walzer (a key representative of JWTh) and his rather controversial positions (they think that he should be classified as a JWTr theorist, while I reject this claim with reasons that I discuss below). I will discuss more on this in what follows. I will start my discussion of the current state and value of moral theories of war with one of the key problems in JWTh.

Are Jus ad Bellum (JaB) and Jus in Bello (JiB) morally distinct, autonomous, or inter-dependent?

One of the key problems in contemporary JWTh is the question of whether *Jus ad Bellum* (moral law that relates to morally permissible ways to start a war) is inter-dependent or related in some morally causal way to *Jus in Bello* (moral law that relates to the conduct of war). This issue is very important because it determines the moral value of actions in times of war. Famous examples that moral philosophers and ethicists have discussed at great length are the following:

i. Is the Nazi General Rommel morally praiseworthy for refusing to comply with the Commando Order? The Commando Order (in German: *Kommandobefehl*) was issued by the high command of the German Armed Forces, on 18 October 1942, basically ordering German soldiers to execute Allied soldiers caught behind lines of defence. This is a key question, because if JaB and JiB are interdependent and the one gains or loses moral value on the moral determination of the other, then no matter what Rommel does, he will always be morally wrong. As a high ranking officer of the Army in the Nazi regime, he will always be morally responsible for the atrocities of the Nazis and for his support to this regime by taking an active part in its survival. If there is a sharp distinction between JaB and JiB and the two are distinct moral entities, then Rommel is morally praiseworthy for keeping JiB in this instance regarding prisoners of war (this

kind of deliberation supports the thesis of the Moral Equality of Combatants or MEC).

ii. Is a state morally allowed to harm civilians and break any other rules within JiB, if it fights for its defence and survival? This situation, which has been characterised in moral debates as a 'supreme emergency' is characteristic of the moral nature of the debates within the contemporary JWTh. Again, here the issue of moral interdependency between JaB and JiB shows up in a rather pertinent way: if they are not morally inter-dependent, then a state can be morally just in terms of JaB and morally unjust in terms of JiB. If they are morally inter-dependent, then moral value in terms of JaB changes the perceived moral value of certain actions that would be condemned by JWTr rules regarding JiB. Some (among whom I classify Walzer) may even claim that as long as a state is morally just in terms of JaB, it can override, bend, or nullify the power of certain JiB rules, such as, for example, proportionality of force, harming civilians, and destroying infrastructure, bombing hospitals and other such JiB rules.

Let us see in more detail why these examples of the problem of inter-dependency of JaB and JiB provide serious and insurmountable challenges for the moral intuitions of both contemporary philosophers (who currently engage in JWTh) and for the philosophers who proposed this differentiation between rules of war centuries ago. In the case of General Rommel (a characteristic example used to support MEC), a contemporary philosopher, Michael Walzer (who for Lazar, in his 2016 SEP article, is classified as a philosopher who follows JWTr, while for others, Walzer only follows JWTh) claims that Rommel should be recognised with moral worth when it comes to his disobedience regarding the Commando Order because: 'The reason has to do with the distinction of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. We draw a line between the war itself, for which soldiers are not responsible, and the conduct of the war, for which they are responsible, at least within their own sphere of activity. Generals may well straddle the line, but that only suggests that we know pretty well where it should be drawn. We draw it by

recognizing the nature of political obedience'.[7] This is an extraordinary remark for someone who wishes to be regarded as a follower of JWTr, taking into account that, as Walzer himself acknowledges, the opinion of the Chief British Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials was that 'The killing of combatants is justifiable … only where the war itself is legal'.[8]

The Chief British Prosecutor based this decision on the Geneva Conventions and other long established international treaties on war (which form the core of what today we consider to be JWTr), and here Walzer seems to be going against some basic moral intuitions expressed in these JWTr documents. By appealing to the distinction between JaB and JiB to justify the moral behaviour of agents who, in JWTr terms, would be considered immoral, Walzer actually shows not only how poor is the very idea of the distinction itself, but also that he does not hesitate to commit himself to moral intuitions that go against established norms of JWTr. Furthermore, some ethicists have criticised Walzer's assumption that all soldiers are the same in terms of their moral status.

Walzer supports this idea (the moral equality of combatants or MEC), by claiming that they have the same moral status because of their mutual consent to be harmed: when combatants fight freely, choosing one another as enemies, they lose their rights of life and liberty by carrying arms and being soldiers.[9] Some, for example, have highlighted that a soldier may be a conscript or a volunteer or a professional, and they should be differentiated in terms of their moral status as a result of this. Some other ethicists have attacked Walzer for refusing to admit the significant moral difference between soldiers who follow the orders of an immoral chain of command (for example coming from an invading army) and soldiers who defend themselves or their country. In the second case, the soldiers do not lose their rights of life and liberty, because others (the attacking army) are morally to blame for the use of weapons to defend themselves (in Walzer's own words: 'People don't lose moral rights by justifiably defending themselves or other innocent people against unjust attack').[10] So, we can see from the

[7] Walzer, M. (1977) *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, New York, Basic Books., pp. 39-40.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Walzer, ibid, p. 37; 136; 145.

[10] McMahan, J. (2006) 'On the moral equality of combatants', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 377–82.

above discussion that the sharp and clear distinction between JaB and JiB, which provides the foundation and supports the MEC, is bringing us into a moral trap that exists only for the justification of the attackers and invaders and not for the acknowledgement of the superior moral status of the defenders.

If we investigate further into the discussion of Supreme Emergencies, we will see that we have similar results. One of the most often cited examples to support the view that we can reduce or eradicate the moral value of JiB rules (when compared to JaB) is Bomber Harris. Walzer describes the state of 'supreme emergency' (that allowed Bomber Harris and his colleagues to bomb Dresden and other cities with thousands of losses in civilian's lives) like this: 'Churchill's description of Britain's predicament in 1939 as a "supreme emergency" was a piece of rhetorical heightening designed to overcome that resistance. But the phrase also contains an argument: that there is a fear beyond the ordinary fearfulness (and the frantic opportunism) of war, and a danger to which that fear corresponds, and that this fear and danger may well require exactly those measures that the war convention bars. Now, a great deal is at stake here, both for the men and women driven to adopt such measures and for their victims, so we must attend carefully to the implicit argument of "supreme emergency"'.[11]

Walzer identifies two conditions that constitute a 'supreme emergency': danger for the very existence of a political community (e.g., there is a serious threat for the existence of a state, nation, or race) and the imminence of threat or urgency for the decision that needs to be taken (ibid). He examines in detail Churchill's decisions in 1942 (and after) regarding the bombing of German cities and he finds that most of them were taken under the supreme emergency considerations and justifiably so. However, Walzer does acknowledge that Churchill reconsidered his argument (after the Dresden bombings and the general outcry against him that his decision caused) with these words (which Walzer cites in his work): 'The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing'.[12]

So, what do we make of the supreme emergency considerations? One serious criticism against Walzer here is that he applies utilitarian

[11] Walzer, 1977, p.251.
[12] Walzer, ibid, p.253.

considerations to reduce the moral worth of non-utilitarian moral rules and principles (JiB). Coady, for example, highlights the fact that Walzer's supreme emergency considerations have a pro-state bias, making any struggles for independence and/or freedom fighters' organisations immoral.[13] Are numbers or systemic considerations for a political community that guarantee the representation of people in cases such as these morally important? If they are not (as many theorists believe), Coady finds that Walzer's supreme emergency considerations are unjustified.[14] Also, any attempt from Walzer to compromise his theory and reduce the effect or impact of his pro-state bias is doomed to failure, because it will make his theory lose its appeal regarding the rarity application that Walzer considers its most important asset (it can be used by almost any political organisation when pushed against the wall). So, Walzer does not seem to have any strong support for his deviation from the JWTr, making his theory to be more a 'free for all' JWTh (a chimeran hybrid of rights-based theory with act-utilitarian tendencies, a pinnacle of inconsistency and self-contradiction).

From the above discussion of serious problems regarding the distinction between JaB and JiB or the interdependence of the two terms, we see a dead-end for a possible moral consensus of ethicists (especially in how this is used in the theory of one of the key current moral philosophers of war). It seems that the very distinction between JaB and JiB and its application has to answer serious unresolvable challenges. Note that in the case of Walzer, we have a moral philosopher, who, in his attempt to accept the distinction while at the same time advising and supporting USA and Israeli governments on battle tactics on the ground (according to one of his many critics)[15], has to admit logical contradictions in his arguments. Walzer believes in the sharp and clear distinction between JaB and JiB; he calls them 'logically independent'.[16] He also strongly believes in the benefit of having this distinction in the determination of the moral worth of actions during war (being a supporter of MEC). However, in his support of supreme

[13] Coady, C.A.J. (2004) 'Terrorism, morality, and supreme emergency', *Ethics*, vol. 114, no. 4, pp. 782–8.

[14] Coady, ibid.

[15] Slater, Jerome, 2024, 'On Michael Walzer, Gaza, and the Lebanon War: An attack on Michael Walzer's position on the Lebanon War', *Dissent*, Spring 2024, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/on-michael-walzer-gaza-and-the-lebanon-war/ (accessed 20/07/2024).

[16] Walzer, 1977, p. 21.

emergencies, he seems to go beyond and outside the recommendations of this distinction and actually recommend the cancellation and moral invalidation of JiB rules.

So, it seems reasonable to suggest here that the very distinction between JaB and JiB is not helpful (at least today) for any major contribution to the current moral debates and seems to hinder us in the clear determination of the moral worth of specific moral actions during war. I am neither the first nor the only one to indicate this. There is already some discussion about who actually admitted this distinction (between JaB and JiB) in its modern form, to what purpose, and whether indeed it is still useful (see for example the relevant work of Wheeler and Deshman).[17]

What the above investigation indicates is a serious problem not only with JWTh, but with most current moral theory in relation to war. Main theories in the ethics of war (moving within the current JWTh framework) are unable to provide satisfying and acceptable answers to the moral problems of war. It seems that theories that provide deeper and more meaningful solutions to the problems at hand are needed. Outside the popular domain of JWTh and JWTr, the situation is not that different. Most moral theories of pacifism are problematic because they fail to provide a realistic answer to the realism of war, causing unresolved conflicts to fester and failing to address the causes of war, providing fuel for wider conflicts and wars later on (a good example of this Contingent Pacifist approach of the UN is the continuing unlawful occupation of more than a third of the island of Cyprus by the Turkish Army, which for fifty years now is still dividing people, depriving them of basic human rights and causing animosity between the communities on the island). Realists on the other hand fail to accept and support any possible vision of peace, perpetually feeding the desires of warmongers and warlords. It seems that Morality and Ethics are unable to help us with their tools and concepts to deal effectively with the challenge of war and violence.

[17] Weiler, J.H.H., and Deshman, Abby, 2013, 'Far Be It from Thee to Slay the Righteous with the Wicked: An Historical and Historiographical Sketch of the Bellicose Debate Concerning the Distinction between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello', *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 24 no. 1, pp.25–61.

I would like to outline here a possible and more plausible alternative: A more profound Ontological and Holistic answer provided in the writings of the late Byzantine philosopher and theologian who is recognised as a saint by the Orthodox Church: St Gregorios Palamas (1296–1357).

Hesychastic Askesis and Palamas: Palamas on Peace and on the root of all violence.

With our brief examination of key perspectives in the philosophy and ethics of war, we have concluded that a more ontological and holistic perspective is needed, which will take into consideration all factors affecting human volition addressing the root and cause of violence and war, and will be able to transform both individuals and societies. This perspective needs to be *ontological* because it needs to focus on the existence of what actually and really influences human will. A simple metaphysical excursion into what might be considered as affecting human will cannot be successful here, because it may lead us into the extremes of pacifism and realism and their insurmountable problems. In my previous research work, I have outlined why I believe that metaphysics is a poor guide for ethics. In order to engage in a meaningful way with an ethical discourse, we need to go into the realm of ontology, not just metaphysics.[18] This perspective also needs

[18] See Athanasopoulos, C., 2018, 'Eudaimonia, Apatheia, Ataraxia and Hesychasm: How St Gregory Palamas' views on hesychasm and asceticism solve the problems in the often misunderstood ancient Greek moral concepts of eudaimonia, apatheia and ataraxia', *Analogia: The Pemptousia Journal for Theological Studies*, Vol.5, pp.5–18; Athanasopoulos, C., 2020, 'Hesychia, Salvation, Ineffability and Quietude: St Gregory Palamas and L. Wittgenstein on the Escapist and Futile Misconceptions of Ontological Salvation and Metaphysical Hinges', in C. Athanasopoulos, ed., *Orthodox Mysticism and Asceticism: Philosophy and Theology in St Gregory Palamas' Work*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp.52–85; Athanasopoulos, Constantinos, 2013, 'St. Gregory Palamas, (Neo-)Platonist and Aristotelian Metaphysics: the response of Orthodox Mystical Theology to the Western impasse of intellectualism and essentialism' in *Divine Essence and Divine Energies: Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy*, edited by C. Athanasopoulos and C. Schneider, 2013, James Clarke & Co, pp.50–67. Athanasopoulos, Constantinos, 2006, 'The Ethical Problems of Sensus Communis Philosophicus: Reflections on McKeon' in Stephan Heuser, Hans G. Ulrich, eds., *Pluralism in Europe- One Law, One Market, One Culture?* Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006, pp.278–289; Athanasopoulos, Constantinos, 2004, 'The influence of Ps.Dionysius the Areopagite on Johannes Scotus Eriugena and St. Gregory Palamas: Goodness as Transcendence of Metaphysics', in Agnieska Kijewska, ed., *Being or Good? Metamorphoses of Neoplatonism*, Lublin: Catholic University of Lublin Press (KUL), 2004, pp.319–341; Athanasopoulos, Constantinos, 2002, 'Scholastic and Byzantine Realism: Absolutism in the Metaphysics and Ethics of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ockham and the critique of St. Gregory Palamas', (in English), in the international philosophy journal *Verbum* (the official Journal of

to be *holistic* (i.e., addressing human beings as a unified whole, with a variety of capacities and powers), because partial attempts that focus on intellectualistic discussions to embed human perceptions of justice within rules of war are doomed to failure, as we have demonstrated in the case of the relationship of JaB and JiB and their shortcomings, with specific examples from current JWTh (and our own previous work).[19]

When we start looking at examples of how Orthodox Christian saints with a hesychastic outlook on life see and understand war and violence, we can establish the basic principles for such an ontological and holistic perspective on war and violence. I will support my investigation here with an analysis of a specific text from the works of St Gregory Palamas. The basics of my approach originate in my prior work on the ontological, holistic, and ethical aspects of Palamas' Orthodox hesychastic philosophy and theology.[20]

In his first Homily dedicated to Peace ("First Homily: On Peace between us and others"; *Ομιλία Α΄, Περί της προς αλλήλους ειρήνης*, PG 151, 16D), which he preached on the third day after his entry to Thessaloniki as its Archbishop, we see Palamas making a detailed analysis of the causes of violence and war and how best to eradicate them. The context of this Homily is particularly important: There were riots and civic unrest in Thessaloniki shortly before Palamas' arrival. The Zealots, who were behind this unrest, sought (unsuccessfully) to befriend and receive the support of Palamas to their cause before his arrival.[21] Palamas wrote and delivered this homily as a response to the climate of violence and fear that prevailed in Thessaloniki at the time (the Zealots were an active and strong political force in Thessaloniki

the Institute of Medieval Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of St. Petersburg, Russia), Vol. 6, Volume Topic: Aristotle in Medieval Metaphysics, January 2002, pp.154–165; Athanasopoulos, Constantinos, 2000a, 'Good and Evil in Human Nature', in *Philosophical Inquiry: International Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.3, pp.104–15; Athanasopoulos, Constantinos, 2000b, 'Natural Law in Ancient Greek and Modern Philosophy: The Case for Ontology', in *Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research*, 2000, Vol. XI, pp. 153–158. Most of these works can be found at the Palamas Seminar Wiki (http://palamas-seminar-neamt.wikidot.com/athanasopoulos and the Palamas Seminar repository: https://archive.org/details/@gregory_palamas/uploads

[19] See Athanasopoulos 2006; Athanasopoulos 2004; Athanasopoulos 2002; Athanasopoulos, 2000b.

[20] See for example Athanasopoulos 2018; Athanasopoulos 2020.

[21] Μεταλληνός, π. Γεώργιος, 1995, 'Ησυχαστές και Ζηλωτές. Πνευματική ακμή και κοινωνική κρίση στον βυζαντινό 14ο αιώνα', στου ιδίου, *Ελληνισμός Μαχόμενος*, εκδ. Τήνος, Αθήνα 1995, σσ. 13-40.

between 1342 and 1349, a particularly troublesome period in the Byzantine Empire, causing the slaughter of nobility in Thessaloniki and a destruction of property and infrastructure).

Palamas starts first outlining the theological and ontological basis of what he will suggest as a remedy later on in his Homily (a familiar Patristic strategy). He highlights the fact that we are all created by one Lord, one Creator, and one Father, which makes us related as brothers (and sisters) to all other humans and that this also makes us related to other parts of creation, including non-sentient existences. Note that the commonality of sharing our existence with all other living and non-sentient beings on our planet, making it our communal home, is undisputed even by today's atheists. He also stresses a core Christian belief that only humans have the image of God (and the possibility to be like God via the likeness) and this through the common genealogy via Adam. Finally, he emphasises that we are all related as brothers and sisters via the Holy Church, of which Jesus Christ is the Leader and its Perfection, who is also our brother, because he asked us to call God 'Our Father' (in the Lord's Prayer, Matthew 6:9–13), and who is also making us parts of the same body, his body, that is the Church. He also explains that it is one and the same baptismal font that allowed us to be born again in Christ and activate the gifts of the Holy Spirit (*Ἐν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀδελφοί τό τῆς παλιγγενεσίας καί θεογενεσίας λουτρόν*). He stresses that it is one faith, one hope, one God for all and through all, God gathering all humans through his Love and making us members of others' bodies and members of his body (*μία πίστις, μία ἐλπίς, εἷς Θεός ἐπί πάντων, καί διά πάντων, καί ἐν πᾶσιν ἡμῖν, συνάγων ἡμᾶς εἰς ἑαυτόν δι' ἀγάπης ἐνθέου καί μέλη ποιῶν ἀλλήλων καί ἑαυτοῦ*).

After this short introduction about the ontological and theological unity of all humans, Palamas identifies the root of all violence and war in the gradual eradication of love within our hearts and the gradual infiltration of hatred in it with the help of the Evil one (*τῇ συνεργείᾳ τοῦ πονηροῦ*). Through a repetition of this process of elimination of love in our hearts, gradually, all love for other human beings, but also for God, is eliminated, paralysing all links and relations between the members of the city, the beings (sentient and non-sentient) in wider inhabited areas, and finally the world as a whole. Through this gradual process of alienation, war seems inevitable and through the confusion

that this process brings, it turns relatives and people of the same city and country against each other and against others from other lands, causing them to commit unheard of ruthless acts, weakening the strength and unity of people and turning them into floating items in the sea (i.e., without rationality) being brought forth and back by tidal waves (i.e., their emotions, instincts and other non-rational powers). Palamas at this point refers to the civic unrest and riots that took place in Thessaloniki before his arrival, calling them 'thuggish acts' (*ἁλιτηριώδους στάσεως*) that seem to be without any valid explanation and plausible cause (i.e., resembling the movement of floating items in sea, being moved aimlessly by tidal waves).

He concludes his preliminary analysis by indicating that all this seems to be like a disease that paralyses the city and destroys all civic connections, referring to the paralytics described in the Gospels. Palamas further calls this unrest a worse medical condition than paralysis, because the evil acts committed under the influence of this disease are far worse (morally) than an inability to move described in the Gospel's paralytics cases (e.g., Mark 2: 1–12). He asks his audience to think about the cause of this disease and seek the medication and treatment that can be provided only by God.

He provides a parallel analysis at this point of the cause of the disease of the paralytics in their sin (*…τό αἴτιον; Ἡ ἁμαρτία*). In the pathology of this disease (i.e., war and violence), the prognosis is the same as in the case of the paralytics: as sin drove out health in the case of the paralytics, so it is in the case of violent conflict: sin is what drives away love, gradually turning our heart cold, producing a necrosis of its sensitivities, causing a particularly strong resistance to place oneself under the grace and guidance of God ('*…ψυγείσης δέ τῆς ἀγάπης τελείως, τήν τοῦ Θεοῦ χάριν καί κηδεμονίαν παραμένει ἀδύνατον*'). Through Biblical parallelisms and analogies, Palamas urges his flock to never think about doing evil, never return evildoing to evildoing and to always defeat evil through good acts. It is only in this way that humans can resist the Devil's plan, who manically tries to establish himself in the hearts of the warring parties, turning them into beasts and making them similar to the Devil and his demons, killing humans, hating humans and opposing Christ ('*Καί οὕτως ἀνθρωποκτόνον τόν ἄνθρωπον ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνθρωποκτόνος καί μισάνθρωπος ἀπεργάζεται*

καί τῷ ζωοδότῃ Χριστῷ ἀντικείμενον…'). Next, through many Biblical references from the Gospels and the Psalms, Palamas proves that not only Jesus cancelled all animosity among people with His Cross but also sent his disciples to spread the message of the Gospels, which is the message of Peace. The Apostles not only lived the message of peace themselves, but they also begin many of their Epistles with the message of peace, spreading peace and providing peace as the foundation of all local churches. Palamas also reminds his flock that Paul's message in his Epistles is that all Christians should pursue peace for all people, because without this peace they cannot be holy and cannot see God. '*…μετά Παύλου πρός ἡμᾶς λέγομεν˙ «εἰρήνην διώκετε μετά πάντων καί τῶν ἁγιασμόν ἧς χωρίς οὐδείς ὄψεται τόν Κύριον»* '.

So, if we would like to summarise in a few words the message of Palamas, we could highlight the following key points:

- War and violent conflict are caused by a disease (with symptoms that affect humans *holistically*, i.e., affecting their whole existence, physical, mental, spiritual). This disease turns humans into entities that are worse than beasts, being ruled by uncontrollable passions, making them instruments of the Devil, hating both humans and God. This disease consists in the disintegration of our personhood: rational powers are weakened, the heart loses its sensitivity and ability to love, there is no control of one's volitional powers, and a transformation into an inert being by materiality and the will of the flesh.
- This disease is caused by sin. Its effect on the heart and the soul of humans is gradual and it makes the human heart cold, losing the sensibilities and special grace that was given through the act of Creation (image and likeness of God) and renewed through their Baptism.
- This disease is not rational, so its treatment and the eradication of its causes cannot depend on rational means (including rationality-based ethics and moral philosophy). Once within the realm of this disease, we need to transform the volitional and other powers of the soul and the heart in a *holistic* way to reverse its progress and the consumption of our very essence as human beings. In the way that Palamas approaches this

issue, one is reminded of Paul's admonition to Christians to guard their minds and hearts within God's peace that goes beyond all thought '*ἡ εἰρήνη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ ὑπερέχουσα πάντα νοῦν φρουρήσει τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ νοήματα ὑμῶν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*' (Φιλιπ. 4,7).

- There is no possibility of cure from this disease unless we turn to God and completely surrender ourselves to his mercy. No half measures are allowed, and one cannot postpone the inevitable.
- The Devil is in control of all those who suffer from the disease. As no cure and no escape from the disease is possible, the disease gains its own spiralling dynamic and effect on societies, spreading like a virus.
- The treatment for the disease depends on specific things we can do and specific things God does. There has to be a co-operation (*συνέργεια*) that needs to be maintained continuously for an effective treatment. The first step needs to be done by us, humans, through a conscious and volition-based decision to do good, when confronted by violence and war. Materiality, love of the flesh, avarice, ambition, pride, and riches are to be avoided (see also Γρηγορίου Παλαμά, *Ομιλία ιγ΄, Πέμπτης Κυριακής των Νηστειών*, PG 151, 161C-165B). Dedication to ceaseless prayer, constant *askesis* and fasting is to be pursued.
- The maintenance of health (i.e., peace in the heart and in social relations), after one establishes this kind of radical treatment of the disease of war and violence, is a continuous struggle in becoming one *holistically* and *ontologically* with the Church and God.
- This diagnosis and prognosis of the disease of war and violence can be found not only in the Gospels and the Epistles of the Apostles, but also in the writings of the Church Fathers, who stress that the Church through its mysteries and the opportunity for true worship and dedication to God that it provides becomes a temple and sanctuary of peace. For example, St John's Chrysostom insists that the Divine Liturgy is the mystery of peace (*Commentary on St Matthew the Evangelist*,

50; PG 58, 508). People with interior conflicts and ruled by passions cannot establish peace in the world. Early Fathers of the Church stress that outer peace cannot be established without first establishing inner peace. Only people who are masters in this inner warfare and have established peace within themselves can help in bringing peace in the world. St Isaac the Syrian connects peace directly with humility, inner peace with outer peace, and peace with hope in God (Homily 51).[22] We also have the example of many early saints who, after reaching greatness in humility and love for Christ, they became great peace makers.[23]

- The recommended treatment for this disease is dependent on a gradual ontological and holistic transformation of our volitional and spiritual powers: at the start of this process, the outer battle and war needs to be turned into a continuous interior battle and war between the spirit and the flesh; gradually, and sometimes in very small stages of development, this inner war will subside and inner peace will be achieved. Palamas, in one of his Homilies (Homily 58) notes that there must be a continuous effort to control our thoughts and volition and distance them from all materiality, so as to effect peace within our heart and, in this way, bring about peace in the world, following here the recommendations of St Isaac the Syrian and other early Church Fathers. The analysis of the recommended treatment for this disease here reminds us other works of Palamas; we can bring into our minds here not only the chief hesychastic works of St Gregory Palamas (mainly his *Triads -Υπέρ των ιερώς ησυχαζόντων*; *The life of St Peter the Athonite- Εις τον βίον του οσίου Πέτρου του εν Άθω*; his *Letter to Nun Xeni* and his *Homilies on the Theotokos*) but also the writings of earlier Church Fathers, like St Macarius of Egypt, who insists that, when in prayer and in conscious effort to approach God, we need to be in peace, stillness (*ησυχία*), full

[22] Miller, D., 1984, *The Ascetical Homilies of Saint Isaac the Syrian* (Holy Transfiguration Monastery: Boston, pp. 243–248.

[23] See for example the life of St Daniel Stylites in Συμεών Μεταφραστής, *Βίος Οσίου Δανιήλ Στυλίτου*, ΛΑ, PG 116; 1008B.

attentiveness (*προσοχή*), repentant heart (*νήφουσαν καρδίαν*), and intense pain for our fallen nature (PG 34, 517). St John of the Ladder discusses this in relation to anger, which he insists is incompatible with a spirit of peace (Λόγος Όγδοος, *Περί Αοργησίας και Πραότητος*, 16). This is also related to what most of the texts in the *Philokalia* are describing and prescribing (see Vol. 1, St Cassian the Roman, *Περί των οχτώ λογισμών της κακίας*: Λόγος 4- Περί της οργής; further references one can find in Kallistos Angelikoudes and Kallistos and Ignatios Xanthopouloi). Some of the details of this lengthy process also can be found in St Nikodemus the Hagiorite text *Unseen Warfare* (*Αόρατος Πόλεμος*); I have discussed the *Philokalia* texts and St Nikodemus' famous text in particular, which has nothing to do with similar manuals in the West, in recent works).[24] Note that I elaborate on the close connection and many links between the texts of the *Philokalia* and the texts of St Gregory Palamas in other works.[25]

An obvious question, however, still remains for the researcher into Palamas' hesychastic perspective: would Palamas approve the use of military force or violence of any kind, even for only defensive purposes? One could even highlight here the friendship between Ioannis Kantakouzinos and Palamas. Was Palamas just supporting Kantakouzinos with his Homily on Peace? This suggestion for some commentators has a basis due to the fact that the Zealots opposed Kantakouzinos. But suppose he tried to support Kantakouzinos with his Homilies. If he did, then why did Palamas not support Kantakouzinos in his wars? Kantakouzinos had to face particular political problems for his survival (the Zealots in Thessaloniki were just one of his many adversaries). Why did Palamas not openly support Kantakouzinos in his violent efforts (for example by preaching for a holy war like the

[24] Athanasopoulos, Constantinos, 2021, 'The Philosophy of Philokalia: The Culture and Life of Beauty in the East', *Annals of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Bucharest*, Topic: The Philosophy of Philokalia, Vol 70, No 1, pp.13–71: https://annals.filosofie.unibuc.ro/index.php/annals/article/view/325/318 ; see also "Philokalia and St Gregory Palamas: An Introduction" in Summares, M. and Ricardo Barroso Batista (Eds.), *Theology and the Philosophy of Philokalia: Its Reception East and West*, Orthodox Ways: St Gregory Palamas Chapel Publications -Saint Gregory Palamas Study Center – Monsul, 2022, ISBN 978-9-72697-347-8 (ebk), ISBN-10 972-6-97347-3 (ebk), pp. 3-62. https://archive.org/details/athanasopoulos-philokalia-portugal

[25] Athanasopoulos 2021 and Athanasopoulos 2022.

Pope did with the Crusades? Here the careful reader of Palamas texts would note the otherworldly character of his discourse. How would hesychasm be compatible to a particular political or military agenda?

Setting aside the historical particularities, the question gains a particular theological importance because the Fathers of the Church do seem to allow a limited use of force: most notable here is St Basil the Great who in his Canon 13 of the 92 Canons admits this: 'Our fathers did not consider killings committed in the course of wars to be classifiable as murders at all, on the score, it seems to me, of allowing a pardon to men fighting in defence of sobriety and piety. Perhaps, though, it might be advisable to refuse them communion for three years, on the ground that their hands are not clean'. (Basil. Ep. 188. 13; see also *Pedalion* p. 801). It is important to note that St Basil here does admit that when men fight in defence of sobriety and piety, it can be pardoned. There is also additional evidence that even at the times of the Apostles, the faithful who were engaged in war could not become members of the clergy, but laymen could receive the mysteries after some time of penance (see here Canons of Hippolytus 14.74, and Apostolic Canon 66). But note that this approach of the Fathers has nothing to do with the Augustinian or Aquinian approach to war. There is still a recognition that engaging in violence is a sin and should be avoided and that penance and a certain time for this penance to have a lasting effect on the heart is required even for laymen approaching the Mystery of Holy Communion.

However, from the above analysis and summary of Palamas' perspective on war, it is obvious, that, for Palamite hesychasm in particular, there would be no allowance for taking arms in a military conflict and no allowance for violently relating with other human beings in any way or form (even for defensive reasons). The hesychasts would be dedicated to prayer and would try to bring peace in the world through the achievement of inner peace in their heart. They might intervene through their intercessions and prayers and (if they received an indication from God that this would be fruitful) would try to bring the warring parties together so that they can arrive at a solution to their problem peacefully and establish peace in this way. This agrees with the views of many contemporary saints who followed hesychasm in their lives: According to St Silouan the Athonite: 'If the kings and rulers of the nations knew the love of God, they would never make war.

War happens to us for our sins, not because of our love…. If those in high places kept the commandments of the Lord, and we obeyed them in humility, there would be great peace and gladness on earth, whereas now the whole universe suffers because of the ambition for power and absence of submission among the proud'.[26]

Political Hesychasm: A Contradiction in Terms?

Fr John Meyendorff has had a great influence not only on interpretations of Palamas and other Church Fathers but also on contemporary Orthodox Theology. A key point of influence that we will investigate here is regarding the term of 'political hesychasm', which has been influential in the debates regarding the recent war in Ukraine. There is strong evidence that through the works of Fr John Meyendorff the term 'political hesychasm' has been introduced in the scholarship related to Palamas and hesychasm. Meyendorff believed that during Byzantine times, the Byzantines achieved a peculiar synthesis (a *symfonia*) between the state and ecclesiastical power that allowed a more nuanced relationship between civic and ecclesiastical duties and responsibilities.[27] In his work *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteenth Century* (1984), Meyendorff proposes a peculiar thesis in relation to the related developments in Russia: through consistent and systematic interventions from a line of Ecumenical Patriarchs influenced by 'Athonite hesychasm', the idea of a Byzantine Orthodox commonwealth (*οικουμένη*) somehow took hold in Russia and influenced the attempts at a unification of All Russia. Key Ecumenical Patriarchs in this move were Athanasius (1289–1293, 1303–1339), Philotheos Kokkinos (1353–1354, 1364–1376), and Anthony IV (1389–1390, 1391–1397), who used canon 28 of Chalcedon and canon 34 of the Holy Apostles in a variety of ways. They promoted, favoured, or influenced ecclesiastical affairs in Russia in such a way as to have a more centralised ecclesiastical administration, which went in parallel

[26] Archimandite Sophrony, 1991, *Saint Silouan the Athonite*, Essex: Patriarchal Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John the Baptist, p.319.

[27] John Meyendorff, *The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church* (Crestwood NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1983; pp. 225–9.

with political developments during that time for a more centralised political government of All Russia.

For example, Meyendorff describes Patriarch Anthony IV, who, in his letter of 1393 to Grand Duke Basil I of Muscovy, specifically mentions that Christians not only need to pray for the Church but also for the emperor, above all other princes (including the princes of Russia). Meyendorff tries to support this thesis through other historical examples, such as the recognition of the Metropolitan of Kiev as Patriarch Job of Moscow in 1589 by Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremias II (c.1530–1595). This thesis has influenced a large group of Orthodox theologians and historians in claiming that there has been a distinct move organised by followers of 'Orthodox hesychasm' and Palamas in pushing forward specific ecclesiastical and political agendas.

Perhaps one of the most important contemporary Greek philosophers, theologians, and cultural critics who has developed and supported further the use of this term is Professor Christos Yannaras. Yannaras has proposed a unique interpretation of many aspects of Orthodox theology and culture leading many to call his work and attitudes 'Neo-Orthodox'. Yannaras has influenced many in Greece and, through the translations of his work into many different languages, a growing number of scholars in both the West and the East. His work has been criticised by many monks in Holy Mt Athos, with Theokletos Dionysiates claiming that Yannaras's ideas were very close to a heresy (Neo-Nicolaitism).[28] In relation to this, it is worthwhile mentioning that, in one of my previous works, I (among many lay scholars) have criticised Yannaras' attack on St Nikodemos the Hagiorite and the *Philokalia*.[29]

Perhaps a focal point in the development of Yannaras' understanding of political hesychasm can be found in his short note on Political Theology.[30] For Yannaras, the goal of Orthodox Political Theology is to investigate the 'authenticity of human existence', which aims to 'serve man according to his nature and his truth; and consequently to serve

[28] See Theoklitos Dionysiates, *The Heresy of the Neo-Orthodox: The Neo-Nicolaitism of Chrestos Yannaras*, Athens 1988; Theoklitos Dionysiates, *The Nicolaitan Error of the Neo-Orthodox, with a critique of Christos Yannaras*, Athens 1989.

[29] See Athanasopoulos 2021.

[30] See Yannaras, Christos, 1983, 'A Note on Political Theology', *St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*, 27, p.53.

the political nature of humanity, i.e., the power of love, which is the heart of its existence and which is the condition of the true communion of persons, the true city, the true *polis*' (ibid). He finds that this can only be done through a certain 'apophaticism' toward the political (especially regarding political ideologies and established political perspectives). The ideal relational political dynamics according to Yannaras can only be achieved through an ecclesiastical unity such as in an Orthodox monastery, inspired by the hesychastic ideals of a separation from worldly pursuits but in obedience to the worldly-political hierarchy.[31] In comparing the two (Meyendorff and Yannaras), Svetelj finds that even though Meyendorff argues that there is no anti-Western sentiment in Palamas' teaching, Yannaras claims in the hesychastic controversies in Byzantium we have a controversy between East and West.[32]

Antoine Lévy, in his scholarly contribution to the debate regarding the use of the term, argues very convincingly that Palamas and his followers would not think that the term 'hesychasm' can have any political connotations. As Lévy notes, even at the time of St Markos Eugenikos and during his participation at the Florence Council (1439), when he considered himself a follower of hesychasm trying to protect the Orthodox world from papal influences and being involved in important ecclesiastical negotiations with remarkably political ramifications, there were no second thoughts regarding the *apolitical* character of hesychasm.[33]

However, Lévy finds that ultimately, with the triumphant prevalence of Hesychastic Palamism in the later years of Byzantine Empire and Byzantine Orthodox theology in particular, it was inevitable that elements of hesychasm would be taken up by the Russian Orthodox world. He finds that the Russians were fascinated by hesychasm and hesychastic practices, especially the obedience of the novice monk to a hesychast elder, which is an essential part of the early stages of monastic hesychastic life. According to Lévy, this is what was particularly useful to Russian leaders who wished complete control both in political and in ecclesiastical powers. For Lévy, this early Russian blind obedience

[31] Γιανναράς, Χρήστος, 1978, *Η Νέο-ελληνική ταυτότητα*, εκδ. Γρηγόρη, Αθήνα, σελ.204.

[32] Svetelj, Tone, 2017/18, 'Gregory Palamas and Political Hesychasm in the Fourteenth and Twentieth Centuries', *Analogia*, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp. 61–80.

[33] Lévy, Antoine '"Political hesychasm" and the Foundational Structure of the Russian State', *Analogia*, Volume 5, 2018, pp.57–82; p.57, footnote 1.

to the focal control point of a consolidated political and ecclesiastical power is what influenced many Russian scholars in recent times to accept this development as 'political hesychasm' and develop political ideologies and cultural analysis to support this trend in recent Russian historical events (including the recent hegemony of political figures). Undoubtedly, Lévy's claims merit a more detailed response (which I hope to provide soon), but I would like to raise here a few questions regarding the plausibility of Lévy's analysis.

Firstly, that Russians have taken a term and made a whole new ideology out of it means nothing to the valid application of the term and its proper meaning. For a scholar approaching the question of appropriateness of the use and application of a term, poor uses in its application are interesting only insofar as this shows what the term should not and cannot mean, not to provide a historical justification of its misuse.

Secondly, it seems Lévy dismissed without much consideration the claim by S. Khoruji that a hesychast who turns to politics betrays the very spirit of hesychasm he is trying to defend by his way of life.[34] As many scholars in Russian Orthodox theology and ecclesiastical affairs note (among whom I would certainly classify Khoruji), there are many different perspectives in the reception of Byzantine Orthodox Theology in Russian theological circles. Obviously, this is the reason for Khoruji's contribution in the current debates. Lévy thinks that G. M. Prochorov's use of the term to influence contemporary Russian academic circles in their political analysis and commentary of recent Russian politics is capturing the quintessence of political hesychasm as it was and still is applied in Russia; one can only question this approach. Lévy would have to make a detailed commentary of all the various voices in this debate to conclude in the way that he does. To not engage with a voice expressing a different perspective from the author's leaves the criticism incomplete.

Lastly, I would be very wary of applying terms with distinct history and contextual meaning (which previously had no primary political connotations) to newer forms of social and political engagement. This is not only anachronistic but also quite gravediggerish. As we are

[34] Lévy, ibid, pp.57–58.

very careful not to dig up the bones of our forefathers to create new tools from their bones, so we should respect terms and their original culture-specific meanings. To do otherwise would mean a purposeful interference into the conceptual and cultural history of terms, providing further support to our confusing trends and tendencies of our violent and warring world.

Conclusions

In the above investigation, we examined key contemporary approaches into the morality of war. Having established the poor record of the famous distinction between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in providing a conclusive solution to the problem of war, we proceeded into examining Palamas' ontological and holistic view on war and violence. It was established that Palamas is following the Church Fathers in formulating an ontological and holistic diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of the disease that causes war and violence in our world. In discussing a contemporary use of hesychasm to justify particular political agendas, we found that this is an inappropriate use of the term, and it is quite anachronistic, making hesychasm lose its meaning and making its application in this composite term 'political hesychasm' questionable.

The main accusations of the Russian Church against the autocephaly of Ukraine

GOCHA BARNOVI
Dean of Faculty of Theology,
Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani University, Tbilisi, Georgia

This study examines the principal canonical and ecclesiological objections raised by the Russian Orthodox Church in response to the Ecumenical Patriarchate's decision to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The first line of opposition concerns the legitimacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's canonical authority to confer autocephaly, particularly regarding its jurisdictional claims over the Ukrainian ecclesiastical territory. By analyzing foundational canonical sources—most notably Canons 9, 17, and 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council—this article demonstrates the historical and canonical basis for Constantinople's prerogatives within the Orthodox Church, including its recognized role as the arbiter in matters of appeal and ecclesiastical order. Special emphasis is placed on the 1686 patriarchal 'Act', which temporarily permitted the Patriarch of Moscow to ordain the Metropolitan of Kiev, a concession granted *ad economia* and never intended as a transfer of jurisdiction. The second accusation pertains to the recognition of ordinations performed during the schism. Through an analysis of canonical tradition and conciliar precedents, the study illustrates the Church's consistent application of ecclesiastical *economia* in similar cases throughout history. The ordinations of clergy during schismatic periods, including those of Filaret and Makarios, are shown to possess canonical validity and apostolic succession. The article concludes that the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate aligns with established canonical procedures and historical practice. The Ukrainian Church's autocephaly thus represents a legitimate and necessary response to contemporary ecclesial and geopolitical realities, aimed at restoring canonical order and preserving the unity of the Orthodox Church.

The Ukrainian issue has become a wider topic for discussion, mainly due to Russia's military invasion in Ukraine. It concerns the difficult relationship between Russia and Ukraine, which, apart from its troubled

past, emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, Ukraine gradually distanced itself from Russia and oriented itself towards the West. However, in the case of Ukraine, beyond the political and economic dimensions, the religious and cultural history and traditions of these peoples must also be taken into account. It is significant that in similar cases, national and religious identity and consciousness have deeper roots in the memory of these countries and peoples.[1] Therefore, the presence and organization of corresponding ecclesiastical structures and institutions in Ukraine, alongside political authority, is of vital importance.

The initiative of the ecumenical throne to grant autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine was entirely based on the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church.[2] This tradition clearly defines the function and position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding the resolution of the issue of autocephaly, as evidenced by the modern ecclesiastical history of the twentieth century, when all local Orthodox Churches received their Tomos of autocephaly from the ecumenical throne.

The accusations from the supporters of the Russian Church (who come not only from the Russian Church but also from almost all the Churches) challenge, first, the authority of the ecumenical throne to grant autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine and, second, the possibility of recognizing ordinations performed during the schism and the restoration of those ordained during the schism to the canonical order of the Orthodox Church.

The first accusation concerning the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to grant autocephaly and its jurisdiction over the territory of the Church of Ukraine, and the consequent alleged encroachment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate into the canonical boundaries of the Church of Russia, pertains to the well-known subject of canonical law, territoriality. If we refer to the ancient canonical tradition of the Church, territoriality is a fundamental principle in

[1] We must note that Vladimir Putin's plan to organize a unified state from the three countries —Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine—was based on three elements: political, cultural, and religious. The political capital would be Moscow, the religious capital would be Kiev, and the common language would be Russian.

[2] Regarding this topic, see the book by metropolitan Kyrillos of Krini, *The Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine*, Constantinople 2021 (Κυρίλλου μητροπολίτου Κρήνης, Το Πατριαρχείο Κωνσταντινουπόλεως και η Αυτοκέφαλη Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας, Κωνσταντινούπολις 2021).

the organization and governance of the Church. According to this principle, each diocese is assigned a specific geographical territory, and the bishop of that diocese has authority over all Orthodox Christians within that territory. This principle is known as 'episcopal jurisdiction' and ensures that there is a clearly defined structure of authority within the Orthodox Church.

The rules of the Orthodox Church address territoriality in various ways. Essentially, these rules aim to regulate the jurisdiction of bishops. Each bishop must have authority over a specific geographical area or territory, and overlapping jurisdictions should be avoided wherever possible.

Canon 2 of the First Ecumenical Council stipulates that bishops should not interfere in the affairs of Churches outside their own diocese unless invited to do so by the local bishop.

Canon 6 (of the same Council) confirms the authority of the bishop of Alexandria over Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, and the authority of the bishop of Rome over the territories of the Western Church.

Canon 9 of the Council of Antioch prohibits bishops from ordaining clergy outside their own diocese, except in cases of necessity and with the permission of the local bishop.

Canon 9 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council confirms the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople with the right to accept appeals from bishops of other regions.

Canon 28 of the same Council grants the bishop of Constantinople equal privileges with the bishop of Rome and confirms the jurisdictional boundaries of the Church of Constantinople and its authority over Churches, including those of the bishops of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace.

Among the above-mentioned canons, canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council is of exceptional importance, as well as the other rules connected to it, because they have a direct relationship with the issue of the autocephaly of the Church of Ukraine. To properly understand and assess this rule, it must be interpreted in the spirit of the time and ecclesiastical practice. According to canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council, the bishop of Constantinople gains "*a presbytery of honor*" and is now equal to the bishop of Rome. This rule established a parallelism between the bishops of Rome and Constantinople. The privileges of New Rome became clearer with canons 9 and 17 of the

Fourth Ecumenical Council. According to these canons, in the case of a dispute arising between local Churches, they should address the bishop of New Rome to resolve the issue. Canon 28 emphasizes the parallelism between the bishops of Rome and Constantinople and thus confirms the authority of canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council. These privileges of Constantinople are once again affirmed by canon 36 of the Fifth Ecumenical Council.

In the nineth century, patriarch Photius of Constantinople began his apostolic mission in Eastern Europe. During this period, specifically in 988, Christianity spread to the Kiev region. Vladimir, the ruler of the Kievan Rus', understood the great significance of Christianity for the future history of the Russian people. Therefore, he and his successors made significant efforts to spread and support the new faith. On the other hand, there was substantial pastoral care from the Mother Church of Constantinople. The new Church was one of the dioceses of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, with its seat in Kiev. For about five centuries, the metropolitans of Kiev, and later Moscow, were elected and consecrated by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The basis for this administrative dependence was canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, which, as interpreted by Theodore Balsamon, states that the patriarch of Constantinople is entrusted with the ordination of bishops in territories outside the bounds of the Roman Empire.[3] It is a fact that the majority of metropolitans in Russia up to the sixteenth century came from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[4] Generally, the metropolitans of Kiev governed the Church of Russia, convened synods, and were responsible for decisions within the Church. Later, in the fifteenth century, the Metropolis of Kiev was divided, and there were now two metropolitans. Metropolitan Jonah (1448), who was subordinate to Moscow, and Gregory, under the patriarch of Constantinople, Gregory Mammas (metropolitan Gregory later returned to Orthodoxy and was accepted by the Ecumenical Patriarch in 1470). However, Jonah's election was made without agreement with the Ecumenical Patriarch.[5]

[3] See canon 15 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon, *PG* 137, 489.

[4] After the death of metropolitan Theopemptus (1048), during the reign of the ruler of Kiev, Yaroslav, at the provincial council, the newly elected metropolitan of Kiev, Hilarion, requested the confirmation of his election from the ecumenical patriarch (see V. Feidas, *Ecclesiastical History* II, Athens 2002 (3rd edition), p. 225).

[5] Οικουμενικός Θρόνος και η Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας – Ομιλούν τα κείμενα, 2018, 4.

In the late sixteenth century, when the metropolis of Moscow was elevated to a Patriarchate under the Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah II (1589), the metropolis of Kiev continued to remain under the jurisdiction of the ecumenical throne. This is evident from the actions of patriarch Jeremiah II during his visit to Kiev in 1589. In the early seventeenth century, when the issue of the union arose, the patriarch of Constantinople granted permission in 1620 to the patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanes, to perform the ordinations of Orthodox bishops in Kiev.

In the seventeenth century, however, when the eastern part of Ukraine was united with Russia, the Church in Ukraine also became divided among Russia, Poland, and Turkey. Russia began its activities in Ukrainian territory, disregarding the canonical jurisdiction of Constantinople over the ordination of the metropolitan of Kiev. Thus, in 1685, the patriarch of Moscow ordained the metropolitan of Kiev, an act which was irregular because the election and ordination of the metropolitan of Kiev had always been under the jurisdiction of the synod of the Church of Constantinople. However, to prevent the Church of Kiev from remaining without its head, and also for historical and political reasons (the Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine and the war between Russia, Poland, and Turkey), in 1686 patriarch Dionysius granted the patriarch of Moscow the right to ordain the metropolitan of Kiev. This right was granted in a 'conciliatory and economical manner', meaning it was granted as an *economia*. The reason for this action was, as mentioned, specific political events.

This refers to the patriarchal and synodal 'Act' or 'Decree of Issuance' from 1686. As is known, the original text has been lost. However, the Russian translation and the original Greek copies from the time of patriarch Callinicus II (1688, 1689–93, 1694–1702) have survived[6], from which the original text has been restored.[7] This synodal document holds canonical value because it clarifies those historical and ecclesiastical events.

Therefore, as mentioned, the inclusion of the metropolis of Kiev under the jurisdiction of Moscow was done as an *economia*—'in a conciliatory and economical manner'. The act of *economia* always

[6] *Ibid*.

[7] For details see V. Tchentsova, Синодальное решение 1686 г. о Киевской митрополии, in: Древняя Русь. Вопросы медиевистики 2 (68), 2017.

indicates the temporary nature of any decision in ecclesiastical life. This is confirmed by patriarch Dositheus of Jerusalem, who wrote in a letter to ambassador Nikita Alekseyevich: 'Kiev should be given to Moscow temporarily due to its occupying tyranny, until the day of divine visitation',[8] and it concerned only the ordination of the metropolitan of Kiev: 'so that the most holy province of Kiev may be subject to the most holy patriarchal throne of the great and God-preserved city of Moscow, namely that the metropolitan of Kiev be ordained by the patriarch of Moscow as needed', meaning that the patriarch of Moscow could ordain the metropolitans of Kiev on behalf of the ecumenical patriarch.

The fact that it concerned only the permission for ordination is also evident in the letter to the Russian kings that has survived in its original form, where it states that the patriarch of Moscow 'has permission to ordain the metropolitan of Kiev'.[9] It is important to note that the permission for the election of the metropolitan of Kiev remains with the ecumenical patriarch. This is clearly emphasized in the patriarchal 'Act', which notes that the metropolitan of Kiev is obliged to commemorate the patriarch of Constantinople during the Divine Liturgy. These points of the text have decisive value because the 'first' commemoration of the ecumenical patriarch by any metropolitan of Kiev as the 'source and origin' means that the Metropolis of Kiev was never ceded to the patriarch of Moscow, but only the permission for ordination was granted. This was the purpose for which the synodal 'Act' was written. According to this text, the Metropolis of Kiev remains under the jurisdiction of Constantinople because the commemoration during the Divine Liturgy is a primary sign of one Church's extension of authority over another. The term mentioned in the text does not allow the patriarch of Moscow to administratively control the Metropolis of Kiev. From the text, it appears that the metropolitan of Kiev, after commemorating the patriarch of Constantinople, was supposed to commemorate the patriarch of Moscow as well, but as a superior, which indicates only the spiritual relationship of the Metropolis of Kiev to the patriarch of Moscow and not Moscow's jurisdiction over Kiev. The

[8] Δοσιθέου Ἱεροσολύμων, *Ἱστορία περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις Πατριαρχευσάντων*, τόμος ΣΤ', 1983, 240· «*νὰ εἶναι ἐπαρχία μὲν τοῦ Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἐπιτροπευόμενη δὲ παρὰ τοῦ ἁγιωτάτου Πατριάρχου Μοσχοβίας... διά τήν κατέχουσαν τυρρανίδα, ἕως ἡμέρας ἐπισκέψεως θείας*».

[9] Οικουμενικός Θρόνος και η Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας – Ομιλούν τα κείμενα, 2018, 8.

well-known Russian theologians Vetochnikov and Kouragiev argue that the jurisdiction of Constantinople over the province of Kiev had been maintained for centuries.[10] The synodal 'Letter of Appointment' given to the patriarch of Moscow for the ordination of the metropolitans of Kiev indicates exactly the permission for ordination in this specific case and only; 'the province of Kiev, being subject to the highest and most holy ecumenical throne of Constantinople, the ordination of its bishop was always received regarding this matter'.[11] It seems that Constantinople used to ordain the metropolitans of Kiev, but now (meaning temporarily) this permission is granted to the patriarch of Moscow due to the circumstances that arose during that period. The term 'being subject' in relation to Kiev indicates that Kiev was under the jurisdiction of Constantinople 'outside of time' (timelessly), but it has become (now) subject to Moscow due to the conditions as an *economia*, which is a temporary measure of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Therefore, the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not grant jurisdiction over its territory to the Church of Moscow. It is incorrect to refer to the text of the 'Act' as a 'Tomos', as the authority of a Tomos differs from that of an Act.[12] The reason this permission was granted to the patriarch of Moscow in an *economia* was due to the great distance between Constantinople and Kiev, as well as the political conditions: 'to know that (i.e., the patriarch of Moscow) is an elder and preeminent there,[13] as he ordains there and not under the ecumenical patriarch, as stated above, due to the

[10] K. Vetochnikov, 'La "concession" de la metropole de Kiev au patriarche de Moscou en 1686: Analyse canonique', *Proceedings of the 23rd International Congress of Byzantine studies*, Belgrade, 22–27 August 2016: Round Tables, ed. by Bojana Krsmanović, Belgrade 2016, 780–784˙ Οικουμενικός Θρόνος και η Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας – Ομιλούν τα κείμενα, 2018, 10.

[11] V. Tchentsova, Синодальное решение 1686 г. о Киевской митрополии, in: Древняя Русь. Вопросы медиевистики 2 (68), 2017, с. 101.

[12] 'Tomos' is granted when autocephaly is conferred on any Church (Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Albania, Poland, Czechia, and Ukraine). The Ecumenical Patriarchate has never ceded part of its canonical territory to another Church through a 'Letter of Release'. However, after granting autocephaly, the Ecumenical Patriarchate no longer intervenes in the affairs of the specific Church. On the other hand, 'Praxis' is usually given in cases of temporary actions by Constantinople, such as the Ionian Islands being assigned to the Church of Greece, where the Ecumenical Patriarchate could say both yes and no, as in the case of Thessaly in 1881, which was handed over to the Church of Greece with the 'Praxis'. However, as is known, the 'Tomos' of autocephaly for Russia does not mention the cession of part of Ukraine's territory to the Patriarchate of Moscow.

[13] Archimandrite Kirill Hovorun, 'Comments on the Constantinople Synodal Letters of 1686', 2018. Here it appears that the patriarch of Constantinople emphasizes that the patriarch of Moscow is considered 'elder and superior' for the metropolitan of Kiev, while in a letter concerning the issue between the patriarch of Jerusalem and the archbishop of Sinai, the patriarch of Constantinople refers to the patriarch of Jerusalem as 'patriarch and elder'.

excessive distance of the place, and due to the continuous wars between the two realms, and in a conciliatory manner following his pre-existing custom, and granting him this permission economically'.[14] The fact that the metropolitans of Kiev ordained by the patriarch of Moscow had to mention 'in the first place' the patriarch of Constantinople, '...to mention in the first place the revered name of the ecumenical patriarch, as being the source and origin and superior over all the communities and dioceses everywhere, then the patriarch of Moscow as his elder...'[15] shows that Constantinople is the source and origin and still 'superior' over the other Churches, including the dioceses of Kiev and Moscow.

The word '*ὄντος*' emphasizes the authority that Constantinople had and continues to have. Although the Ecumenical Patriarchate was located within the Ottoman Empire, it had administrative and judicial privileges over the other Orthodox Churches. Patriarch Jeremiah II, in the patriarchal 'Tomos' for the establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow, writes: 'so that the recently ordained metropolitan of Moscow [Joasaph] is called a patriarch, and is numbered among the other patriarchs, and has the rank and commemoration after the patriarch of Jerusalem, and is obliged to mention our name and those of the other patriarchs, and to regard the apostolic throne of Constantinople as his head and first, as the other patriarchs do'.[16] The terms found in the text of 1589 indicate that the ecumenical patriarch is 'superior' and 'the source' for the patriarchs of Moscow, who were required to mention the patriarch of Constantinople and the other patriarchs.

It is important to note that, following the official Synodal Documents, letters from patriarch Dionysius to Kings John and Peter were also issued. Although these letters do not carry the weight of the official Synodal Documents due to their private nature, they provide significant clarifications on the matter. In these letters, it is mentioned that the then patriarch of Moscow, as well as 'the subsequent patriarchs in the same manner', received permission to perform the ordination and enthronement of the metropolitans of Kiev. However, this last phrase is not included in the official ecclesiastical text, and this silence suggests

[14] V. Tchentsova, Синодальное решение 1686 г. о Киевской митрополии, in: Древняя Русь. Вопросы медиевистики 2 (68), 2017, с. 101–102.

[15] *Ibid* 101.

[16] Regel, № 5, p. 87; V. Tchentsova, Синодальное решение 1686 г. о Киевской митрополии, in: Древняя Русь. Вопросы медиевистики 2 (68), 2017, с. 96.

that the permission from Constantinople to Moscow was temporary. Although the letter mentions that this permission would also apply to future patriarchs, it does not state that this permission would be perpetual, as is usually specified in official patriarchal documents. This is also evident from the part of the letter where patriarch Dionysius writes to patriarch Joachim of Moscow that during the Divine Liturgy, the metropolitan of Kiev should remember the patriarch of Constantinople:

> ...with one thing being preserved, namely, that when the metropolitan of –Kiev performs the bloodless and divine mysteries in the parish, he should mention first the revered name of the most holy ecumenical patriarch, as from him all good things are spread to the ends of the world, and being the source of all, and in a conciliatory manner due to the aforementioned reasons, and acknowledging the subjection of the Moscow Patriarchate to the throne of Constantinople, and then the patriarch of Moscow.[17]

The letters of Dionysius are significant because they show that the throne of Moscow is remembered as being subject to Constantinople.[18]

The letters of patriarch Dositheos of Jerusalem confirm the right of the patriarch of Moscow over Kiev only for the ordination of the metropolitans of Kiev but explain that this right is temporary.[19] Representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate usually cite this part of Dositheos's letter and the 119th canon of Carthage and the seventeenth canon of the Fourth Ecumenical Council.[20] His eminence metropolitan Kyriakos of Crete notes:

[17] Οικουμενικός Θρόνος και η Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας – Ομιλούν τα κείμενα, 2018, 28; Βλ. Φειδά, *Το ζήτημα της Αυτοκεφαλίας της Ορθοδόξου Εκκλησίας της Ουκρανίας εκ πηγών αψεύδων*, Αθήνα 2019, 31–32.

[18] Архимандрит Кирилл Говорун 'Комментарии к Константинопольским синодальным грамотам 1686 года', 2018.

[19] Αρχιμ. Καλλίστου, «Ο Πατριάρχης Δοσίθεος (1669–1707) και οι αγώνες αυτού και της αδελφότητος υπέρ των Αγίων Τόπων», *Εκκλησιαστικός Φάρος*, τχ. ΙΒ (Δεκέμβριος 1928), 742.

[20] Ράλλη - Ποτλῆ, *Σύνταγμα θείων καὶ ἱερῶν Κανόνων*, τόμ. Γ', 574 και τόμ. Β', 258–259: «*Τὰς καθ' ἑκάστην ἐπαρχίαν ἀγροικικὰς παροικίας, ἢ ἐγχωρίους, μένειν ἀπαρασαλεύτους παρὰ τοῖς κατέχουσιν αὐτὰς ἐπισκόποις, καὶ μάλιστα ἢ τριακονταετῆ χρόνον ταύτας ἀβιάστως διακατέχοντες ᾠκονόμησαν. Εἰ δὲ ἐντὸς τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν γεγένηταί τις, ἢ γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφισβήτησις, ἐξεῖναι τοῖς λέγουσιν ἠδικῆσθαι περὶ τούτων κινεῖν παρὰ τῇ Συνόδῳ τῆς ἐπαρχίας. Εἰ δέ τις ἀδικοῖτο παρὰ τοῦ ἰδίου μητροπολίτου, παρὰ τῷ ἐξάρχῳ τοῖς διοικήσεως, ἢ τῷ Κωνσταντινουπόλεως θρόνῳ δικαζέσθω, καθ' ἃ προείρηται. Εἰ δὲ καί τις ἐκ βασιλικῆς ἐξουσίας ἐκαινίσθη πόλις, ἢ αὖθις καινισθείη, τοῖς πολιτικοῖς καὶ δημοσίοις τύποις, καὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν παροικιῶν ἡ τάξις ἀκολουθείτω*».

> The Patriarchate of Moscow, in order to strengthen its own position, resorts to the 119th canon of Carthage and the 17th canon of Chalcedon, since within a period of three years (Carthage) or thirty years (Chalcedon) the jurisdiction of the (ecumenical throne) in Ukraine was not contested. However, Ukraine, as a free state today, is neither a rural nor a domestic parish between two bishops (Chalcedon), nor is it related to Donatist bishops who, upon returning to the canonical Church, could claim within three years the place that belonged to them. Besides these points and the problem of where Ukraine properly belongs, the granting of autocephaly to it and the restoration to normalcy of the first schismatics is undoubtedly based on the right of appeal to the Ecumenical Patriarchate...[21]

But how did events develop from the seventeenth century onward? After 1686, most of Ukraine remained under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In 1710, the first Ukrainian Constitution stated that the Metropolitanate of Kiev should be restored under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In 1791, at a local council in Pinsk, the archpriests from the provinces of Western Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland decided to restore autonomy under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This jurisdiction also extended to Southern Ukraine and Crimea, which were under Ottoman control. Many Cossacks left Zaporizhzhia in 1775 and moved to Ottoman territory, remaining under the omophorion of the ecumenical patriarch until the mid-nineteenth century. The Carpathian region was under the jurisdiction of the ecumenical throne and was only occupied by the Russians in 1946. In 1788, Russia abolished the Crimean provinces, but the Ecumenical Patriarchate never recognized the decision of the Russian Church. The older provinces in Crimea, Gothia, and Kapha were under the jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarch until the Russians occupied Crimea.[22] So why did the Patriarchate of Constantinople not react to these violations? As is

[21] Κυρίλλου μητροπολίτου Κρήνης, *Το Πατριαρχείο Κωνσταντινουπόλεως και η Αυτοκέφαλη Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας*, Κωνσταντινούπολις 2021, 24–25.

[22] Archbishop Job of Telmessos, 'The Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukrain and the canonical Prerogatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate', in *The Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ukrain Autocephaly*, Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle, 2019, 49–50.

known, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, after the fall of the City, lived and performed its duties under difficult conditions, particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the life and death of patriarch Gregory V alone is enough to understand this situation. However, Russia took advantage of the ecumenical throne's situation and succeeded in occupying and abolishing its older provinces. The usual violations by the Patriarchate of Russia constitute the reason for the revocation of the 'Act' of 1686 by the patriarch of Constantinople.

The second accusation of the Russian Church's claims is the challenge to the recognition of ordinations conducted in schism and the restoration of those ordained in schism to the canonical order of the Orthodox Church. This issue is one of the fundamental matters of Canon Law that has concerned the Church throughout the centuries. Although a similar issue arose in the Orthodox Church last century, specifically the Bulgarian schism, the particular question regarding the Church of Ukraine remains in doubt.[23]

It is known that schism is the organized refusal to submit to the canonical order of the Church; it is the separation of a group from ecclesiastical unity, and a key characteristic is the presence of at least one bishop within that group.[24] This separation occurs either due to doctrinal differences or administrative positions. In the case of the Ukrainian issue, it is clear that the reason was administrative. However, the important question of how clergy ordained in schism will be accepted back into the Church reemerges whenever it occurs in the life of the Church.

In the history of the Church, there are numerous examples confirming the recognition and acceptance of those ordained in schism, but I believe it would be unnecessary to list all these examples here. Instead, we will emphasize the extent to which the Church has addressed the preservation of its unity. The 68th apostolic canon prohibits reordination, and in cases where ordination was performed by heretics, the Church employs the measure of ecclesiastical economy. The Church

[23] In 1852, the Bulgarian bishops were deposed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, a fact that was reiterated by the Synod of Constantinople in 1872. However, later in 1945, the Synod of the Bulgarian Church requested the Ecumenical Patriarchate to restore and lift the deprivations, which was done in 1961. The Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized all the sacraments and, of course, the ordinations that took place during the schism. No autocephalous Church protested against the specific actions and decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

[24] Π. Μπούμη, *Κανονικὸν Δίκαιον*, Ἀθήνα 2002, 244.

examines each case individually every time. This is observed in St Basil the Great, who addresses this issue in his letter to Amphilochius of Iconium. The 68th apostolic canon forbids reordination unless it was performed by heretics. But even in such cases, the Church employs the measure of economy. This is evident from numerous examples in ecclesiastical history. Here are a few: St Meletius of Antioch was ordained by the Arians. He, in turn, ordained St Basil the Great and St John Chrysostom. Similarly, St Cyril of Jerusalem was ordained by the Arians. The bishops ordained by the Arians were present at the Second Ecumenical Council. St Germanus of Constantinople had been ordained by the Monothelites. Not only St Germanus but also many others ordained by the Monothelites were accepted into the Church.

Likewise, at the Seventh Ecumenical Council, thirteen bishops who had been ordained by the Iconoclasts were accepted. If the Church recognized the Baptism as valid, then the priesthood was also considered valid, but not always—if heretics had been baptized within the Church, they were accepted into the Church, as seen in the letter of Alexander of Alexandria to the First Ecumenical Council, where it is mentioned that those ordained by Meletius of Lycopolis were to be accepted into the Church.[25] The view of St Tarasius is interesting, as he points out that those coming from heretics should be accepted into the Church and their clerical rank should not be removed.[26] St Tarasius also references St Basil regarding the Novatians and the eighth canon of the First Ecumenical Council concerning their acceptance into the Church without reordination. This specific view of Tarasius is confirmed by St Photius, who adds examples of heretics coming into the Church and their acceptance and retention of their clerical rank.[27] It is well-known that the Seventh Ecumenical Council accepted cases of iconoclasts only with an apology for their heresy, despite the 68th apostolic canon which mandates reordination for heretics.

The question is whether, in the case of schismatics who have not committed any theological heresy, their acceptance into the Church is necessary. The method of accepting heretics and schismatics has always

[25] Σωκράτους, *Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Ἱστορία Α'*, 9, *PG* 67, 80.

[26] *ACO* 4, 1, 230.

[27] Φωτίου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, *Ἐρωτήματα δέκα*, *PG* 104, 1224. Κυρίλλου Μητροπολίτου Κρήνης, *Το Πατριαρχείο Κωνσταντινουπόλεως και η Αυτοκέφαλη Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας*, Κωνσταντινούπολις 2021, 47–48.

been more lenient compared to the theological analysis of heresies or schisms because the Church examines each case individually, always emphasizing the mystery of the Incarnation of the Word, which reflects God's infinite love for the sins of the first humans. The Church of Christ always acts towards the healing of each case rather than their condemnation, and for the impact on the path of salvation for every person. All these examples show that both heretical and schismatic cases are understood only through ecclesiastical economy. When there is a particular case and need, the Church of Christ always transcends the canonical provisions.

The case of Ukraine was addressed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate using the criteria of Canon Law and the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church. In the process of achieving autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church, the leaders of the two factions within the Ukrainian Church, Filaret and Makarios, turned to the ecumenical patriarch to resolve the existing situation. The reason they turned to the ecumenical patriarch was the right of appeal that the Ecumenical Patriarchate holds according to the ninth and seventeenth canons of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, a right that the ecumenical throne acquired with the third canon of the Second Ecumenical Council when it gained the privileges of the Church of Rome. If we read the interpretations of Byzantine canonists such as Balsamon, Zonaras, Aristinos and Matthew Blastaris, we will see that the Ecumenical Patriarchate has an indisputable right to accept appeals outside its own jurisdiction.

The main accusation of the Moscow Patriarchate against the leaders of the two factions—Filaret and Makarios—was the questioning of the canonical validity of their priesthoods and, consequently, the ordinations they performed, as both were deposed by the Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, if we examine the timeline, we see that both of them had canonical ordinations and, therefore, apostolic succession, which the Moscow Patriarchate disputed. In 1990, due to political and ecclesiastical circumstances, the Moscow Patriarchate declared the Ukrainian Church as autonomous. At that time, Filaret became the exarch and metropolitan of Kiev (his beatitude metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine). Filaret, therefore, was ordained in the Russian Church and thus had canonical ordination and apostolic succession. The same applies to Makarios, who was ordained by bishops Dmitry

(Yarema), Igor (Isichenko), and Methodius (Kundryakov), who were ordained by metropolitan Metislav (Skripnik). Metropolitan Metislav had been ordained by Polikarp Sikorski, who had been ordained by Dionysius, metropolitan of Poland, in 1942.

The council of Poland was primarily made up of Ukrainian archbishops who decided upon and took the initiative to establish the Church of Ukraine, which was done in 1942 under the presidency of Polycarp Sikorski, who, as mentioned, had been ordained by the metropolitan of Warsaw and all Poland. Under Stalin's regime, due to the persecutions against the autocephalists, all the archbishops left for America and Canada.

As we see, the legitimacy of their ordination and thus the apostolic succession is indisputable. It is another matter that they were deposed by the council of the Moscow Church. The reason for their deposition was their struggle for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. At that time, the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized these deprivations, as is usually done with the recognition of deprivations by other Orthodox Churches. However, this does not prevent the Ecumenical Patriarchate from lifting these deprivations.[28] The Ecumenical Patriarchate could not reject the appeal from the Ukrainian autocephalists, which had been strengthened by the official endorsement of the President and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized the ordinations of the former schismatics and advanced the act towards the declaration of the autocephaly of Ukraine, as it had done with other newer Orthodox Churches in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Church has always acted this way, not only with schismatics but also with heretics.

These acts of the Church are understood only within the framework of ecclesiastical *economia*. As St Nicodemus of Mount Athos explains, the Church governs the salvation of the souls of the faithful sometimes with strictness and sometimes with *economia*[29].

Finally, we will note that: a) as we have seen, historical and canonical facts support the autocephaly of Ukraine, as noted by well-known canonists of the Orthodox Church; b) after the ancient institution of

[28] Κυρίλλου Μητροπολίτου Κρήνης, *Το Πατριαρχείο Κωνσταντινουπόλεως και η Αυτοκέφαλη Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας*, Κωνσταντινούπολις 2021, 53.

[29] *Πηδάλιον*, Ἐν Ἀθήναις 1886, 54.

the Pentarchy, the establishment of newer Orthodox Churches and the granting of autocephaly to them happened for the same reasons and in the same manner as with Ukraine, e.g., the way autocephaly was granted to the Churches of Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria, which was exactly the same way it was granted to the Church of Ukraine; c) the reason the Patriarchate of Constantinople, as the 'First Among Equals', began granting Tomes of autocephaly was to maintain the unity of the Church, so that there would be no pressure on the life of these newer Churches from their old jurisdictions. During the dissolution of the imperial regimes, the hierarchy of the new national countries no longer wished to be subject to the imperial hierarchy, and the only solution was the granting of autocephaly to these Churches. This was the case with the Church of Georgia, even though Georgia did not fall under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Constantinople. d) Historically, the privilege of granting autocephaly has always belonged to the See of Constantinople, and I believe it should remain so, as it is impossible to reach an agreement on this issue, because the hierarchies of the major countries will never agree to grant autocephaly to the newer countries that have been liberated from these states.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate serves as the high criterion for resolving the various problems that arise in the Orthodox Church from time to time. The Ecumenical Patriarchate has never viewed the appeal as a means of exerting influence over newer Churches. On the contrary, the purpose of the appeal, as the safest key defined by the Fathers of the Ecumenical Councils, was to contribute in the best way to the resolution of various issues in the life of the Church and their healing.

Captivity & suffering in Etty Hillesum and Iulia De Beausobre: a closer look of autobiographical texts

ALESSIA BROMBIN
Associate Professor of Theology, Sulkhan Saba Orbeliani University, Tbilisi, Georgia

With this paper I intend to outline, with a comparative approach, the spiritual experience of suffering in two 20th-century female authors who admirably described the impact that World War II and the Russian Revolution had on their lives respectively. On the one hand, Etty Hillesum (1914-1943), a Dutch Jewish writer who was a victim of the Holocaust, and Iulia de Beausobre (1893-1977), an author of Russian origin who was a refugee in England. Different lives in similar contexts, one Dutch and the other Russian, one tied to a complex network of family and emotional relationships seasoned by personal contradictions and the looming threat of war, the other, after her release from a seven-year imprisonment in the 'Gulag' concentration camps of the Soviet Union, treasured the experience and summarised it in her autobiography "The Woman Who Could Not Die" (1938) in the pamphlet "Creative Suffering" (1940). They suffered abuse and violence very close together. Their existences were punctuated by suffering, but they were able to rework, according to their respective faiths, their suffering and draw great lessons from it, which have been bequeathed to us.

Suffering runs through all human life. Iulia de Beausobre, speaking in London in the dark days of 1940 from her experience of isolation and exile, describes how the Russian people learned to respond to suffering. She starts from the basic premise that suffering can be used creatively, in the power of Christ's victory.

In Etty Hillesum, there is an evolution of the meaning of suffering according to the progress of her own spiritual growth; in her life she was able to gather and integrate experiences, maturing an understanding of suffering by linking it to that of others; for her, recognizing her own and others' pain meant strengthening her trust in God. Suffering was seen as a source from which to draw the strength to overcome obstacles.

For Etty, suffering is a "potential for humanisation"; for Iulia, suffering is "participation". In this talk, we will examine the respective views of the authors, trying to draw parallels and points of contact.

1. Preliminaries

With this intervention, which falls within the topic of *Christian Approaches (Orthodox and non-Orthodox) to Violence, War, and Conflict*, I intend to outline, through a comparative approach, the "suffering" as a spiritual experience, and the spiritual resources to meet them, in the lives of two 20th-century female authors who admirably recorded their own impressions in diaries, letters, and autobiographies.

Etty Hillesum (1914–1943) and Iulia de Beausobre (1893–1977) had different life experiences but were intertwined within similar historical contexts. One was Dutch, while the other was a Russian refugee in Great Britain. One was Jewish, the other Eastern Orthodox Christian. One was connected to a complex web of family and emotional relationships that intertwined with personal contradictions and the threat of war. The other, after seven years of imprisonment in Soviet Union camps, captured her experience of evil in "Creative Suffering" written in 1940.[1] They both endured similar abuses and violence, and their lives were marked by pain. However, this allowed for the on-going reworking of their sufferings, drawing profound lessons for themselves and those who follow their teachings.

Iulia de Beausobre, writing from London about her experiences of isolation and exile in the dark post-release days her release, described how the Russian people, whom she considered herself a part of, and had learned to respond positively to suffering. The fundamental premise is that suffering can be used creatively, leveraging the strength of Christ's victory over death. Cruelty is symptomatic of a deeply rooted evil that surpasses human understanding. Thus, her time in prison allowed her to delve into the very roots of evil, which, for every Christian, were defeated on the Cross.

In Etty Hillesum, we can observe an inner evolution of the meaning of suffering, following the progress of her spiritual growth. In her life, she was able to gather and integrate multiple nuances of pain, maturing an understanding of suffering in relation to the suffering of others. For her, recognizing her own pain and that of others meant strengthening her trust in God. Suffering was seen as a source from which to draw strength to overcome life's obstacles.

[1] De Beausobre, Iulia. *Creative Suffering.* Fairacres Oxford: SLG Press, 1994. (First printing: De Beausobre, Iulia. *Creative Suffering.* Westminster: Dacre Press, 1940.)

For Etty, suffering was a great potential for humanization. Similarly, for Iulia, the hermeneutic key of suffering is essentially "participation." In this intervention, we will have the opportunity to observe their respective reflections, seeking to analyse their parallels and potential points of contact.

2. Status quaestionis

Physical pain, illness, and death relate to the broader issue concerning human finitude. Man constantly faces the horizon of death; he is a "Sein zum Tode" (Heidegger). On such a profound problem, suffering humanity has sought answers not only in philosophical speculation but also in religious beliefs. The problem of the meaning of suffering, being inherently personal and concrete, yet involving all of humanity, requires a reflection that encompasses every level of reality. It calls for a refraction of the most human dimension of this problem, emphasizing each individual's ability to consciously integrate it into their existential worldview. This endeavour was magnificently undertaken in the past century by authors belonging to various religions and denominations, such as Wiesel, Bonhoeffer, Moltmann, and others.

The question often arises: "What does the Bible say about God and the mystery of human suffering"? The most famous biblical reference to the reality of innocent suffering is found in the book of Job. This text has been the subject of commentary by great thinkers of the Church, from Augustine and Gregory the Great to Elie Wiesel, who survived the Holocaust. This book allows us to glimpse, on one hand, the silence of God, and on the other, His merciful care for the suffering poor, who undergo a process of inner transformation due to their pain. This entails moving from resistance to supplication, acceptance, making choices, and ultimately sharing and experiencing this journey together.

Both authors urge us to perceive in catastrophic events the positive resonances of the suffering endured by others, proposing a transformative solution to being that embodies the incessant pursuit of holiness akin to that of Christ on the Cross and the great patriarchs and prophets of the Old Testament.

In this presentation, we will first explore the contributions of Iulia de Beausobre and then delve into those of Etty Hillesum, as Iulia's figure remains relatively unknown to most.

3. The Creative suffering of Iulia de Beausobre

In nineteen hundred and thirty-two, Iulia de Beausobre, a highly inconvenient and politically exposed Russian woman, was imprisoned as a result. She was a young aristocratic lady from a noble family in Tsarist Russia and spent her early years in St. Petersburg. In nineteen hundred and fourteen, at the onset of the Great War, she returned from her European trip to serve as a voluntary nurse. In nineteen hundred and twenty, she married Nikolay de Beausobre, a Russian diplomat.[2]

Her marriage to a diplomat drew the attention of the political police, resulting in their imprisonment. Her personal sufferings were first recorded on paper in nineteen hundred and thirty-eight in her autobiography, *The Woman Who Could Not Die*. Having sought refuge in England since nineteen hundred and thirty-four, she provided a powerful account of her captivity in Soviet Union camps, along with a careful analysis of the various psychological and spiritual states she experienced during her painful ordeal. In this text, Iulia recounted the illnesses she contracted and her fear for her life, from her exile in nineteen hundred and twenty-nine to Nikolay's arrest in February nineteen hundred and thirty-two, followed by her own arrest six days later. After being released from the concentration camp, she decided to seek refuge in Great Britain.

It was during this phase of her life, alone and without assistance or shelter, with the confirmation of Nikolay's execution, that she began her original elaboration of the concept of "creative suffering." This led her to write "Creative Suffering" in nineteen hundred and forty, a theological interpretation of her personal experience in the light of Eastern mystical churches. She was guided by the idea that, like the Foolishness for Christ (*διά Χριστόν σαλότητα*, in Greek; *yurodstvo*, in Russian),[3] she had been called to participate in the miseries of life.

[2] Babington Smith, Constance. *Iulia de Beausobre. A russian christian in the West*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1983, 5-22.

[3] The "foolishness in Christ" (in Greek *διά Χριστόν σαλότητα*, in Church Slavonic *оуродъ*,

3.1 Peace in suffering

In her autobiography, Iulia placed emphasis on the aid she received from meditating on the Gospel. It was the words of John, "Peace be with you" (John 20:19), that resurfaced forcefully in her prison cell, offering her an avenue of escape from despair. Iulia mustered the courage to address her five armed jailers, saying to them: "Let peace stream to the left of you. Let peace stream to the right of you. Let peace remain awhile wherever you may tread. May it spread even to the furthest boundaries of the universe."[4]

What did this serene gaze of perfect understanding reveal to her? In "Creative Suffering," being a sharp-eyed and observant observer, Iulia described how a victim could survive the cruelty of their tormentors through an extraordinarily clear effort of perception of both reality and oneself.

This effort, incidentally and inevitably, is capable of granting the victim of abuse a kind of inner serenity. Iulia was certain that even this inner peace could be shattered, particularly when the pressure from the captors is of a psychological nature. What Iulia did was to analyse the very idea of suffering, not so much from the perspective of the isolated victim, but from that of the martyr embedded in the mystical tradition of the Church. She wondered if the belongingness of the tortured ones to the Church could alter the perception of suffering itself, that is, if recognizing oneself as part of the mystical body of Christ could change the balance between the torturer and the tortured. Supporting this hypothesis, Iulia found illustrious examples from the Orthodox

юродъ) represents a particular expression of holiness in the tradition of Eastern Christianity. Its sources in the New Testament can be mainly found in the Pauline Epistles (1 Corinthians 1:25; 3:19; 4:10; 2 Corinthians 6:8). The fool in Christ bears witness to Christ by going decidedly against the common way of life. They exhibit bizarre behaviour: living in extreme poverty, uttering seemingly meaningless words, and performing actions and gestures that defy common logic. This is motivated by a desire to despise oneself and to highlight the glory of God. The fool aims to demonstrate the vanity of appearances, the falsehood of self-love, pride, and arrogance, while calling for authenticity in the Christian life. Unique expressions of this kind of holiness include freedom of conscience and speech, indifference to adversity, simplicity, rejection of education, the gift of prophecy, which makes them interpreters of the will of the Lord, and inner solitude. The Russian term (derived from the ancient word "urod" meaning "abortion, monstrosity," see 1 Corinthians 4:10) designates those individuals who adopt an extremely ascetic way of life, disregarding social conventions. In the Byzantine world, the fool in Christ was referred to by the Syriac term "salós," as mentioned in dictionaries (Ferro, Maria Chiara. 'Tradurre i lemmi russi appartenenti al lessico agiografico slavo ecclesiastico. Difficoltà e proposte', Studi Slavistici IX (2012): 139-140.)

[4] De Beausobre, Iulia. *The woman who could not die*. New York: Viking Press, 1938, 10-11.

mystical tradition, such as that of Mother Theodosia and the other nuns encountered by Seraphim of Sarov in the lumber camp in the forest.[5] Although the nuns were prohibited from singing hymns and litanies out loud, they constantly prayed to Christ, and Mother Theodosia herself continued to watch over the dying even on her deathbed.[6] Iulia learned a great deal from those nuns about self-discipline. She knew she was part of the mystical body of Christ, as Mother Theodosia had suggested[7]. Iulia realized that this view of suffering, as an essential part of communion with Christ, was typically Orthodox, but at the same time, it should not be limited to Russian Christians alone. On the contrary, she believed that spreading this constructive perspective on pain could help every Christian bear the burden of personal suffering. Her reference to the "fools for Christ" finds resonance in the Western mystical tradition as well, in the writings of Julian of Norwich and not just in the Gospels. Julian's positive view of suffering - which, through her contemplation of her own bewilderment in the face of the hell that separated humanity from God, led her to believe that if everything was brought into being and accomplished by Him, then even sin could be seen as something "benign" - aligns not only with Iulia's thinking but with the entire Orthodox mysticism. This universality of value is explicitly expressed in "Creative Suffering," where Iulia explains how accepting the perception of her communion with the Saints allowed her to overcome the sufferings of imprisonment and experience a state of peace. However, the merit of this outcome does not solely lie in a mental state but directly stems from the Passion of Christ on the cross, which, in turn, depends on God's merciful love. Realizing that she stood beneath the Cross implied belonging to the community of all those to whom God has granted knowledge of His peace, even in the midst of pain. However, Iulia focused specifically on Redemption because it assisted her in "redeeming the act" of sadism and cruelty

[5] In the life of Serafim of Sarov, it is narrated the special spiritual bond he shared with the sisters of the Diveyevo convent. Donald, Nicholl. 'The starets: saint Seraphim.' *Triumphs of the spirit in Russia*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1997, 11-66; Evdokïmov, Pavel Nikolaevič. 'Saint Seraphim of Sarov. An icon of Orthodox spirituality,' *Ecumenical Review* 15 (1963): 264-278.

[6] Felton Pidgin, Charles. *Theodosia, the first gentlewoman of her time. The story of her life, and a history of persons and events connected therewith*. Boston: C.M. Clark Publishing Company, 1907.

[7] Kontzevitch, Helen. *Saint Seraphim. Wonderworker of Sarov and his spiritual inheritance*. Wildwood (CA): St. Xenia Skete, 2004, 17.

that she herself, as a victim, had endured. This attention to Redemption also had deep roots in Orthodox mystical thought; the life of Serafim of Sarov is once again an emblematic example. In one of the episodes from his biography, the Saint had encountered in the forest a redeemed creature, a ransomed tree, a towering black spruce illuminated from within, an echo - so to speak - of his transfiguration, a sign of the new creation that was gloriously breaking into his path.[8]

Iulia realized that the peace she had attained was of transcendental origin and not psychological. She knew that it is "more potent to counteract sadistic lusts than any barren impassivity could be,"[9] and therefore, "The serenity that has been attained is a sure safeguard against all self-deception and any petty distractions."[10] Iulia firmly believed that the path towards transcendence leads directly to the limits of human existence, as it is through active participation that one can overcome difficulties, not through resistance or evasion. The effort to transcend evil through sheer force inevitably led to further evils, which is why the hermeneutical essence of "Creative Suffering" is undoubtedly found in "participation." While this author illustrated her concept of "participation" through imagery drawn from Russian and English literature, the broader significance of this notion can be discerned. The concept of "active participation" in suffering or in the evil of others involved integrating both the evil and the wrongdoer into a wider context — the context of God's plan and one's own state of sanctification. Participation entailed a "loving sympathy" towards one's jailor based on the belief that "Where evil is at its most intense, there too must be the greatest good. To us this is not even a hypothesis. It is axiomatic."[11]

De Beausobre assures us that such sympathy is "an act of redemption" for the one who suffers and for all others. Through loving participation, suffering can be creative in the sense of an impersonal enrichment, a universal good, a part of the redemptive work of Christ in his mystical body. The author is sensitive to the corporate or social aspect of

[8] *Cavarnos, Constantine, and Zeldin, Mary-Barbara (ed.). St. Seraphim of Sarov*. Belmont: Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 2001, 116.

[9] De Beausobre, Iulia. *Creative Suffering*, 17.

[10] De Beausobre, Iulia. *Creative Suffering*, 45.

[11] De Beausobre, Iulia. *Creative Suffering*, 14.

suffering. A Christian does not suffer, or overcome suffering, alone but as a member of Christ's mystical body, the Church.[12]

4. Etty Hillesum and the Spirituality of Suffering

It feels as if great changes are taking place in me, and I believe it is more than a passing mood. Last night was a great breakthrough: a new insight, at least if one can call something like that insight, and this morning I was filled with peace again and with an assurance I have not felt for a long time. And all this because of one little blister on my left foot.[13]

In nineteen hundred and forty-two, Etty Hillesum was aware of the intensification of persecutions against the Jewish people, and her response manifested in three ways: through accepting the responsibility to document such persecution, through the maturation of her own conception of God and prayer life, and the development of a "spirituality of suffering."[14] In this examination, we will focus specifically on this last aspect, as within her, a spontaneous introspective movement had arisen, driven by the urgent need to understand human essence, which she explicitly identified with the search for God. For her, when the Lord is recognized within the depths of the individual, love then emerges as the only possible attitude to comprehend and respond to the pain of suffering. The love that Etty Hillesum speaks of is inherently a tension, a vital force, a desire that propels humans towards God and towards others.

Etty, in her analysis of others' actions, also included those that were evil and cruel, and she believed that it was necessary to start from the awareness of a common psychological background among human beings, which exists regardless of religion or other factors, defining the essence of humanity itself. One comes to feel a sense of strength that permeates the relationship with the executioner because - for Etty - even the enemy is a human being, and within this humanity, something to be understood is hidden, as was the case with the German soldier who attended the daughter of a rabbi at the peak of her agony, upon

[12] Murphy, Anne. 'Contemporary theologies of the Cross, II,' *The Way* 28, no. 3 (1988): 263.

[13] Hillesum, Hetty. *An Interrupted Life the Diaries, 1941–1943 and Letters from Westerbork*. New York: Owl Books-Henry Holt and Company, 2012, 157.

[14] Gaillardetz, *Richard R.*. 'Sexual Vulnerability and a Spirituality of Suffering: Explorations in the Writing of Etty Hillesum,' *Pacifica* 22 (2009): 78-79.

which Etty reflected with extreme sensitivity and compassion, noting: "Out of all those uniforms one has been given a face now. There will be other faces, too, in which we shall be able to read something we understand: that German soldiers suffer as well. There are no frontiers between suffering people, and we must pray for them all."[15]

The German soldier, above all, cannot be regarded as the adversary, but rather as a human being whose exploration should emerge from personal experience and lived circumstances. It is essential to consider all the challenges that shape their existence. This lies at the heart of Etty Hillesum's proposition against indiscriminate animosity, combating the ailment of the soul that oversimplifies reality, dichotomizing it into opposing factions of malevolent and virtuous, oppressors and victims. In contrast, Hillesum advocates for the potency of love, capable of delving even into the countenance of the foe, seeking a glimmer of humanity.

The perspective adopted by Hillesum allows us to understand that the other is a human being, and their soul represents an expansive and deep battleground where opposing forces collide and all contradictions find space. It is humanity, irrespective of race, that is capable of both evil and love.[16] The world is not a battlefield between two opposing principles, but rather a place where the love of God is made manifest. This unwavering conviction enabled Hillesum to confront one of the darkest chapters in human history with an attitude that may appear as resignation and passive acceptance. In response to this underlying accusation, she wrote: "I shall always be able to stand on my own two feet even when they are planted on the hardest soil of the harshest reality. And my acceptance is not indifference or helplessness. I feel deep moral indignation at a regime that treats human beings in such a way. But events have become too overwhelming and too demonic to be stemmed with personal resentment and bitterness. These responses

[15] Hillesum, Hetty. *An Interrupted Life the Diaries, 1941–1943 and Letters from Westerbork*, 142.

[16] Etty Hillesum endeavours to look at the individuality of each man and woman, something that war prevents us from seeing, and she perceives in the behaviour of the oppressor and the person in charge a characteristic that can also appear on the face of the victim. Fear for oneself and hatred must be replaced by the experience of pain, which, like love, is a part of life. Thus, pain becomes pietas, a clear acknowledgment of evil, and a refusal to judge the wrongdoers, because the afflictions of the soul affect everyone. (Boella, Laura. *Le imperdonabili Milena Jesenská, Etty Hillesum, Marina Cvetaeva, Ingeborg Bachmann, Cristina Campo*. Sesto San Giovanni (Mi): Mimesis, 2013, 80).

strike me as being utterly childish and unequal to the fateful course of events."[17]

In the face of a subjective viewpoint, a broader perspective emerged that left no room for resentment, bitterness, and hatred, as such feelings are devoid of strength, barren, and blind, incapable of generating anything positive. Hence, Etty's *Diary* and *Letters* reflect her growing conviction that when suffering cannot be avoided, it can still be transformed by incorporating it into a wider vision of existence. This forms the foundation of her "spirituality of suffering," wherein one must neither flee from suffering nor allow oneself to be overwhelmed by it, but rather incorporate it into broader horizons where grace and blessing can always be found.[18]

5. Epilogue

In the face of the extermination of Jews in Europe, in her writings, Hillesum reveals a kind of emotional depth that testifies to an outpouring of love as a means of responding to experiences of life and death, much like the great mystics and poets of all times. Etty reached a point where she had learned to love people through the love for God that was within them.[19] Her perspective alludes to an approach to suffering that involves nurturing and transforming it into love and compassion, rather than rationalizing or intellectualizing it. This view emphasizes

[17] Hillesum, Hetty. *An Interrupted Life the Diaries, 1941–1943 and Letters from Westerbork*, 165.

[18] Gaillardetz, *Richard R.*. 'Sexual Vulnerability and a Spirituality of Suffering: Explorations in the Writing of Etty Hillesum,' 81.

Gradually, as her understanding grew, she saw suffering as an inescapable reality, and her challenge became accepting the inevitable; she turned to face vulnerabilities and sorrows instead of evading them. Her perspective began to reveal an interesting lucidity. If suffering is a part of life, there is no point in not facing it; still, one should not seek it out either. Moreover, authentic suffering leads the human being to what she called - echoing Spier's annotations - an "active passiveness" that "consists in accepting and enduring something irrevocable, and that is how new forces are released." […] In that progressive existential lucidity, Etty Hillesum discovered that suffering could give her a humanizing potential. Suffering could be lived in dignity, and human beings could even face death with no loss of self. For this, all that was necessary was to live beyond the stigmas that humans place on things because of their fear. And again, for Hillesum, suffering was viewed as a source of strength and life, for both oneself and for others (Navarro Sánchez, Rosana Elena. *Suffering, Silence, and Wisdom in the Life of Etty Hillesum*. In *The Lasting Significance of Etty Hillesum's Writings*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019, 296-297).

[19] Morrison, Glenn. 'I love people so terribly: approaching affectivity with Levinas, Hillesum, and Christian Theology,' *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 54, no. 4 (2019): 541.

the importance of embracing suffering and, at the same time, allows for the shaping of one's empathetic capacity and understanding of others.[20]

This approach converges with the one adopted by Iulia De Beausobre, as she assures us that this sympathy/empathy is "an act of redemption" not only for the one who suffers but also for everyone else. "Participation" is perhaps the only way to survive the sadism and cruelty of one's oppressors. To achieve this, it is necessary, to the extent possible, to enter the minds and motivations of those who inflict pain.

The author of "Creative Suffering," speaking of her experience of isolation and exile from London, described how the Russian people had learned from the Christian Tradition to treasure this experience. Iulia's core idea centers on the backdrop that underpins this book the idea that suffering can be harnessed creatively, drawing strength from Christ's ultimate triumph over death. Consequently, any endured cruelty is indicative of a profound malevolence beyond human comprehension. Nevertheless, it is at its core that Christ conquers this malevolence, and it's for this very reason that such suffering is embraced out of love for the Father. Ultimately, we can agree with Peranton in affirming that Hillesum followed a similar path to the Orthodox one, recognizing God in her life and gaining a deeper understanding of herself. This led her to see other human beings as images of God. Therefore, in June nineteen hundred and forty-two, when events took a swift and definitive turn, Hillesum tried not to emphasize in her Diary the separation between "them" - the Nazis, the perpetrators, and the evil - and "us" - the Jews, the victims, and the good.[21] Furthermore, like Iulia, Hillesum turned to prayer to confront this terrifying situation. In prayer, she perceived her own suffering and that of all humanity, leading to new levels of understanding the significance of terms such as "with," "the other," and "you." She began to experience the importance of unity, of sharing in common, to strengthen their shared hope.[22]

[20] Murphy, Anne. 'Contemporary theologies of the Cross, II,' 263.

[21] Arriero Peranton, Fernando. *A "staretz" in Camp Westerbok. The Connections Between Slavic Orthodoxy and the Spirituality of Etty Hillesum*. In *The Lasting Significance of Etty Hillesum's Writings*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019, 38.

[22] Navarro Sánchez, Rosana Elena. *Suffering, Silence, and Wisdom in the Life of Etty Hillesum*, 295.

Imagining Peace
Imagination, Theological Reflection, and Peace-Making in the Thought of St Augustine and St Catherine of Siena

JOHN FARINA
Associate Professor of Religion, George Mason University

How does the imagination function in the process of peace-making? My approach to this admittedly complex question will be to study two models from history: the model of the peacemaker as political theorist in the thought of St Augustine and the model of the peacemaker as prophetess-saint in the life of St Catherine of Siena.

1. Theological Reflection and the Imagination

How does the imagination function in the process of peace-making? My approach to this admittedly complex question will be to study two models from history: the model of the peacemaker as political theorist in the thought of St Augustine and the model of the peacemaker as prophetess-saint in the life of St Catherine of Siena. My method blends historical analysis with theological reflection and is, admittedly, more narrative than systematic. It also considers two examples from vastly different ages and must do so with brevity. Bearing in mind these caveats, I begin with a few definitions.

Peace. My definition contains a number of overlapping meanings. I will be speaking of peace as a spiritual quality of the person, similar to the way St Paul does in the Letter to the Galatians where he refers to peace as a fruit of the Spirit, meaning that a soul enjoying God's grace will possess the quality of peace. Theologically this peace is not only a personal trait, but also a description of one's relationship with God. For Christ, as Paul tells us in Colossians, has destroyed the record of sin that alienated God and humanity, 'nailing it to his cross'. (Col.

2:14). For Paul this new relationship of grace is characterized as having peace with God. Again and again, he begins his letters to the churches proclaiming the good news that we are at peace with God: 'Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ'. (E.g. Rom. 1:7; I Cor. 1:3; II Cor.1: 2; Gal. 1:3; Eph. 1:2)

I will also be speaking about peace as a state of tranquility or quiet in the social order. This will include harmony in the personal relationships of the individual and a state of mutual concord between governments. The latter sense picks up the meaning of the Latin *pax*, which in its verbal form, *pacisci,* means to agree, to form a pact that brings about tranquility, security, and freedom from conflict.

As implied by the last meaning, I will also be speaking of peace-making, or an attempt to bring about such a condition in society.

Imagination. I shall be talking about how the imagination functions in the process of theological reflection in response to the lived experience of believers. One of the main tasks of the imagination in theological reflection is to achieve a linkage between lived experience and the hope of a more perfect world, which is fundamental to the Christ event. That linkage has implications for two contemporary crises: the cognitive crisis of modernity and the socio-economic problem of effecting justice in the contemporary setting.

As David Tracy reminds us, the imagination plays a key role in the development of analogical theological language.[1] What are the characteristics of that language? First it is a language of ordered relationships articulating similarity in difference. For example, if we have a primary analog (P) and analogies A and B, A and B have a distinct but similar relation to P. The goal of a theological language in which P is the mystery of Christ is to produce a harmony between A and B that is not forced and that occurs by means of a common focus on that mystery. That mystery releases its meaning through a process of reflection and interpretation that is never exhausted.

Theological reflection involves both negations and affirmations. The negations insist on the radical dissimilarity between A or B and P. They intensify the tensive character of P and prevent a slackening of the sense of radical mystery. These negations are balanced by affirmations

[1] My discussion of theological reflection and imagination is based on my reading of David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination* (New York: Crossroad, 1987), pp. 408 ff.

that speak of the similarity between A or B and P. The affirmations fulfill the mind's valid need for order and harmony.

The imagination produces the analogies in the process or journey of reflection. That journey begins when the theologian articulates one particular theological focus. By means of the imagination the theologian next creates symbols that express similarity-difference. In this process the theologian always makes reference to the Jesus event, a fundamental question—in our case, what is the meaning of peace—and some lived praxis.

Any understanding of an object of theological inquiry is, then, linked to the process of the imagination. As the primary analog releases its meaning through analogies we see manifested not just the reality of P but the revelatory powers of the imagination. As a result, our understanding of God and world is at the same time an understanding of the self, which can never be isolated from God and world.

When we ask our primary question (what is the theological meaning of peace?), we are also asking what peace means in the world, in this practical situation, and what peace means in the self. Any adequate discussion will always echo these harmonies, while at the same time resisting the urge to blend God-self-world into a forced unity—a warm, fuzzy Gaia experience, if you will.[2]

[2] Before leaving this, let us ask how this use of analogy differs from another form of analogical reason that has a similar interest in praxis, namely, legal reasoning. Legal reasoning involves extensive use of analogy. In any particular case (C) the question is asked how is C the same as and how is it different from similar cases that have come before the court (A and B). Because A, B, and C are actual cases and controversies, not hypotheticals, some form of difference is virtually always present. A judge is asked to decide whether a case is mostly like or unlike another case and make his decision on that basis. In this sense, there is a difference between legal reasoning and analogical theology, because there is an effort at the bar to resolve ambiguity in favor of a practical outcome and resolution. Yet even though the decision of a court about the relationship of cases A and B to C is dispositive for the resolution of C, the tensive character of the analogies made often lives on in the progeny of a case. Each time a new case (D) arises that refers to C, the relationships among A, B, and C are reexamined and sometimes reinterpreted in the light of the current practical situation as presented in D.

What is clearly different between legal reasoning and analogical theology is that the analogies created in legal reasoning deny rather than allow ambiguity. The interaction of negations and affirmations occurs but is never acknowledged. So we would never hear the equivalent of Maximus the Confessor's statement: 'The perfect mind is one that through genuine faith knows in supreme ignorance the supremely unknowable'. George Berthold, ed., *Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), p. 185. Rather a court opinion usually makes it appear that the similarities between C and A and B are obvious and incontrovertible, when often they are far more ambiguous. See Edward H. Levy, *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.

2. Augustine's Vision of Peace: The Peacemaker as Political Theorist

With these ideas in mind, let us look at the first of two models of peacemaker: the peacemaker as political theorist. Here we will look at Augustine, whose masterwork is *The City of God*. I will argue that Augustine's vision of peace in civil society cannot be understood apart from his theology of history, despite the efforts of many commentators over the years to extract purely political theories from the pages of *The City of God*.

Augustine's Age

Augustine wrote *The City of God* between 413 and 426. A century after Constantine, Christianity had come a long way from the days of being an illegal, often persecuted sect. In the Roman Empire during Augustine's life, it was not only tolerated but favored. The state had given large sums to Christians for the building of churches. In a society in which church and state were not structurally separated the Romans gave bishops state subsidies for distribution to the poor. Legal codes had been revised with Christian morality in mind. Celibates were allowed to inherit property, concubinage and pederasty were outlawed, and illegitimacy punished. The army too felt the influence of this new relationship. After 416 all officers of the army were required to be Christian.

Rome's turn toward Christianity was not without its critics. Those outside the Church were still suspicious of Christian allegiances, and some Christians feared closeness to the state would co-opt the Church's moral authority. After years of disputes between the eastern and western Empire that had weakened the once invincible Roman army, Visigoth, Vandal, and other raiders had taken their attacks from the borders deeper into the Empire's territory. In 410, Alaric led a Visigoth army in the sack of Rome that resulted in great bloodshed, devastation, and the killing of many of the people of Rome. The barbarian general soon left Rome, and the Empire continued for centuries. But the blow to Roman pride and the psychological dislocation that followed shattered the *pax romana*. Alaric was an Arian Christian, not a pagan. His victory presented a military and social challenge to Roman civilization, not a

theological one. However, as shall be discussed, some pagan Romans used the occasion of the sack of Rome to make a case for the superiority of pagan gods to the God of the Christians. In searching for an explanation for the terror, some fell upon the notion that Christianity, with its pacifist strain, had weakened the resolve of the Empire to fight. It is commonplace to see *The City of God* as Augustine's response to that accusation. It was that, but not only that, as shall become clear in what follows.

The debate long has raged as to whether *The City of God* is a prophetic call to Christian peace-making, or a realistic theory of public order. On the one hand, Ronald G. Musto in his 1986 book, *The Catholic Peace Tradition*, argues that *The City of God* laid the framework for a Christian vision of peace-making in the world that derives from the Gospels and was destined to act as a check upon the claims of the state. Augustine's praise for the Empire and its wars is really a critique of violence and exploitation. Augustine does speak of 'just war', but it is for him a perverted imitation of God, which seeks to impose its own dominion of fellow men in place of God's rule. It hates God's peace. It does, nevertheless, Musto concedes, provide a degree of order and tranquility in society.[3]

While Musto is right to suggest that a 'Christian peace-making tradition' was present among Christians in the early fifth century and that it was deeply critical of militarism, he overstates his case when it comes to Augustine. Musto's prophetic, apocalyptic vision of the Church as an alternative society is foreign to Augustine. Origen, writing two centuries before Augustine, when the Church was still the object of persecution, would have been far more receptive to such an idea. But Augustine's praise of Roman virtues—their love of freedom, their bravery, and their self-sacrifice—and his appreciation of *pax romana* is not just rhetorical. He understood Rome's limitations but valued it for what it was.

On the other hand, George Weigel offered a contrary view in his 1987 *Tranquillitas Ordinis*.[4] For him, Augustine's fundamental concern was to establish the realistic conditions for the possibility of a politics

[3] Ronald G. Musto, *The Catholic Peace Tradition* (Mary knoll, NY: Orbis, 1986), p. 49.

[4] George Weigel, *Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 26–32.

of virtue. The goal is the peace of public order in a dynamic political community. War and conflict may have a role in establishing that order, and because of that, pacifism is not only not the moral imperative for Christians but might even be a hindrance to real peace and a concession to evil and injustice.

Weigel is right when it comes to Augustine's vision of the dynamic nature of war and peace in the public order, and certainly his picture of Augustine is fuller and more realistic than Musto's treatment. Nevertheless, with his emphasis on public discourse, Weigel gives little shrift to Augustine's larger understanding of the role of the person in the process of making peace.

Another issue closely related to views on war and peace is the relation of church and state. To what extent is Augustine critiquing the Christianization of the empire? Robert Markus, for example, in the 1970 work *Saeculum*, offers one view of this, endorsed by Jean Elhstain in her more recent *Augustine and the Limits of Politics.* He argues that Augustine inveighed against the notion that a Christianized civil order could perfect the earthly city in a way that pagan Rome could never do. Earthly institutions will always be infected with ambiguity and imperfection, escapable only in the heavenly city.[5]

In contrast to Markus's view, scholars like John Neville Figgis, have suggested that Augustine at times tends to identify the City of God with the Church on earth.[6] Echoes of this view can be seen in the post-millennialist understandings of American Protestants like Jonathan Edwards, who got their Augustine via Puritan divines like Thomas Hooker. For them, after the Gospel had overcome its enemies, an age would eventually come when a thousand-year peace would reign on earth before the return of Christ.

Whatever one thinks on these points, the larger outlines of Augustine's theory of the state are clear. Herbert Deane's formulation remains solid: The state is an external order. The peace it maintains is an external peace–the absence of overt violence. The state is maintained by the use of force. It has no weapons by which it can save the souls of

[5] R.A. Markus, *Seculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 35, 42, cited in Jean Betake Elhstain, *Augustine and the Limits of Politics* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1995), p. 92.

[6] John Nevill Figgis, *The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's City of God*, as cited in Elhstain, p. 92.

persons. It is, rather, a remedial, coercive order, which is a consequence of the Fall.[7]

That external order is contrasted with that of the City of God, which is, emanating from the true nature and essence of God and his creatures, built on love rather than coercion, eternal, not temporary, and participatory rather than remedial.

Peace as Imagined in The City of God

Many of the debates about Augustine's views of peace miss the mark because they attempt to extract that view out of a political theory of church and state. *The City of God* does speak to issues crucial to political theory, such as the debate about the definition of the republic in Book II, or the debate about the role of the state as a teacher of virtue, or the question about the nature of the state's power. Nevertheless, it is primarily a theology of history, as Thomas Merton reminds us in his introduction to the 1950 Modern Library edition of *The City of God*.[8]

This is a point easily missed in reading secondary treatments of Augustine but as plain as a barn side to anyone who actually confronts the text in its totality. This is why Merton, sitting in his hermitage in Gethsemane, Kentucky far from a great university library, got it right, and other more bookish types—especially political theorists who think theology a sideshow—tend to get it wrong. Augustine, confronted with violence on a massive scale in the sack of Rome, seeing, as it were, one-thousand 9-11s, hearing of Roman Christians slaughtered, innocent virgins raped, children cut open, while pagans hiding in Christian churches were sometimes spared, could not facilely answer the questions that arose from this terror. It took him thirteen years and over 800 pages in twenty-two books to work through this. How is God with us? How can we believe in a God of peace and justice in the face of such a thing?

He imagines a vision, not simply of another, heavenly existence in which all tears will be wiped away, nor of a completely secular order,

[7] Herbert Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 117.

[8] Augustine, Aurelius, St., Bp. of Hippo, *The City of God*, trans. Marcus Dods, intro. Thomas Merton (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), pp. ix–xv.

deserted by God. But something far more complex in which neither the earthly nor the heavenly elements are subordinated to one another, a kind of 'micro-macro cosmic isomorphism',[9] if you will, in which God works in history. God works in the history of Rome. And he works in the history of the Jews and of his Church. Through it all he is building the City of God. We cannot always see the exact limits of that city on earth. It is not coterminous with the Church; it is not completely absent from the state. It stands apart from them, yet it is manifested through them.

How do we experience peace in such a cosmos? Here I think we must read *The City of God*, which Merton called the autobiography of the Church, in light of Augustine's own autobiography, *The Confessions*, and his important work of theology, *On the Trinity.*

Imagining peace begins with seeing our personalities as reflections of the Trinity.[10] The memory corresponds to the Father. It is the storehouse of ideas, the place from where our energies and thoughts first emerge. It includes our imaginative powers. The understanding corresponds to the Son. It is the place of our intellectual powers to order, shape, arrange, see patterns, and make extrapolations. The will corresponds to the Spirit. It is our power of desire, whence come our passions and most importantly our love.

The person at peace is one who rightly sees this image within, and, by entering within herself, ascends to God and to participation in the life of the Trinity. Seeing is important. Augustine again and again returns to a biblical phrase and describes the City of God as 'the heavenly Jerusalem'. 'Jerusalem' he translates as 'vision of peace'.

That vision cannot occur without the grace of God in Christ, which sets us free from the power of concupiscence and heals our divided will so that we love God above all his creatures. When charity replaces concupiscence, we are united to our authentic selves and to others in the bond of our common creature-hood. We then know true peace.

In that experience of interiority, we know the peace of the City of God, where all are united in the beatific vision. As we behold the image of God within, we understand the right order of things and burn

[9] Elshtain, p. 100.

[10] For a longer discussion, see John Farina, *Great Spiritual Masters* (New York: Paulist Press, 2005), pp. 64–70.

with love. In that sense, our imagining peace is a real participation in the eschatological peace, an experience of the not-yet-but-already. As Augustine put it in *The Confessions*: 'You called and cried out to me and broke open my deafness; you scattered my blindness. You breathed fragrance. I drew in my breath and I now pant for you. I tasted and I hunger and thirst. You touched me, and I burn for your peace' (10:27).

3. St Catherine of Siena: The Peacemaker as Prophetess and Saint

When confronting Catherine of Siena (1347-1380), we are at once presented with a paradox. Supposedly an uneducated woman, she held no political office and was not related to royalty. She died when she was just 33 years old. Yet she played a major role in convincing Pope Gregory XI to move the papacy back to Rome from Avignon, where it had been very comfortably established for three-quarters of a century. She also played a significant role in establishing peace between the papacy and the league of Italian anti-papal states, headed by Florence. Adding to the paradox, 80 years after her death she was canonized and in 1970, she was declared one of the few female doctors of the Church.

Catherine's Life

Catherine was born to a merchant class family in Siena. The primary source for knowledge of her life remains Raymond of Capua's *Life,* a pious admiring biography. Even the most respected contemporary attempts by Giulianna Cavallini and Susan Noffke have no real interpretive emphasis and focus on recovering the texts of Catherine's writing. Those writings are as close as we get to the woman behind the legend. Her biography, by contrast, has long been seen as the stuff of hagiography. As with a number of women saints of the Middle Ages, it is often impossible to separate history from legend. Cavallini's lifework has made great progress toward establishing the original texts, but the reality still persists that Catherine is known to us through the hands of her loving disciples. Augustine, by contrast, who wrote nine-hundred years earlier, is better known, because his writings stand on their own, apart from his saintly legend.

Nevertheless, what emerges is a picture of an extraordinary woman. Catherine was born in 1347, a twin, and the twenty-fourth of twenty-five children. She came into a world in which the Hundred Years War was just ten years old. Both the papacy and the remnants of the Holy Roman Empire had been weakened by decades of conflict. The urban middle class had new wealth and power buttressed by the growth of courts of law, dominated by lawyers and secular legal codes rather than by chancellors and principles of equity based on church law.

A new sense of kingly power and patriotic loyalties was emerging. France led the opposition to foreign control in church affairs, especially in the conflicts at the end of the thirteenth century between Philip the Fair, who won popular approval of his move against the pope in the Estates General and Boniface VIII, whose *Unam sanctum* is one of the strongest claims of papal power over civil authority ever made. The brief captivity of the pope and the election of the Frenchman, Clement V, in 1305 illustrated the dominance of the French kings over the papacy. Clement set up his court in Avignon, in the orb of French influence, but technically part of Naples, who sold it to the papacy in 1353, when Catherine was 6.

The Avignon papacy was marked by efficient administration and relative stability. The city was the equivalent of a newly created capital district, without the political strife and tensions that constantly beset Rome as the seat of a once great empire and a rival of a contentious group of Italian city-states. The papacy prospered financially under a system of taxation and user fees, which included trade in church offices, taxes on business transactions, and revenue sharing arrangements with office holders. The Italians, especially the Florentines and Sienese, found this all entirely unacceptable and constantly worked toward the restoration of the Roman papacy.

Into this world came Catherine. According to her biographer Raymond, in the same year that Naples sold Avignon to the papacy, she had a vision of Christ in pontifical vestments, sitting on a throne near the apostles Peter and Paul. Soon after that, at age 7, she took a vow of perpetual virginity and started going out to a cave in the hillsides to pray and fast in emulation of the Desert Fathers. When she was 14, she cut off her hair in resistance to her mother's efforts to marry her off. Her mother reacted angrily and confined her to a small closet

and a life of toil, in which Catherine seemed to delight. This softened her parents, who, thinking that there were twenty-four other kids to produce grandchildren anyway, relented and let her join the Sisters of St Dominic in 1363, the same year the Muslims invaded eastern Europe. This was a third order, however. She wore the black robes of the Dominicans, but continued to live at home, where she spent long periods in solitary prayer accompanied by ecstatic visions.

In 1367, at age 20, she decided that God was calling her to serve her family and her city and she began an active social ministry that included caring for the sick and poor and, most relevantly, peace-making between those famously feuding Italian families. She began to gather followers of men and women.

Legends about her relate her extraordinary gifts. In addition to her purity and dedication, her selflessness and sacrifice for the good of others, she was a wonderworker and healer. There are many accounts of her curing the sick and foretelling the future through a preternatural knowledge of events.

Her prophetic intervention extended eventually to affairs of state. She devoted herself to mending the rift between the Tuscan cities and the papacy. It involved going to Florence and making friends with the pro-papal party, traveling to Pisa and Lucca to dissuade them from joining the anti-papal league, writing letters to Gregory urging him to return to Rome, and, eventually in April of 1376, going to Avignon to meet with Gregory. Why a young girl from a family that was not working in politics would ever think of doing such a thing is not explained by her hagiographer other than to imply that she did this explicitly on God's command.

It appears that to some extent, Gregory came to rely on her to provide a divine sign that he was doing God's will in moving the papacy from Avignon. He asked her repeatedly what she saw. When he wavered at the last moment in September right before the massive relocation was scheduled to begin, she revealed to him a secret vow that he had made to God when elected pope. That was enough to assure him to go ahead with the move in spite of tremendous opposition from the status quo.

The Religious Imagination as a Basis for Political Vision

With Catherine we see the imagination at work in two distinct ways. One is what may be called the creation of the church-imagined legend of Catherine. The other is the imagination of the saintly woman herself. The church-imagined legend is at least partially the creation of the post-Avignon, Roman papacy. Catherine is imagined as the saint on a divine mission to return the papacy to its God-appointed home in Rome. In the longstanding battle between popes and kings, Catherine is the protector of the purity of the church.

Appropriately in her legend she is presented as supernaturally pure. She is not defiled by sex. We have already recounted stories of her early dedication to virginity from age 7. There is no adolescent fascination with members of the opposite sex, as there was with St Francis of Assisi. No ill-fated marriage, as with St Catherine of Genoa. Furthermore, she is depicted as even being pure from the defilement of food. She hardly eats, and in the last year of her short life, she lives entirely on the bread and wine of the Eucharist, prompting one recent student of hers to dub her a holy anorexic. Undefiled by the world, she is joined to Christ in her body. She receives the stigmata, in 1375, right as her intervention in papal politics begins.

These points are reinforced when we look at the imagery of her visions related in the church-imagined legend. The first vision at 6 is of Christ in papal vestments seated near Peter and Paul. It is an obvious reference to the restoration of the Roman papacy, in the city of Peter and Paul. The symbol of a strong papacy in which the pope is the Vicar of Christ on earth, supreme over temporal power is presented.

The second vision comes at age 28, after receiving the stigmata. She sees the believers in the papacy and the Church and 'unbelievers' entering the wound in the side of Christ. The message is plain. Division in the church extends the sufferings of Christ. In her vision she is then given an olive branch and a cross, which she interprets as a command to bring both peoples together. The message is again plain: Out of the suffering of Christ, and of her suffering as a pure stigmatist joined to Christ's body, come healing and reconciliation.

In contrast to this, the imagination of the woman Catherine is at work in the imagery of her first letter to Gregory XI. She wrote: 'I long to see you as a productive tree planted in fertile soil and laden with sweet

mellow fruit. For a tree uprooted from the soil of true self-knowledge would dry up and bear no fruit'.[11] Here is the image of a tree planted in the soil is interesting. The soil, one would think, would be Rome. But instead, Catherine tells us the soil is 'true self-knowledge'. An intriguing twist, one that goes to the psychological, personal, spiritual appeal of the prophetess. It is no accident that this fresh direction comes from her own writing, which is most likely more historical than the legends of her visions. She tells Gregory that he is Christ on earth, the successor of Peter, the shepherd of the flock who should not fear the political machinations of men. No appeal is made to practicality, for Avignon is practically speaking, a comfortable alternative to Rome. The appeal is to the heroic, the idealistic, to the imagination, not to practical reason. As the prophet always does, she calls Gregory to look with different eyes on the political situation and to choose an alternative that comports with true self-knowledge and faith. She asks Gregory to see himself authentically, not simply through the eyes of his courtiers.

In this sense her use of the imagination is similar to Augustine's, in that the power to imagine becomes the ability to see the authentic self and, accordingly, to see one's right place in the divine order. Peace is a product of that vision.

The fruits of Catherine's Political Career

Catherine intervened in political events to bring about a specific goal. Accordingly, the effects of her peace-making efforts are open to debate on the merits. The church-imagined legend holds that the fruits of Catherine's intervention are largely good. The Church is saved from its long captivity in Avignon, a new spiritual purity is rediscovered and peace is made with the Italian states. In fact, the record is more checkered. Opponents of Gregory's move to Rome also enlisted prophets, one of whom warned he would meet an untimely death in Rome. He did, dying one year after returning to Rome.

The victory of the Italians over the French was short-lived. After Gregory's death, the Cardinals elected an Italian, Urban VI. His election

[11] Catherine to Pope Gregory XI, Letter 54, January 1376, in Suzanne Noffke, ed. *The Letters of St. Catherine of Siena, Vol. 1* (Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1988), p. 166.

inspired such resentment among the French cardinals that they soon elected Robert of Geneva as Pope Clement VIII, who returned to Avignon as an alternative pope. The Great Schism had begun, with Europe divided in its allegiances between the popes. It lasted forty years, during which a third line of popes was created.

Judging Catherine as a political actor, we are left with two very different pictures: The saint, acting on God's orders, who saved the papacy and church. Or the dupe of the sly Tuscan politicians, who manipulated the naive twenty-year old girl for their own purposes just as they had a young poet-turned-statesman, Dante Alighieri, a few decades earlier. They used her popularity and her cult of sanctity to lend the aura of divine approval to their mission to end French control of the papacy. Catherine, whose religious sincerity cannot be doubted, was in that reading the quintessential useful fool.

Judging her as she appears in her own writings, however, we see she imagined peace and spiritual health and articulated that vision with some subtlety. The appeal to the authentic spiritual self, found in the papal letters, is matched in her central work, *The Dialogue*. That book is a highly imaginative rendering of the soul in constant conversation with its divine lover. The prologue sets the tone:

> …a soul rises up, restless with tremendous desire for God's honor and the salvation of souls. She has for some time exercised herself in virtue and has become accustomed to dwelling in the cell of self-knowledge in order to know better God's goodness toward her, since upon knowledge follows love. And loving, she seeks to pursue truth and clothe herself in it.[12]

So real is that love that it brings about a desire for union with the beloved and with all creatures in the harmony of charity. Peace in the soul and in the city comes from that vision.

[12] Suzanne Noffke, O. P., ed., *Catherine of Siena: The Dialogue,* (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), p. 25.

3: Imagination and Models of Peace-making

In closing, let us return to the question of the definition of imagination. We have seen a number of different uses of that word in the course of this study. Tracy spoke of the imagination as that power responsible for making analogies that captured similarity-in-difference and helped lead out the meaning of Chris for us in the practical situations of our lives. Augustine spoke of the imagination as a power of memory. As we remember, we image the trinity and, in that process, participate in the understanding and love of God as he works in history.

Those uses suggest two more that might help us in defining imagination. Bernard Lonergan posited that human beings, in addition to being *homo religious*, were also symbol-makers. Lonergan spoke of the ambiguity of pure experience and its relation to the inner experience of consciousness. For him, pure experience is the starting point in the development of self-knowledge that occurs as the result of ordering the undifferentiated mass of pure experience. Making symbols is one way that we bring order to pure experience and find self-knowledge. The process of forming symbols out of pure experience would involve, it would seem, what we have been calling imagination.[13]

The process of symbol-making is also addressed by Mircea Eliade. He speaks of symbol making as a pre-theological experience that humans participate in to represent the ambiguity of being, even though they might lack the language to adequately convey such meanings. Theology, as a later, reflective, verbal attempt to convey meaning, struggles to express a mode of being as the coincidence of opposites. But this mode may be more easily expressed by religious symbols, for instance the Yin-Yang diagram. A symbol for Eliade has the characteristic of multivalence. It conveys a multiplicity of meanings. Its meanings are not easily exhausted. If we retain only one of its significations, declaring it to be the only or fundamental one, we risk not grasping the true message of the symbol.[14] Symbol-making involves the imagination.

Whatever the differences among these various meanings of imagination, one thing is clear. They each convey something quite

[13] Frederick E. Crowe, ed. *A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), pp. 116–118.

[14] Mircea Eliade, *Polarites du symbole, Etudes Carmelitaines 39 (1960) 15–28*, in Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, ed. *Symbolism and the Sacred Arts* (New York: Continuum, 1992, p. 5

different from the colloquial understanding of the term. Webster defines imagination as 'the act or power of forming a mental image of something not present to the senses or never before wholly perceived in reality'. 'Imaginary' he defines as 'lacking factual reality'. For each of our thinkers, the imagination serves precisely to bring into our consciousness not something 'lacking reality' but something containing the complexity of ultimate reality. The nature of reality involves a becoming, a process of unveiling, which the power of the imagination participates in. Imagination participates in reality in some fundamental way; and men and women are organically connected to that reality through the operation of their imagination.

We have seen different models of peace-making involving different uses of the imagination: the political theorist and the prophetess-saint. In each case the believer responded to the practical political and social needs of his or her day. For Augustine it was a new role for the Church in a society where the ancient Roman order—and the security it had brought—was slowly being eroded. The Church would have to take up more and more of the functions once performed by the state and have to assume more of an active role in the dynamic process of maintaining the tranquility of order. For Catherine, the rift between the papacy and the Italian cities needed to be addressed and the independence of the papacy from secular control had to be reestablished.

The price for such involvement is high, and the more specific the intervention, the higher the cost. Catherine ran the greatest risk of being manipulated because she insisted on a certain political outcome. Her presence in Italy and early death were all that saved her from bitter criticism, given the calamities that followed Gregory's return to Rome. Augustine has been criticized for presenting a vision of the world in which there is little point in prophetic action, given human concupiscence and the inexorable working of God in history.

But each imagined peace and brought that vision of peace into the storms of the moment. For Augustine, especially, the peace they imagined was not just a memory, not just a harkening back to an earlier, more pristine age. Augustine saw his church in the midst of an epic journey that would end only with the beatific vision. Even Catherine, whose vision was more revanchist to be sure, saw a spiritual renewal of the papacy, extricated from political machinations.

How else can a Christian make peace if not by imagining a situation different from the present and struggling to claim more of the not-yet reality of the eschaton? Christian perception of the present is in this sense always imaginative, for it sees through the lens of hope. Our glimpses of hope come most clearly from an inward vision of Christ in us, the hope of glory.

Max Scheler and Joseph Maria Bochénski on the Nature and Ethics of War

MARTIN HÄHNEL
Bremen University, Germany

This paper examines the contrasting yet complementary perspectives of Max Scheler and Joseph Maria Bochénski on the nature and ethics of war. Scheler, drawing from his phenomenological and value-ethical framework, explores war as a metaphysical force that reveals moral truths and societal decay, while Bochénski, a Thomist and war veteran, provides a systematic military ethics rooted in virtue theory and natural law. The paper contextualizes their reflections in light of contemporary conflicts, especially the war in Ukraine. By comparing Scheler's metaphysical idealism with Bochénski's practical virtue ethics, the study offers insights into enduring ethical questions surrounding war, moral responsibility, and the cultivation of military virtue.

Introduction

In the following article, I would like to give room to two Christian voices of the twentieth century who, although fundamentally different in their philosophical approaches, have provided thought-provoking insights into the phenomenology and ethics of war. These reflections are pertinent to today's discussion, which is unfortunately overshadowed by numerous real war events. After discussing the different philosophical personalities of Max Scheler and J. M. Bochénski, their intellectual origins and intersections, I will first introduce Scheler's phenomenology and metaphysics of war. Then I will deal with Bochénski's military ethics. Finally, I intend to draw a comparison between Scheler's and Bochénski's understanding of war and try to place both positions in the context of current discussions on the ethics of war.

1. Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Joseph Maria Bochénski (1902–1995)

Although the two philosophers were devout Catholics, the differences in biography, outward appearance, and philosophical approach could not be greater. On the one hand, we have J.M. Bochénski, a Dominican priest, Thomistic logician, and active participant in World War II; on the other hand, there is Max Scheler, the well-known phenomenologist and creator of the material ethics of values, who felt the confusion and horror of the First World War some time before Bochénski.

However, despite these obvious differences in biography and intellectual background, Bochénski knew Scheler's writings and, to a certain extent, also appreciated some of them. Whether Scheler, to whom Thomism was rather distant, would have returned Bochénski's appreciation can be doubted—at least in the philosophical field. Bochénski, by contrast, considered Scheler's phenomenology of value to be very original and he believed at times that its content could even be translated into the (i.e., his) language of analytical philosophy.[1] Both philosophers, of course, also commented on ethical questions, although their approaches do not fit into the nomenclature of moral theories that are common today. In Scheler's case, his material ethics of values is relatively at odds with consequentialist virtue ethics and deontological theories.[2] For Bochénski, ethics was not at the centre of his philosophical interest. In his memoirs he remarks laconically: 'Ethics: I have proposed a treatise (probably the only existing one) on military ethics. I have proposed a sharp distinction between morals, ethics, and various kinds of religious morality (piety). I have analysed the controversy concerning animal experimentation'.[3] This statement shows that Bochénski saw his greatest contribution to ethics in the development of a specific military ethics. Scheler was not concerned in his remarks with illuminating practical and political aspects of war, but with postulating a certain metaphysics of war that should shape our

[1] Bochénski, J.M. (1975), Is Scheler's language translatable into an analytical one?, in: Paul Good (ed.), *Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie*, Francke Verlag: Bern und Berlin, 259–266.

[2] His material ethics of values is explicitly directed against utilitarian and deontological concepts. Although Scheler is sympathetic to the moral category of virtue, he chooses the concept of value as the starting point and basis of his systematic considerations.

[3] Bochénski, J.M. (1993): *Wspomnienia*, Philed, Krakow, 326.

moral understanding as such.[4] In the next section, we start right away with Scheler's reflections on the nature of war and try to draw some parallels to current events in the Ukraine and Israel.

2. 'Spider web, driven in the storm' – Scheler's Phenomenology of War

Max Scheler wrote in depth about the nature of war in several places in his work, not only against the background of his experiences in World War 1 but guided by a deep philosophical-psychological interest in pursuing the question of what actually lies behind the physical violence of warlike actions.

Vitalism of the war

In his essay 'The Genius of War'[5], he tries to show that war is not about the goal of the self-preservation of man and his species, but about the 'struggle for something higher than existence' (16). In view of the current Ukraine war and Putin's attitude, it can indeed be assumed with Scheler that 'the movement of the warlike spirit is rather an original, spontaneous agent. Sense and desire to try out its power on the environment, and to shape and form it in it, at the surging peril, even at the risk of failure'. (18) In this way, of course, the warlike spirit does not act without calculation; rather, it seems to be characterised by a predatory pleasure in the play of forces between itself and the enemy powers, which it believes it can determine. This gesture, incidentally, is alien to what Scheler calls the utilitarian conception of war, according to which 'warlike virtues are to be regarded as derivatives of the specifically mercantile virtues' (30).

War is the end of any solidarity of interests

From today's perspective, it seems striking how much our current situation, in which Europe is surrounded by wars, resembles the constellation and situation before and during the First World War.

[4] More on this: Schäfer, R. (2017): Scheler's Metaphysics of War, in: *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 79/4, 801–817.

[5] Scheler, Max: GW IV (1982, 2008): *Politisch-pädagogische Schriften*.

Back then, according to Scheler, people also 'believed in the growing solidarity of the interests of international trade and transport and in the common interests of social classes' (23). So, as is often emphasised today out of a forgetting of history, this is not just the idea of a German post-war party SPD which, with an eye on Eastern Europe, committed itself to the foreign policy credo of 'change through trade'. The fact that this belief must repeatedly turn out to be a delusion is commented on by Scheler—without knowing the EU—with the following drastic words: 'But how wretched and how weak these interest groups and the organisations and international mechanisms serving them have proved to be! Spider webs, driven in the storm!' (23). Scheler sees a cause for this development above all in a 'philosophy of peace which biologically sees in war only a complicated variety of animal food fights and which at the same time wants to derive the historical phenomena of war from economic and internal political factors, which continues to see in increasing economic solidarity of interests of the peoples the guarantor of an ever-approaching "eternal peace"' (23). Apart from the former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder and a few other incorrigibles, however, the West has hopefully come to the realistic conclusion that any solidarity of interests can quickly be counteracted by authoritarian regimes, such as Russia or China. Quickly forgetting this naivety, a hasty change of attitude is currently taking place in the West, which can also be attributed to the 'war as the strongest force of human unification' (68). For the time being, however, no new economic solidarity of interests is emerging here, but nations and peoples are moving closer together because they are under attack and want to work together to ward off war and the suffering it causes. Incidentally, this new solidarity of Europe (which also includes Russia) was for Scheler a genuinely Christian one as an expression of 'true friendship' as opposed to mere 'politeness towards clients and international courtoisie' (262). According to Scheler, in order to be able to accept this form of solidarity, one must cast off the foolish attitudes of pacifism and militarism. This includes the 'erratic attitude militarism (*Gesinnungsmilitarismus*)' (187f.) towards Russia that is currently spreading in the media, which is psychologically the other side of the coin of that self-satisfied pacifism that we encountered almost everywhere in Germany and Europe before 24 February 2022. Then as now, 'a profound psychological error of many pacifists is to be

seen in the assumption that the appalling manifestations of hatred in this war were only *brought about* by the war'.[6] Like no other before him, Scheler studied the psychological structures of individual hatred and resentment.

War and collective morality

In the sense of Scheler's phenomenological attitude, we should therefore rather look at war as it shows itself from itself; i.e., it is first of all not so important to ask about the causes and possibly catastrophic consequences of war, but to try to explain what all shows itself through the current war. Scheler writes: 'War clarifies, examines, criticises; from a cultural and moral point of view, it creates nothing at all that was not already there in the germ; in the same respect, it destroys nothing at all that was not already inwardly dead or pretending to be something it was not in fact. It only classifies things and people according to their real value'. (GW IV, 262f.) War thus paradoxically follows a certain principle of order and in doing so it has an unmasking character. War not only shows us the true face of the enemy, who is not infrequently ignored by us but also reveals a great moral deficit of our own. Just as we did about 100 years ago, we can say again: 'This war has revealed the moral status of Europe' (203). For Scheler, the recognition of our own moral deficit was at the same time the starting point for a cultural rebirth: 'There will have to come in the coming peace a time of tremendous repentance and penitence, and out of this state of mind a richer and more serious striving for moral construction, these new forms of consciousness created by the war shall lead to the act of regaining European dignity' (282). As we all know, this rebirth did not take place afterwards because the world was plunged into the next catastrophe of the Second World War, which J.M. Bochénski personally experienced and which also gave him the occasion to develop a certain military ethics.

[6] Scheler, Max, GW 6 (1963): *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, 202.

3. J.M. Bocheński on military virtues

Joseph Maria Bocheński (1902–1995) is known to most not as an ethicist, but as a logician, Thomist, and theoretician of the Soviet system. What is less well known is that Bochénski, who was himself a participant in the war, was one of the first to write a survey work on military ethics,[7] which of course clearly bears a Thomistic signature, theoretically processes personal experiences with war, and, in doing so, assigns the foundation of an ethics of war and peace a prominent role.

Before I go into the individual thoughts of the work, it is necessary to emphasise that this work is to be read and understood against the background of contemporary history. At the time of writing, Europe was in a situation of all-round threat, in which the question of how to achieve peace took a back seat to the question of how to repel Hitler's attack. This allows a connection to be drawn between the presence and the Russian war of aggression on the Ukraine. As a Christian, Bochénski is well aware of the fact that war should be the last resort and that peace should be sought with all one's might. However, his personal experiences and a rational analysis show him that pacifism is a fiction and war must be permissible under certain circumstances.

Bochénski's critique of pacifism

According to Bochénski, pacifism is a fiction because it is based on three false assumptions (17ff.):

i. The human individual, his weal and woe, is the only reality, while society is a fiction.
ii. Pacifism invokes humanitarian sentiments and their normative validity for the purpose of its foundation.
iii. Pacifism assumes that human life is the highest good.

Contrary to the first assumption, Bochénski emphasises that society is a complete reality: 'Although society is not a thing like, say, Mount Everest or a human being, it nevertheless represents something real. It is a collection of people connected by real relations' (17). From this, Bochénski deduces that individual interests can be subordinated to the common good and its laws. If the preservation of the common

[7] Bochénski, J.M. (2018): *Militärethik im Überblick*, Bad Sassendorf 2018, published in Polish as a series of essays in 1938–1939.

good requires warlike actions, then the particular interests of pacifists must be subordinated to this requirement. With regard to the second assumption, Bochénski counters that humanitarian sentiments can indeed induce us not to assert our right to defense by force of arms, but no general rule can be derived from this. Bochénski refers to the example of the father whose child is fatally threatened by a criminal. It would be morally highly reprehensible if the father were to forego the protection of his child. Bochénski refutes the third argument by showing that there are higher values than human life. If, for example, Russia succeeded in taking away the higher values (culture, religion, history, etc.) of the Ukrainian people, this would have a direct impact on the determination of the value of human life, because the Ukrainians would then possibly live a worse and shorter life. To ensure that this does not happen, Ukrainians fight with their lives first and foremost against the destruction of these higher values.

The ethical teleology of war

After these critical remarks on pacifism, Bochénski goes back to some considerations that are familiar to us from *just war theory*, which has reached up to the present day. However, Bochénski's contribution only becomes truly innovative when it comes to justifying an 'ethical teleology of war' (25). This teleology involves formulating requirements that must be met for the means to achieve a certain goal (victory over the aggressor, successful defense against the aggressor, etc.) to be selected and used effectively. For this, according to Bochénski, it is essential that certain exemplary skills be present in the army, and in a weakened form in society as a whole, so that the goal of ending the war can be achieved. These military virtues include, above all, righteousness, bravery, obedience, and decision-making efficiency on the battlefield. If these qualities are not found, then it is difficult to achieve a goal that one has set for oneself. In this regard and similar to Scheler, Bochénski has observed something very interesting that can also be well applied to the current situation in the Ukrainian war and the state of the Russian army and society: 'It does not seem certain that the moral neglect that we actually observe after major wars would be the result of the war

itself, of all things. It is for the most part merely the outward expression of the actual state of morality in the society in question' (20).

Virtue ethics between war and peace

I now come to the actual core of Bochénski's military ethics: his remarks on the military virtues. It must first be said that Bochénski, as a professed Thomist, assumes that virtues cannot only be acquired, but also received – as *virtutes infusae*. These virtues are added, i.e., higher abilities that one cannot acquire or earn but that are given to someone undeservedly. For example, the virtue of the soldier's obedience to his superior is different from the virtue of the same soldier's obedience if he believes in God. Especially in war, as we know from many diaries of famous literary figures, the infused virtues play a major role, since trained bravery in battle is not enough or is to be supplemented by a higher ability, if—in a certain challenging or dangerous situation—the 'gift' of bravery, whereby someone's life can be saved, has been received. This usually results in what can be called 'honour' or 'heroism'.

I do not want to go into detail now about the military virtues of righteousness, bravery, obedience, and efficiency of decision-making in combat cited by Bochénski, but only cursorily address certain aspects that seem weighty enough to me to make them fruitful for current discussions on the ethics of war and peace.

Regarding the development of the soldierly and general capacity for righteousness, Bochénski emphasises that it is important to know where one comes from. Those who fight or want to fight for their country should love it, insofar as they know and value their own history, culture, and the values that apply there. Part of this righteousness is that anyone who is or wants to be militarily engaged for their country is or becomes just and benevolent towards their colleagues and comrades.

With regard to the cultivation of bravery, it is worth mentioning that, according to Bochénski, we are dealing with a basic, perhaps even the most original military virtue, which is rarely encountered in normal everyday life (except perhaps in the form of 'civil courage'). The fact that we rarely encounter bravery in everyday life today and therefore probably rather disregard it is also due to the fact that our society, 'under the influence of Kant, generally holds in higher esteem the person who

controls himself by force than a calm soldier who is sure of his nature' (54). That is, brave is rather the one who does not have to force himself to be self-controlled (because he may be too afraid), but the one for whom self-control has already become an integral part of his habitus of bravery. Consequently, a coward who has self-control would still be a coward. (55) Furthermore, it is also important to address some of the cognitive conditions of bravery, e.g., 'the awareness of danger' (58). For example, the person who overestimates the danger often needs more bravery than the person who is unaware of the extent of the danger. Looking at the Ukrainian defense against the Russian attack, and this is really an interesting observation by Bochénski, the position of the defender often requires greater bravery than the position of the attacker. Why? Because the attacked party is in a tense permanent state of threat and defense against that threat. If the attacked party lacks the means and opportunities to counterattack and has to spend the time enduring the danger, then it needs real stamina, which, however, is not possible without bravery.

As far as the virtue of obedience is concerned, Bochénski makes it clear that we do not primarily submit to other people, but to a norm (which these people represent). The obedient person—this is true in the military as in everyday life—is of course free, because he could also choose disobedience. In general, obedience in the sense of a limitation of the mind (not of the will) leads us to choose the direct goal. This also includes accepting the command without giving it much thought and concentrating one's energies solely on choosing the right means to implement the command. Of course, every command must nevertheless be understood somehow and the attitude of obedience also has its limits, because: 'Obedience to an unethical command would itself be unethical'. (93) Finally, Bochénski addresses whether and how obedience can be learned. The answer is virtue-theoretical: yes, and by means of role models.

The fourth disposition that Bochénski examines is the ability to make decisions on the battlefield; next to bravery, this is probably the most typical military virtue. Here it is important to emphasise that a decision in battle follows the rules of practical syllogism and cannot be deduced abstractly and theoretically. In practical syllogism, the facts are included in the form of concrete circumstances of action: 'No

abstract conjecture will help here. One must not only be able to observe well, but also to see what is there and not what we would like to see' (121). Misperceptions are often based on the fact that military decision-makers like to see the realisation of their own hypotheses. (Perhaps Putin has already fallen victim to this strategy.) For Bochénski, it is therefore important that someone who wants to and can decide well first cultivates a corresponding character that enables good decision-making behaviour, which also includes the expression of other virtues. Decisiveness is an 'enduring and reason-driven inclination to act' (134), which makes us more forward-looking and does not allow our mind to capitulate despite possible surprises.

Conclusion

In the preceding remarks, we were able to learn about the different views of Max Scheler and J.M. Bochénski on questions of the nature and morality of war. Nevertheless, we can also identify commonalities or overlaps between the positions of these two thinkers. Both deal with direct experiences of war in their works. While Bochénski, as a participant in the war, concentrates more on the development of an applied ethics for military personnel, Scheler's experiences in the run-up to or during World War I result in a 'pseudo-mystical nationalism',[8] which unfortunately can only make a modest contribution to a better understanding of what war is or what makes people wage war. Furthermore, not surprisingly, both reject pacifism for different reasons and sympathise with the idea of just war. While Scheler believes he can find the ethical justification of war in a phenomenology of value and a metaphysics of the person, Bochénski is guided by the classical principles of just war theory as developed by Thomas Aquinas in his *Questio de Bello.* Both Bochénski and Scheler attach special value to the virtues in the conception of an ethics of war. Above all, Scheler suggests that the reasons that lead to war are to be sought in the emotional value structure of individuals or certain groups (nations, value communities, religions, etc.). Hate in particular seems to be an important starting point and a special motive for wanting to wage war. Scheler thus places

[8] Lobkowicz, N. (2003): On Values, in *Studies in East European Thought* 55, 367-386, here: 375.

hatred in the vicinity of the vices, to which, according to Thomas Aquinas, war must also be counted. In contrast to Scheler's reflections, which are unsuitable for application contexts, Bochénski's analyses are a treasure trove for current research on military, peace, and war ethics, despite their contemporary historical character. Some may find the somewhat affirmative tone in relation to the topic of waging war somewhat off-putting, but many of the Polish logician's arguments are valid and should be taken into account in the current debate. His approach to natural law and virtue ethics, which is enriched by personal experience, also deserves to be re-examined, especially with a view to making a meaningful addition to the lively international debate on 'just war'.

The Orthodox Church of Georgia and the perspectives of recognizing the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine

GURAM LURSMANASHVILI
Lecturer of Modern Orthodox Theology and Political Theology; Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani University, Tbilisi, Georgia

The Georgian and Ukrainian nations, as well as the Georgian and Ukrainian Orthodox Church traditions, have many things in common. These common features are often associated with Russia, as both the Ukrainian and Georgian nations have tried to break away from both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This aspiration was frequently reflected in matters of faith. In 2019, the bestowal of the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) by the Ecumenical Patriarch was a remarkable event in the recent history of the Orthodox Church. Some local Orthodox Churches recognized this autocephaly, while others have not yet recognized it. The Orthodox Church of Georgia (OCG) belongs to the latter group. In this article, we discuss the arguments that the OCG and her representatives use to justify their position of not recognizing the autocephaly of the OCU. At the same time, our goal is to outline the prospects for the recognition of the autocephaly of the OCU by the OCG.

Introduction

Nowadays, the issue of Ukraine is one of the widely debated in the world. Ukraine is discussed in the light of military, geopolitical, cultural, social, religious, and many other spheres. For the Orthodox Church and theology, the central issue is the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and the recognition or non-recognition of this status by the local Churches. Until now, the autocephaly of the OCU is recognized by four local Churches, namely: Constantinople, Alexandria, Greece, and Cyprus. Other churches have not recognized it yet. The Orthodox Church of Georgia (OCG) is among them.

It is true that Georgia, like Ukraine, was forced to be a member of the Russian Empire first, and then of the Soviet Union (which automatically affected the state of the Church). However, the issue of autocephaly for the OCG, unlike OCU, was resolved much more easily for several reasons. In addition to the fact that the OCG had a centuries-old tradition of independence, she also had other details that distinguished her from the OCU. Unlike Tbilisi, Kyiv is considered the main pillar of Russian political ideologies such as 'Third Rome', 'Holy Rus', 'Russian World', etc. Thus, the existence of the Church of Kyiv independently from the Church of Moscow/St Petersburg is fundamentally opposed to Russian imperialism, which the current Russian state and church structures will not accept. Another important moment is related to the period of the Soviet Union. In 1943, Joseph Stalin, in pursuit of his political goals, decided to change the religious policy that had existed until then and openly included the Church in his imperialist paradigm. All this required the special status of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which would be recognized even outside the borders of the Soviet Union. The first stage of this was the consolidation of Orthodox Church units within the Soviet Union. Thus, in 1943, the Eucharistic union between the Orthodox Churches of Russia and Georgia was restored and later, the ROC chose Sergiy (Stragorodsky) as Patriarch. The OCG was actively involved in the process of legitimizing Patriarch Sergiy. Since 1943, the Orthodox Church has actively participated in international events, and her autocephaly, *de facto,* has been recognized by all other Orthodox churches. The *de jure* recognition took place immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the Ecumenical Patriarch Demetrios I handed over the Tomos to the Patriarch of the OCG—Ilia II. This event was very quickly and joyfully received by the entire Orthodox world; therefore, the recognition of the autocephaly of the OCG did not cause any controversy in the Orthodox world, because it had both a historical background and a convergence of interests on the part of Moscow and Constantinople. In this regard, the autocephaly of the OCU is quite problematic because, on the one hand, there was no autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church in past centuries, and on the other hand, Constantinople and Moscow have radically different opinions regarding her status. This polarization is getting deeper in the

context of the terrible war waged by Russia in Ukraine and is currently ongoing.

The members of the Holy Synod of the OCG have their own arguments to support their position. This article provides a brief overview of the positions expressed by Georgian bishops and seeks to elucidate the way in which the principle of non-recognition of OCU functions in the thoughts of the Georgian orthodox hierarchy.

Why does the OCG not recognize the autocephaly of the OCU?

The first argument in support of non-recognition belongs to Metropolitan Nikoloz (Pachuashvili) of Akhalkalaki, Kumurdo, and Kars, who, on January 7, 2019, answered the question asked by journalists about the position of the Georgian Church regarding the autocephaly of Ukraine, as follows: 'We should read the tomos, maybe what is written in this tomos'.[1] The reality is that time has passed since January 7, 2019, but we still do not know for sure if the bishops have read the Tomos text or, if they have, what conclusions they have drawn from it. I would like to point out that in the Georgian language there are at least two versions of the Tomos of the Autocephaly of the OCU, one of which was translated from the original Greek, and the other from the Ukrainian language.[2]

The same Metropolitan, when asked by journalists whether the OCG is obliged to state her position regarding the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, gave an unclear answer. According to him, the issue of the autocephaly of the OCG has not yet been fully resolved by the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which is why they [OCG] cannot make a hasty decision regarding the autocephaly of Ukraine. This

[1] 'We should read Tomos, maybe what is written - Metropolitan Nikoloz on the issue of autocephaly of Ukraine' [Tomosi khom unda tsavikitskhot? Ikneb ra tseria – Meufe Nikolozi Ukrainis avtokefaliis sakitkhze], URL: https://tinyurl.com/ycx575b4 [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

[2] See the translation of Tomos from Greek to Georgian: „საპატრიარქო და სინოდური ტომოსი უკრაინის მართლმადიდებელი ეკლესიისთვის ავტოკეფალური სტატუსის მინიჭებისთვის", pp. 84-89, Translated by Irine Garakanidze, in: Gocha Barnovi, Guram Lursmanashvili (eds), Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ukrainian Autocephaly, Historical, Canonical and Pastoral Aspects. Tbilisi 2019.

See the translation of Tomos from Ukrainian to Georgian: „საპატრიარქო და სინოდური ტომოსი უკრაინის მართლმადიდებელი ეკლესიის საეკლესიო სტრუქტურისათვის ავტოკეფალიის ბოძების შესახებ", Translated by David Chikvaidze, URL: https://tinyurl.com/577pe52c [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

answer is very vague and unclear. Firstly, because the issue of Georgia's autocephaly was finally resolved about three decades ago, as proof of which the OCG has a special document—Tomos. Also, it is not clear what the phrase 'hasty decision' means. Years have already passed since the OCU received autocephaly. The question is how many years should pass before the position of OCG 'does not turn out to be hasty'.[3]

The second argument in support of non-recognition belongs to Metropolitan Anania Japaridze, of Manglisi and the Tetri-Tskaro. In October 2019, when asked about the recognition of Ukraine's autocephaly, he gave the following answer to journalists:

> We are in Diptych, and according to Diptych, Alexandria, Antioch, etc. must first recognize. And then our turn will probably come. We always support autocephaly for the Church of Ukraine. A nation, the state has the right to have autocephaly and it will definitely have. This is a process, which proceeds. It doesn't happen in a day or two.[4]

This is quite an interesting answer and needs to be analyzed. On the one hand, one can directly see support for Ukraine and the Ukrainian Church, but on the other hand, if we think carefully, we will definitely notice ambivalence. First of all, when there is such issue, following the diptych is not very relevant. If the members of the Holy Synod think that it was legal for the Church of Constantinople to grant autocephaly to Ukraine, then what is the need to wait for others? By the same logic, if Constantinople's move was non-canonical, then why should anyone wait for someone? It will be more justified if any local Church openly states her position. If we follow the logic of Metropolitan Anania, even the Churches of Greece and Cyprus were not justified in recognizing the autocephaly of Ukraine, because they did not wait,

[3] 'Metropolitan Nikoloz on the autocephaly of Ukraine—we cannot make a hasty statement' [Meufe Nikolozi Ukrainis Avtokefaliaze – Chven nachkarev gantskhadebas ver gavaketebt], URL: https://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=4&id_artc=152818&fbclid=IwAR3AZUiLRLFzUYrNuQUj0dtJyWFzfYnVeMODAsNADgXcvDkJ08OW_bhFUjs [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

[4] 'Metropolitan Ananias Japaridze: According to Diptych, Alexandria, Antioch, etc. must first recognize...and then our turn will probably come', URL: https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/metropolitan-anania-japaridze-we-always-support-the-autocephaly-for-the-orthodox-church-of-ukraine/ [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

for example, for the recognition of this autocephaly by the Bulgarian Church, which is before them in the diptych. Finally, if the Synod of the OCG is guided by this logic (I mean waiting for the positions of the ancient Patriarchates on the recognition of the autocephaly of the new Churches), then it contradicts itself. Given the fact that OCG has recognized the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in America (OCA), whose autocephaly has not been recognized by other ancient Patriarchates, it is logical to ask if the Georgian bishops were wrong when they recognized this autocephaly of the OCA and did not wait for the decision of the ancient Patriarchates, or are they wrong now when they do not recognize the autocephaly of OCU until others take this step?

The next argument belongs to the same metropolitan, according to whom the autocephaly of the new church should be recognized first of all by the 'Mother Church' and, in the case of Ukraine, the Russian Church is the 'Mother Church': 'According to the Canon Law, the "Mother Church" must recognize the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. In this case, the "Mother Church" is the Russian Church. If the Russian Church recognizes it, then, of course all churches will recognize it'.[5] Several things can be highlighted from this phrase. First of all, the so-called 'On the matter of the Mother Church': in the case of Ukraine (Kyiv Metropolitanate), it is simply a denial of historical facts and circumstances to say that the 'Mother Church' of the Kyivan See is Moscow and not Constantinople.[6] The final part of the sentence is very interesting, in which the Metropolitan says that if Russia recognizes the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, then all other Churches (including Georgia) will recognize it. In other words, the main problem is Russia and not the canonical, historical, or theological arguments surrounding this issue. It should be noted here that Metropolitan Anania's statement is much closer to reality than, for example, Metropolitan Ioane Gamrekeli, of Kutaisi and Gaenati who declares that 'Russia has nothing to do with Ukraine's autocephaly'.[7]

[5] "Metropolitan Anania: The Church of Russia is the Mother Church of the Church of Ukraine," [Meufe Anania: Rusetis Eklesia Ukrainis Eklesiis Deda Eklesiaa], URL: https://tabula.ge/ge/news/612139-meupe-anania-rusetis-eklesia-ukrainis-eklesiis [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

[6] See: Φειδάς Βλάσιος, *Το ζήτημα της Αυτοκεφαλίας της Ορθοδόξου Εκκλησίας της Ουκρανίας εκ πηγών αψευδών*, Αθήναι 2019.

[7] 'Russia has nothing to do with it - Metropolitan Ioane Gamrekeli regarding the issue of Ukraine's autocephaly'

Metropolitan Ioane uses a rather popular argument for non-recognition of the autocephaly of the OCU, according to which: 1- the Patriarch of Constantinople could not single-handedly decide the punishment imposed by the Moscow Patriarchate on Philaret Denisenko and Makary Maletich; 2- Clerics consecrated by the schismatics could not be "received into the church."[8] It must be said that these arguments have been answered for centuries in the Church based on its history, canon and practical actions. Among them, these studies have been translated into Georgian, and interested persons can learn and understand why the arguments made by Metropolitan Ioane are not strong.[9]

Official positions of the hierarchs of the OCG

On February 14, 2023, the meeting of the Holy Synod of the OCG was held, which made an interesting decision. At this meeting, it was decided to establish a Eucharistic communion with the Orthodox Church of Ohrid (North Macedonia), which was in a schism and recently restored the Eucharistic relationship with the Orthodox Church of Serbia.[10] This decision is quite interesting because we see that the OCG established a Eucharistic communion with a church that was in schism in the past, but OCG does not have a Eucharistic connection with OCU and still considers her as schismatic, despite the fact that the OCU received the Tomos of Autocephaly much earlier than the Church of Ohrid, and at the same time, she received this Tomos from the Church of Constantinople. A logical question arises: what was the reason for

[Ruseti arafer shuashia – Meufe Ioane Gamrekeli Ukrainis avtokefaliis sakitkhtan dakavshirebit],

URL:https://newpress.ge/ukrainis-avtokefaliis-sakitxtan-ruseti-arafer-shuashia--meufe-ioanme-gamrekeli-9aov9?fb_comment_id=2588596667874158_2588867257847099&fbclid=IwAR0qWjPcgBRtom-1UlavHKwzDgR7A-rpPFRFQrB8ksa5ztA2jHVjAqd0TE4 [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

[8] 'Excerpt from Reverend John's letter about Ukrainian autocephaly' [Natskveti Meufe Ioanes Tserilidan Ukrainis Avtokefaliis shesakheb], URL: https://tinyurl.com/uzjknsr8 [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

[9] See: Βασιλείου (Ἀρχιεπ. Ἀγχιάλου νῦν δέ Σμύρνης), *Πραγματεία περί τοῦ Κύρους τῆς Χειροτονίας Κληρικῶν ὑπό Ἐπισκόπου Καθῃρημένου Σχισματικοῦ Χειροτονηθέντων*, Ἐν Σμύρνῃ, 1887.

[10] 'Decision of the Holy Synod of the Georgian Orthodox Church 14.02.2023' [Sakartvelos Martlmadidebeli Eklesiis Tsminda Sinodis ganchineba] - URL: https://www.businessinsider.ge/ka/product/776 [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

making such a decision? The answer to this decision may involve politics. For example, according to the official position of the Church of Constantinople, only the Church of Constantinople gives the Tomos of autocephaly to all new Churches. There is also a second position, which is related to the Russian Church. According to it, the Church of Constantinople is not authorized to single-handedly grant autocephaly to a new Church, but this decision must be made in agreement with other churches, and it must include the role of the 'Mother Church'. In light of the fact that, so far, the Church of Ohrid has received the Tomos from the Church of Serbia (not from Constantinople), and the OCG entered into Eucharistic communion with Ohrid (not with Ukraine), it should come as no surprise that this move is relevant to Russian ecclesiology.

In the spring of 2021, the Georgian TV channel 'Formula' recorded an exclusive interview with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I.[11] During the interview, the Formula journalist asked the patriarch about an opinion in Georgia (which he had also heard from members of the Synod of the OCG). According to this opinion, if the OCG recognizes the autocephaly of the OCU, the Moscow Patriarchate will, in turn, recognize the autocephaly of the Church in Abkhazia (a historical territory of Georgia temporarily occupied by Russia, where Russia does not recognize Georgia's legislative or ecclesiastical jurisdiction). In response to the journalist, the Ecumenical Patriarch stated that the right to grant autocephaly belongs exclusively to the Church of Constantinople; therefore, Russia cannot grant independence to the Church of Abkhazia.

When we talk about the positions expressed by the hierarchs of the OCG regarding the OCU, we must mention the letter dated March 24, 2023 that the Patriarch of Georgia wrote to the Ecumenical Patriarch. At the very beginning of the letter, a rather interesting position is voiced: 'It is also clear to us that the Government of Ukraine, being at war, has its own position towards it [regarding the circumstances which are happening in Ukrainian Orthodoxy], and does not consider

[11] 'Bartholomew I: It is groundless blackmail to claim that Russia will grant autocephaly to the Church of Abkhazia' [Bartholomew I: Usafudzvlo shantazhia, rom Ruseti Abkhazetis Eklesias Avtkefalias mianitchebs],-URL: https://formulanews.ge/News/49804 [Accessed 02.03.2023].

religious depth. That is why I am addressing you, Your Holiness'.[12] After clarifying this position, we read in the letter the main reason why it was written:

> Hitherto, Metropolitan Onufriy is deprived of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, there are problems with other churches and monasteries, which are under his jurisdiction, as well […] Your All Holiness […], if it is possible, you might help ease the tension, which, in our opinion implies the creation of conditions for peaceful coexistence at the first stage, and then, a peaceful move towards mutual rapprochement.[13]

The letter clearly shows unconditional support for Metropolitan Onufriy, and it does not mention at all Metropolitan Onufriy's personal connections with the Russian authorities or the contacts of the clergy under Onufriy's jurisdiction with Russian security services.

Speaking about this topic, the position of Metropolitan Andrea (Gvazava) of Gori must also be mentioned. As reported by the official website of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Andrea, in an official letter, expressed his support to Metropolitan Onufriy and the clergy under his jurisdiction.[14]

In accordance with the aim of this article, it is necessary to say that quite often, Georgian bishops, in personal conversations, with journalists or on the internet, state their positions supporting the autocephaly of the OCU.[15] These positions enjoy approval among the Georgian people, because the majority of the Georgian society openly supports the independence of the Ukrainian state and the autocephaly of the OCU, however, depending on the system of the Orthodox Church, the position expressed by individual bishops cannot influence the official position of the Church. The official position of the Church

[12] 'To His All Holiness, Bartholomew', 24.03.2023, URL: https://patriarchate.ge/news/3160?fbclid=IwAR2_VokWBo0it3_pn5OLUkRAy4_qet8cyIQZLZ0g1uXPzoeEWqXJHukZrRg [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

[13] *Ibid*

[14] 'Митрополит Горийский Андрей: Происходящее силовое воздействие на Украинскую Православную Церковь неприемлемо ни по духовным, ни по гражданским законам', URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6016139.html [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

[15] 'Georgian bishops who openly supported the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church' [Kartveli mgvdeltmtavrebi romlebmats giad dauchires mkhari Ukrainis Eklesiis Avtokefalias], URL: http://alion.ge/2022/03/4380/ [Accessed: 26.10.2023].

is echoed by the Holy Synod, and the fact is that the official position of the Synod of the OCG is not affected at all by the Facebook post of a bishop or the statement made to journalists.

By Way of Conclusion

The most obvious thing to mention is that the issue of recognizing Ukraine's autocephaly in Georgia is quite difficult. Georgia is not the only Church that has not recognized this autocephaly, and this is not a tragedy, but the reality is that until now we have not heard an official position from the Holy Synod of the OCG, according to which they at least welcome this step and congratulate the Ukrainians. Instead, we see a different position even regarding the Ohrid Church, which raises doubts about the political motives of this decision. From our personal standpoint, what we must and can see clearly is that the only actual reason why the OCG has not recognized the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church is Russia, and in this context, the OCG will recognize the autocephaly of the OCU only when this recognition is acceptable to the Russian side. Whether this is true or not, let the readers of this article decide.

Francisco De Vitoria's Jus Post Bellum And The Principle Of Punitive Justice

LISA TRAGBAR
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna

This text examines Francisco de Vitoria's punitive justice principle in the *jus post bellum*, presented mainly in his lectures *De iure belli* (1539) and *De Indis* (1539). According to Vitoria, post-war prosecution and other punishment measures aim to deter future armed conflicts but are limited by moral principles. However, focusing his *jus post bellum* solely on punitive victor's justice overlooks Vitoria's concept of the global community of peoples (*totus orbis*) that he develops in *De potestate civili* (1527). This text argues for an interpretation of his *jus post bellum* based on the *totus orbis*, where violations of international law are addressed by its own judicial system, reintegrating wrongdoers back into the global community. After war has ended, the *totus orbis* aims to restore negative peace among all peoples, emphasizing compensatory justice. I firstly provide a short outlay of Vitoria's *totus orbis* concept and in a second step address the specifics of his *jus post bellum*. I explain that the punitive justice principle after war is rather a justice deriving from the global order than a victor's justice. It is part of the *totus orbis'* compensatory justice system.

Introduction

Francisco de Vitoria is a product of his time —16th century Spain — a time of political upheaval, confrontation between new peoples and continents, a time of church reform, and an era between the Middle Ages and the European modernity. This is also reflected in his lectures, which partly still contain strong scholastic thought and method, but also incorporate modern content.[1]

[1] Vitoria was described as 'a towering figure of traditionalism in a time of tumult and discovery'. Alex Bellamy, 'Francisco De Vitoria (1492-1546),' Daniel R. Brunstetter, Cian O'Driscoll (ed.), *Just War Thinkers: From Cicero to the 21st Century*. (Abingdon, New York: Routledge 2018), 77.

A debate around Vitoria has revolved around the foundations of the Just War Theory, arguing that Vitoria is considered one of the historical precursors of important principles of warfare and the morality of war. This has primarily been demonstrated through a thorough analysis of the *ad bellum* and *in bello* criteria, while a detailed outlay of his *jus post bellum* has only been partially explored.[2] In the following, I will focus on Vitoria's post-war law and examine its principle of punitive justice in greater detail. I will argue for the connection between the global community and post-war law.

Vitoria has often been referred to as the 'father of international law'[3]. Parts of his international law have been interpreted up to a secular war theory,[4] a claim widely contested and criticized, (not only) by proponents of a postcolonial interpretation of Vitoria.[5] While Vitoria keeps parts of his law of war and international law separate from missionary law,[6] it

[2] As highlighted by Larry May, 'Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia,' Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson, *Jus post bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 15–25.; Daniel Schwartz, 'Jus post bellum,' Harald Ernst Braun, Erik De Bom, and Paolo Astorri, *A Companion to the Spanish Scholastics*. (Leiden; Boston: Brill 2022), 390 and Švaňa, Lukáš, 'Jus post bellum and Global Responsibility for Peace,' *Profil* 21, 2 (2020), 28; Bass, Gary, 'Jus post bellum,' *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 32. (2004): 384–412.

[3] Around the 400th anniversary of Vitoria's death, his figure and philosophy resurfaced within an academic debate of James Brown Scott. In this debate, the Dominican was referred to as the 'father of international law'. Alex Bellamy, 'The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus post bellum and the Just War.' *Review of International Studies* 34, 4 (2008): 601–625.

[4] Norbert Campagna, *Francisco de Vitoria: Leben und Werk: zur Kompetenz der Theologie in politischen und juridischen Fragen*. (Wien/Berlin: Lit Verlag 2010), 36.

[5] Fundamental texts of these critiques are Antony Anghie, 'Francisco de Vitoria and the colonial origins of international law,' *Social & Legal Studies* 5, 3 (1996): 321–336.; Martti Koskenniemi, 'Colonization of the 'Indies': The origin of international law,' Yolanda Gamarra Chopo, (ed.), *La idea de la América en el pensamiento jus internacionalista del siglo XXI*. (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico 2010), 43–63; Anthony Pagden, 'Conquest and the Just War,' Muthu Sankar (ed.): *Empire and Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012), 30–60.; Karma Nabulsi, 'Conceptions of justice in war: from Grotius to modern times,' Richard Sorabji, David Rodin (ed.), *The Ethics of War*. (London: Routledge 2020), 44–60. Fitzmaurice provides a clear overview of this discussion. See Andrew Fitzmaurice, 'The Problem of Eurocentrism in the Thought of Francisco De Vitoria', José María Beneyto, Justo Corti Varela (ed.): *At the Origins of Modernity: Francisco De Vitoria and the Discovery of International Law*. (Cham: Springer International Publishing 2017), 81-91.

[6] For instance, this becomes evident when Vitoria asserts that religion does not constitute a legitimate basis for waging war (Francisco de Vitoria, 'De iure belli. Über das Kriegsrecht,' Ulrich Horst; Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Joachim Stüben (ed.): *Vorlesungen II. Völkerrecht, Politik, Kirche = Relectiones*. (Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: Kohlhammer 1997), 557). Similarly, he does not acknowledge the papal bull *Inter Caetera* of 1493 as a legitimate justification for the annexation of indigenous territories by the Spaniards (Francisco de Vitoria, 'De Indis. Über die Indianer.' Ulrich Horst, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Joachim Stüben (ed.): *Vorlesungen II. Völkerrecht, Politik, Kirche = Relectiones*. (Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: Kohlhammer 1997), 431). Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Francisco de Vitoria zu Krieg und Frieden*. (Köln: Bachem 1991) 79; Mariano Delgado, *Gott in Lateinamerika: Texte aus fünf Jahrhunderten. Ein Lesebuch zur Geschichte*. (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag 1991), 29.

is essential to acknowledge that his work is deeply rooted in Christian values and scholastic methodology.[7] This non-secular foundation is crucial to understanding the essence of Vitoria's legal philosophy and warrants further exploration. However, my primary objective is not to engage directly in the debate over the secularity of Vitoria's theory of warfare. Rather, while acknowledging the profound influence of Christian principles on his work, I aim to investigate Vitoria's post-war law with the central goal of critically assessing the theoretical and ethical dimensions of the principle of punitive justice.

In his extraordinary lectures (*relectiones*) held by the Dominican theology professor at the University of Salamanca, he reflects on political philosophy and current topics of the time.[8] In *De potestate civili* (1527)[9], Vitoria discusses the nature of state power and develops his idea of the global state community *totus orbis*, which forms the basis of his doctrine of international law. About twelve years later, around 1539, Vitoria delivers two of his most well-known lectures, *De iure belli*[10] and *De Indis hispanorum in barbaros*[11] (henceforth abbreviated as *De Indis*). In the former, he discusses the laws of war, in the latter, he examines legitimate and illegitimate reasons for Spanish rule in the newly 'discovered' indigenous territories of the past 50 years. The lectures *De potestate civili* and *De iure belli* will be of greater importance in the following text, as I will argue for their connection.

[7] James Muldoon, „Francisco De Vitoria and Humanitarian Intervention", *Journal of Military Ethics* 5 (2), 2006, 133.

[8] The *relectiones* at the University of Salamanca were extraordinary lectures held on holidays and addressed a specific critical audience. They provide a glimpse into the vibrant intellectual discourse among prominent scholars in 16th century Spain. The School of Salamanca, renowned for its scholarly engagement, witnessed a prolonged debate spanning several decades, in the early discussions between intellectuals like Bartolomé de Las Casas, Hernán Cortéz, Ginés de Sepulveda and Francisco de Vitoria. This debate unfolded against the backdrop of colonial conquests and the grave atrocities committed against indigenous populations, prompting discussions regarding the moral and theological justifications for colonial practices. Theologians alike engaged in deliberations concerning moral-philosophical dilemmas, including the validation of an international natural law and the ethical considerations surrounding missionary activities. Anthony Pagden, 'Conquest and the Just War,' 32, Anthony Pagden, 'The School of Salamanca', George Klosko (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 248.

[9] Francisco de Vitoria, 'De potestate civili. Über die politische Gewalt,' Ulrich Horst, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Joachim Stüben (ed.): *Vorlesungen I. Völkerrecht, Politik, Kirche*. (Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: Kohlhammer 1995), 114–161.

[10] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 542–605.

[11] Vitoria, *De Indis*, 370–541.

That Vitoria's law of war and international law are linked is a broad consensus within his reception.[12] However, his *jus post bellum*, which tends to be under-examined,[13] has so far been interpreted as too one-sided in the sense of a victor's punitive justice and not sufficiently connected to his concept of the community of peoples. Researchers such as Larry May and Daniel Schwartz have delved into Vitoria's post-war law.[14] Alex Bellamy in his article 'The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War" (2008), however not focusing on Vitoria but the scholastic tradition in general, has argued that the concept of *jus post bellum* within the scholastic tradition is based on a punitive form of justice emanating from the victorious party.[15] He proposes an understanding of this post-war law as a minimalist approach to reconstructing peace. Vitorias *jus post bellum* would therefore be part of the minimalist tradition. While I do not disagree with this categorization here, I aim to contribute further nuances to the discussion. I argue that the insights of his *jus post bellum* deriving from the lectures *De Indis* and *De iure belli* (1539) must be read within the scope of his political philosophy deriving from his lecture *De potestate civili* (1529). The aim of this text is to connect the punitive justice principle within the *jus post bellum* with Vitoria's *totus orbis*. In doing so, I examine in more detail what content emerges from his *jus post bellum* and how it relates to the concept of *totus orbis*.

In the following text, I aim to propose an understanding of his *jus post bellum* as a form of restricted victor's justice within a framework of the world community's compensatory justice system. Vitoria's concept of punitive justice within the *jus post bellum* can be understood as a form of compensatory justice deriving from the global order. I argue that *jus post bellum* is not necessarily imposed by the victorious party alone, but rather rooted in the compensatory justice system of the *totus orbis*

[12] Kirstin Bunge, 'Das Verhältnis von universaler Rechtsgemeinschaft und partikularen politischen Gemeinwesen. Zum Verständnis des totus orbis bei Francisco de Vitoria,' Kirstin Bunge, Anselm Spindler, Andreas Wagner (ed.), Die Normativität des Rechts bei Francisco De Vitoria. *Politische Philosophie und Rechtstheorie des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit*. (Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog 2011), 224.

[13] Lukáš Švaňa, 'Jus post bellum and Global Responsibility for Peace,' 19.

[14] Both argue that his proposed measures of *jus post bellum* are charged to the losing side in the form of burdens instead of making it a positive duty for the winners. Larry May, *After War End*s. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012). Daniel Schwartz, 'Jus post bellum,' 390–410.

[15] Alex Bellamy, 'The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus post bellum and the Just War,' 606.

and executed by representatives of the global community of peoples. While Vitoria's *jus post bellum* encompasses additional principles,[16] I will primarily focus on its core aspect: punitive justice. Therefore, a new interpretation of *jus post bellum* in the context of *totus orbis* is necessary in order to open a new perspective on Vitoria's post-war law.

The following, second chapter deals with the foundations of Vitorian international law, in particular his concept of the global community of peoples (*totus orbis*). It first establishes the link between the global community in times of peace as well as in times of war. In the third chapter, the punitive justice principle of his *jus post bellum* is presented. It explains how the *totus orbis* lays the basis for the *jus post bellum*. The fourth chapter then clarifies in more detail how rulers of commonwealths are acting as executive powers of the *totus orbis*. In the concluding chapter, critical reflections are made on the Vitorian *jus post bellum* and its topicality.

1. The Global Community of Peoples: Vitoria's Totus Orbis

In this chapter, Vitoria's concept of a natural and global community of peoples is explained first. Vitoria explains this notion within his lecture *De potestate civili*. It is argued that the *totus orbis* forms a global, yet invisible legal order that aims to 1. preserve global peace and 2. protect international rights among its equal members. First, the history of the emergence of the community of peoples is explained in more detail, before the two main purposes of the *totus orbis* are discussed.

In Times of Peace: A Global Order Securing International Law

The term *totus orbis*, translated as 'whole earth', refers here to a supranational community order that regulates the global common good of peace on a legal and moral level.[17] It is based on the common human history shared by all peoples. Vitoria derives this concept from God's creation:

[16] Cécile Fabre, *Cosmopolitan Peace*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019), 15.

[17] Kirstin Bunge, 'Das Verhältnis von universaler Rechtsgemeinschaft und partikularen politischen Gemeinwesen. Zum Verständnis des *totus orbis* bei Francisco de Vitoria,' 202.

> 'Omnis […] potestas, qua res publica saecularis administrator, non solum iusta et legitima est, sed ita Deum auctorem habet, ut nec orbis totius consensus tolli abrogari possit'[18]

For Vitoria, there is no force that does not derive from God's creation.[19] The community of peoples emerged from the history of creation. According to this story, at the beginning of human history, all people shared goods, land, sea, and mineral resources.[20] The earth was the common property of all. It was only through the sharing of goods that inequalities, political structures, and thus different peoples emerged.[21] Although differences and disparities developed between the peoples, they did not lose their original rights despite the changed political structures. The historical origin secures a global legal basis for peoples to live together within an international, legal system, which is based on natural law. Vitoria explains that all people are entitled to rights based on their common creation, regardless of their culture or even religion. He assumes a substantial equality of human beings based on their community of nature.[22]

Peace is the bond that is holding the *totus orbis* together. In Vitoria's understanding, peace represents the natural form of human coexistence,[23] as in the original state of human history, peace and equality prevailed

[18] 'Any power [...] by which the temporal polity is governed is not only just and lawful, but has God for its author in such a way that it cannot be abrogated or abolished even with the consent of the whole world.' Vitoria, *De potestate civili*, 119. This and the following translations are translated from German to English by me, with the help of DeepL. More thoughts on the German translation of Vitorias original texts are found in: Joachim Stüben, 'Wie soll man Vitoria übersetzen? Einige Gedanken zu Sprache und Inhalt der Relektion De potestate civili und des Kommentars zu den Quästionen De lege des hl. Thomas,' Kirstin Bunge, Anselm Spindler, Andreas Wagner, (ed.): *Die Normativität Des Rechts Bei Francisco De Vitoria. Politische Philosophie und Rechtstheorie des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit*. (Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog Verlag 2011), 3–40.

[19] Vitoria *De potestate civili*, 119.

[20] Ulrich Horst , 'Leben und Werke Francisco de Vitorias,' Ulrich Horst; Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Joachim Stüben (ed.): *Vorlesungen I. Völkerrecht, Politik, Kirche = Relectiones.* (Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: Kohlhammer 1995), 90.

[21] Vitoria, *De Indis*, 461; Kirstin Bunge, 'Das Verhältnis von universaler Rechtsgemeinschaft und partikularen politischen Gemeinwesen. Zum Verständnis des totus orbis bei Francisco de Vitoria,' 202.

[22] He attributes to all human beings an innate ability to reason, which enables them to understand natural law. Vitoria, *De potestate civili*, 125.

[23] Kirstin Bunge, 'Francisco de Vitoria: A Redesign of Global Order on the Threshold of the Middle Ages to Modern Times,' Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein, David Roth-Isigkeit (ed.), *System, order, and international law. The early history of international legal thought from Machiavelli to Hegel.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017), 49.

between all peoples. Vitoria defines peace primarily as negative peace[24], which for him means the absence of military action and the securing of global security, as he mentions in his law of entry:

> 'Secundo a principio orbis, cum omnia essent communia, licebat unicuique in quamcumque regionem vellet intendere et peregrinandi. Non autem videtur hoc demptum per rerum divisionem.'[25]

Peace is a shared common good from which every nation benefits because it is the precondition for international rights. Contrary to contemporary views, Vitoria does not understand peace primarily as respect for the territoriality of other commonwealths, as this is softened by the above-cited right of entry and hospitality *(jus communicationis and jus peregrinandi)*.[26] Rather, he is concerned with global security and the possibility of exercising one's rights without the use of force.

The legal order of the *totus orbis* is based on natural law, which, according to Vitoria, has existed since the beginning of human history.[27] Natural law ensures a global, moral, and legal equality of peoples of different faiths. It is implemented by the *totus orbis*, forming a supranational power based on natural consensus but subject to no direct rulers. It does not represent a contract-theoretical model of peace, but is a common natural, moral, and legal order, which applies equally to all rational people and polities, regardless of their origin or culture.[28]

[24] Michael Allen Fox, *Understanding Peace. A comprehensive introduction*. (New York/London: Routledge 2014), 178–179.

[25] 'Secondly, at the beginning of the world, when everything was common to all, everyone was allowed to move and travel to any territory he wished. But this does not seem to have been abolished by the division of goods.' Vitoria, *De Indis*, 461.

[26] Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800*. (New Haven: Yale University Press 1995), 80. On the *jus peregrinandi* building on the *totus orbis*: Kirstin Bunge, 'Francisco de Vitoria: A Redesign of Global Order on the Threshold of the Middle Ages to Modern Times,' 38–55.; Kirstin Bunge, 'Das Verhältnis von universaler Rechtsgemeinschaft und partikularen politischen Gemeinwesen. Zum Verständnis des totus orbis bei Francisco de Vitoria,' 201–227.; Johann Schelkshorn, Entgrenzungen. *Ein europäischer Beitrag zum Diskurs über die Moderne*. (Weilerswist: Velbrück 2009), 283.

[27] Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Francisco de Vitoria zu Krieg und Frieden*, 177.

[28] In short, all the peoples of the *totus orbis*. Joseph Höffner, *Kolonialismus und Evangelium*. (Trier: Paulinus 1969), 320–321.

In summary, Francisco de Vitoria's concept of *totus orbis* is based on the notion that all the commonwealths of the world are bound together by a common moral and legal order rooted in human history. This idea manifests itself as an invisible institution as a global and universally valid principle of order. Through this existing commonality, all peoples are bound to maintain peace and respect the natural rights of all peoples that have prevailed since the beginning of history. The two principles of the *totus orbis* imply normative guidelines:

i. As a legal order, it is responsible for implementing the global common good peace,
ii. It secures universal rights among peoples.

So far, my analysis has primarily focused on the functioning of the global community of peoples during periods of peace. However, it is equally crucial to examine its role during times of war. The following subchapter argues that in times of war, the *totus orbis* proves to be an institution of compensatory justice.

In Times of War: An Institution of Compensatory justice

Vitoria's international law is closely linked to his law of war. Firstly, the common good of peace has top priority in both areas:[29] 'Sexto probatur, quia finis belli est pax et securitas rei publicae.'[30] Keeping the primary goal of peace in mind, the *totus orbis* proves secondly to be an institution of compensatory justice. This is demonstrated by the fact that violations of fundamental international rights can already constitute moral grounds for waging war.

Deterrence plays a big part in the negative peace that Vitoria imagines. He continues: 'Esset enim omnino iniqua condicio belli, si hostibus invadentibus iniuste rem publicam solum liceret rei publicae avertere hostes nec posset ulterius perequi.'[31] If deterrence is not enough to keep enemy states from attacking, not only defensive warfare but also

[29] 'The highest goal of every war is peace, which is why every act of war should be judged by it. All wars serve the goal of peace.' Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 547.

[30] 'Sixthly, the sentence is proved because the aim of war is peace and the security of the commonwealth.' Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 547.

[31] 'But there cannot be security within the community without instilling fear of war in the enemies and discouraging them from committing injustice. For there would be a totally unjust starting position for war if a community, when unjustly attacked by enemies, were only allowed to repel these enemies and not to pursue them further.' Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 556–548.

continued persecution is a form of punitive justice that is potentially legitimate after witnessing an injustice. For example, the denial of the international right to hospitality[32] could already justify some use of force,[33] since the law of war begins where the rights of the natural community of peoples are violated.[34]

Vitoria argues that it may be legitimate to punish communities that have violated international law to prevent further injustice. In order to protect the community, it may therefore be necessary to use force to punish wrongs that have been committed and to restore peace between all peoples.[35] A violation of natural law thus constitutes an inequality within the *totus orbis* that must be punished. The global community of peoples is responsible for punishing these violations. Prosecution serves to deter further injustices and to reintegrate wrongdoers back into the *totus orbis*.[36] It can be understood as a form of compensatory justice - the law violation by the wrongdoer gives rise to compensation. The at-fault party must be held accountable for its wrongdoing. In this context, the *totus orbis* can be seen as an institution of compensatory justice, as it aims for the preservation of global peace and the observance of universal rights between peoples.

This compensatory justice principle was explained here with the help of the *jus ad bellum* but has consequences both for the *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum*. While *jus ad bellum* decides to punish violations of international law that occurred in times of peace, in the post-war period, violations of *jus in bello* are punished. In the *jus post bellum*, a line is drawn by balancing the injustices committed by the losing side with a fair measure of punishment. Consequently, that also means that if there were a just war, (that is, if all soldiers fought according to *just in bello* principles), there would be no need for a *jus post bellum*.[37]

[32] Vitoria, *De Indis*, 461–462.

[33] Höffner, Joseph, *Kolonialismus und Evangelium*, 411; Johann Schelkshorn, *Entgrenzungen. Ein europäischer Beitrag zum Diskurs über die Moderne*, 286.

[34] At this juncture, it must be added that not all injustices warrant punishment. Vitoria, employing the principle of proportionality, argues that it is not always necessary to respond to injustices with military means. Instead, he advocates for the practice of Christian values such as mercy and forgiveness. Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 602–603. Further elaboration on this matter can be found towards the end of this article.

[35] Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Francisco de Vitoria zu Krieg und Frieden*, 72.

[36] Integration is understood here in a broader sense, in the sense of the re-implementation of a negative peace.

[37] Vitoria demonstrates a pragmatism that acknowledges that we can't always assume that the defending side will act justly in war. As a result, it's likely that soldiers will face legal consequences after the war has ended.

As stated in the previous text, it is up to the *totus orbis* to uphold international law. It is also upon the *totus orbis* to punish injustices. One difficulty, however, is that it has neither a ruling nor an executive power because it lacks global world supremacy. Due to the absence of a world monarch or global authority, there does not seem to be an institution capable of protecting the universal common good. Furthermore, the *totus orbis* does not have its own executive punitive power, such as neutral troops, to act against violations of international law. The question arises who can assume this punitive power?

In answering this question, Vitoria distinguishes between ecclesiastical and political power. While the Pope is the head in religious matters, the political rulers of the polities have secular power in political matters.[38] Since violations of international law concern secular matters, the Pope has no decision-making power here. Consequently, the Pope or other ecclesial powers are not responsible for securing the foundations of international law within the *totus orbis*.[39]

Both decision-making and executive power regarding the safeguarding of international law are transferred to the political heads of the affected commonwealths. In this context, the princes are assigned the decision-making power to protect the *totus orbis* from violations of international law.[40] They are also given the power of punishment with which they can act against injustice, deter and punish wrongdoers.[41] In their function, they have the task of restoring the global world order and the original state of peace between peoples[42] - in brief – protecting the interests of the *totus orbis*.

By virtue of their neutrality, rulers are obliged to treat all peoples equally and to grant them equal rights. As Vitoria points out, whatever the ruler is obliged to do for his own commonwealth, he is equally obliged to do for other peoples:[43] 'Et in summa quidquid rex tenetur facere pro commodo suae patriae, idem tenetur facere pro barbaris.'[44] This principle of equality also means to include indigenous peoples

[38] Vitoria, *De Indis*, 421.
[39] Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Francisco de Vitoria zu Krieg und Frieden*, 170.
[40] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 547.
[41] Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Francisco de Vitoria zu Krieg und Frieden*, 73.
[42] Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Francisco de Vitoria zu Krieg und Frieden*, 71.
[43] Vitoria, *De Indis*, 509.
[44] 'And in general, whatever the king is obliged to do for his fatherland, he is equally obliged to do for the barbarians.' Vitoria, *De Indis*, 509.

and every commonwealth of another religion, which at that time, was a groundbreaking thought.

Summing up, with the idea of the *totus orbis*, Vitoria strives for a global community of peoples based on a state of peace and equality between all peoples. The *totus orbis* goes back to the original state of human history and still forms a natural legal order between all peoples, granting them natural international rights. If one of the commonwealths commits an injustice, and thus breaks peace within the legal order, these violations of international law are to be punished by the *totus orbis* itself – by military means if necessary. When war has ended, Vitoria's punitive justice principle aims at punishing injustices that occurred during the war, then reintegrating the wrongdoers into the *totus orbis*, and restoring a negative peace between peoples. The following text develops on how the rulers can offer satisfaction to their own aggrieved commonwealth as well as the *totus orbis*. Before the responsibilities of the rulers are explained in more detail, the following third chapter takes a closer look at the punitive justice principle during the post-war period.

2. Francisco de Vitoria's Jus post bellum

Whereas Vitoria develops his political philosophy in the *relectio De potestate civili*, he presumes these foundations within his more applied lectures *De Indis* and *De iure belli*. However, his political bases still play a great role in his law of war.

In the context of presenting Vitorias punitive justice principle within his *jus post bellum*, some central questions arise: What exactly does the punishment look like? To what extent are the political rulers entitled to it? In order to answer these questions, I will first draw on three moral principles that are applicable to the time after war as well as some more concrete examples, which Vitoria elaborates on mainly in *De iure belli* and *De Indis*. I will then link these considerations to the concept of *totus orbis* and argue that rulers have a dual role as leaders of a polity and as representatives of the *totus orbis*. My aim here is to emphasize that Vitoria advocated for a limited prosecution of the defeated party. His focus lies rather on compensatory justice, advocating for punitive

means, in the sense of reintegrating the wrongdoers into the global community of peoples.

The Principle of Punitive Justice

At first glance, Vitorias *jus post bellum* resembles a punitive justice. Here, the question arises as to whether the punitive measures of the *totus orbis* have individual or collective consequences.[45] It also serves as deterrence and establishes negative peace.[46] By punishing individual soldiers on the opposing side, collective suffering is inflicted upon the enemy. The principle of punishment also destroys the enemy's personnel capacities to wage war.

Vitoria argues that combatants are guilty when fighting the wrong, unjust side of a war.[47] Their goodwill and strong dutiful bond with their ruler make them responsible for fighting on that side. The targeted killing of enemy soldiers is therefore not a punishment of the individuals, but rather a punishment of their people by hurting them.[48] It is aimed at punishing the collective but can take place on an individual level. According to Vitoria, when individual soldiers are harmed, it is the collective that suffers. Consequently, individual soldiers can be punished for the wrongdoing of their collective, even if they were only minimally involved as individuals in committing the injustice.[49]

Punishment within the *jus post bellum* becomes a corrective measure if the injustices of the opposing party have not yet been punished for during the war. It also gives an opportunity to punish *in bello* injustices. Consequently, the punishment principle serves to fulfill the objectives of war in the last instance.[50] Imposing punishment could be done by

[45] This differentiation goes back to the different roles of soldiers and rulers. While rulers are responsible for judging the morality of the war and making decisions on the further course of the war, soldiers fight in 'good faith' for their people and are bound by the decisions of their political leaders (Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 605). However, they themselves are also responsible for assessing the morality of the war (Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 553).

[46] Negative peace in the sense of the absence of armed military violence can also be accompanied by other types of violence, for example structural violence as emphasized by Johan Galtung in 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,' *Journal of Peace Research*, 6, 3 (1969), 167–191.

[47] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 605.

[48] They can be punished even if their wrongdoing is based on their ruler's responsibility. Vitoria, *De potestate civili*, 139.

[49] The individual actions of the combatant fighting on the wrong side are decisive for his criminal liability, while the actions of his people determine the extent of the liability attributed to them. Daniel Schwartz, 'Jus post bellum', 392.

[50] Helen Frowe, *The Ethics of War and Peace. An Introduction*. (New York: Routledge 2015),

the following means: It is not only done by killing the opponents but also includes the payment of reparations by paying taxes. It seeks to implement the recovery of the costs of war, as well as the prosecution of the wrongdoers to serve a lasting security to the just winners.[51]

Vitoria gives several examples of post-war punitive justice, such as punishing some of the defeated soldiers, confiscating and executing property, deposing the enemy ruler, looting, killing, penalties, and enslaving. Vitoria concedes a potential justification for all these acts.[52] However, these measures are controlled by three meta-principles of war. Punitive justice can be executed as long as the principles of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination are met (see chapter 3.2). Post-war punitive actions, such as killing, levying taxes, looting and occupation must be carefully examined for their moral legitimacy first.

Prosecution of individual wrongdoers as a form of punitive justice after victory serves above all to deter future wars in order to achieve the goal of peace within the global community of peoples. In terms of negative peace, punitive justice aims to limit the opposing party in its military means (soldiers, weapons and ammunition, money) in such a way that further wars are prevented. Vitoria's most important principle of punitive justice within his *jus post bellum* comes closest to a limited victor's justice[53] if read without the idea of his *totus orbis*. Post-war punishment serves to correct past injustice, in the sense of compensatory justice with the aim of reintegrating the defeated into the community of peoples (see second chapter).

However, Vitoria's punitive justice principle within his *jus post bellum* seems outdated in various aspects. He argues in his work for certain morally permissible actions after the end of war, which are highly disputed today.[54] For example, Vitoria's *jus post bellum* allows looting, slavery, and even killings as punishments within a moral scope.[55] This

242.

[51] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 591.

[52] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 597–599.

[53] Helen Frowe, *The Ethics of War and Peace. An Introduction*, 240; Larry May, *After War Ends*, 45.

[54] Brian Orend, The Morality of War. (Peterborough: Broadview Press 2006), 20; Larry May, *After War Ends*, 46.

[55] Daniel Schwartz, *The Political Morality of the Late Scholastics: Civil Life, War and Conscience*. Cambridge University Press 2019), 192.

view was based on a widespread right to punishment, which in the 16th century was usually associated with the right after the end of a war.[56]

Several points speak against the topicality of Vitoria's post-war law. His *jus post bellum* offers only limited protection for individuals and relies mainly on collective punitive measures as well as negative peace. It does not offer a framework for the rights of the defeated – aspects that are now considered fundamental to modern international law.[57] Compared to current maximalist approaches, which impose obligations on winners after the end of the war, *post bellum* minimalists, mainly scholastics, tend to advocate concessions to the winners.[58] Permissions dictate to the winning side what they may do after a victory. Most minimalist accounts of *jus post bellum* limit the winners' rights to acts that protect themselves, that were taken unlawfully, and punish the perpetrators. This means that the winners secure the just cause of war and deter future aggression by punishing the aggressors.[59] However, I contend that Vitoria's post-war legal framework encompasses more than mere punishment and criminal justice. It also includes other forms of *post bellum* reconstruction, even though the punitive justice principle seems to be the most important aspect.[60] Even though it has been recognized that forms of reconstruction and criminal justice also appear in variants of the minimalist position,[61] Vitoria's *jus post bellum* should be explored from aspects outside of the minimalist categories.[62]

[56] Daniel Schwartz, 'Jus post bellum', 390.

[57] Larry May, *After War Ends*, 46.

[58] Larry May, 'Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia', 22; Alex Bellamy, 'The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus post bellum and the Just War', 602.; Larry May, *After War Ends*, 47.

[59] Helen Frowe, *The Ethics of War and Peace. An Introduction*, 240; Brian Orend, *The Morality of War*, 612.

[60] Brian Orend, 'Jus post bellum: The Perspective of a Just-War Theorist,' *Leiden Journal of International Law,* 20 (2007), 573.

[61] Larry May, 'Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia,' 22; Alex Bellamy, 'The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus post bellum and the Just War', 602.

[62] Moreover, Vitoria's post-war law is associated with a minimalist position. I do not aim to criticize this categorization, however, it is worth noting at this point that Vitoria's post-war law encompasses additional elements that, while not rendering it a maximalist concept, are also grounded in principles of restoration and reparation, as emphasized by Larry May, *After War Ends*, 47 and Cécile Fabre, *Cosmopolitan Peace*, 15.

Three Moral Principles Post Bellum

In the Conclusiones of the lecture *De iure belli*, Vitoria reminds that after war, rulers are first and foremost obliged to keep peace according to Paul Rom. 12:18:

> 'Supposito, quod principes habent auctoritatem gerendi bellum, primum omnium debent non quaerere occasiones et causas belli, sed, fieri potest, cum omnibus cupiant pacem habere'[63]

This is the highest and unconditional priority, which concerns not only bordering peoples but all peoples of the global community. War is waged with the aim of re-implementing peace and security, as elaborated in chapter 2.

In the Vitorian *jus post bellum*, the classical three normative principles of the just war doctrine are applied to assess the legitimacy of an action. These principles also play a significant role the *jus in bello:*

1. Proportionality:

After war has ended, the principle of proportionality applies as a limitation for killing for punishment purposes. In this context, the total punishment must be in proportion to the initial wrong done by the enemy state. The level of punishment should correspond to the wrong committed that served as a just cause for entering war in the first place. After war has ended, punishment is allowed under the principle of proportionality: 'servata autem humanitate et aequitate, quia poena debet esse proportionate culpae.'[64]

This principle is intended to ensure that the level of punishment is proportionate to the suffering endured. An unrestricted killing of enemy soldiers could therefore be considered too great an intrusion into the common good peace and not be proportionate to the degree of guilt under the proportionality principle.

[63] 'Suppose that rulers have the authority to wage war. Their very first duty is not to look for opportunities and reasons for war, rather they must strive to keep peace with all, if possible.' Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 602–603.

[64] 'Of course, with due regard for humanity and justice; the punishment must be measured according to the degree of guilt.' Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 598–599.

In the post-war period,[65] the victorious side virtually sets off the injustice suffered. It then measures the punishment based on the severity of the crime and makes sure that the punishment corresponds to the injustice committed by the enemy. Vitoria explains, based on the occupation of France, that the penalty should be assessed according to the proportionality principle. From this example, he derives that a punitive action by the winning side is unjust if the principle of proportionality is not observed. Vitoria illustrates the example that it would be unbearable to occupy all of France, if the French had taken livestock from Spanish herds as loot or set a single district on fire.[66]

2. Necessity:

Necessity is another normative principle of the *jus post bellum* that all war agents have the obligation to uphold.[67] Accordingly, the use of force should be limited to the minimum in order to achieve the overall goal of war, which is peace and the reintegration of the wrongdoers back into the *totus orbis*.[68] Accordingly, any punishment must be assessed based on the principle of necessity. According to this necessity calculus, not all crimes necessarily require the highest possible punishment:

> 'Et si necessitas et ratio belli postulet, ut maior pars agri hostium occupetur aut quod plures civitates capiantur, oportet, ut compositis rebus et peracto bello restituantur tantum retinendo, quantum sit iustum pro impensatione damnorum et impensarum et pro vindicta iniurae'[69]

The Christian value of moderation allows the winners to only punish the most fundamental war crimes. Some punishments can be avoided if the actions were not crucial for the injustice suffered. For example, because of their non-knowledge of a legitimate warfare and their citizen

[65] The principle does not only apply to killing after was but to punishment measures more generally, also during warfare (*in bello*) – it thus restricts killing for punishment. Daniel Schwartz, 'Jus post bellum,' 395.

[66] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 599.

[67] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 599.

[68] James Muldoon, 'Francisco De Vitoria and Humanitarian Intervention,' 137.

[69] 'And if the necessity and nature of the war require that the greater part of the enemy's country should be occupied, or that several cities should be taken, they must, when an agreement has been reached and the war ended, be returned, retaining as much as may be lawful to retain for the payment of damages and expenses, and for the punishment of wrongs.' Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 599.

duty to serve,[70] not all soldiers need to be punished for fighting on the wrong side.

3. Discrimination:

Regarding punitive justice, a third moral principle also derives from Vitoria's lectures, which is applied in the *jus post bellum* – the principle of discrimination. The discrimination principle, also relevant during warfare, also becomes important in post-war law. It requires a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate goals:

> 'Solum ad vindicandam iniurium non semper licet interficere omnes nocentes. Probatur, quia etium inter cives non liceret, si etiam esset delictum totius civitatis, interficere omnes delinquentes'[71]

Based on this principle, it needs to be distinguished between innocent citizens and soldiers.[72] Unjust combatants on the losing side can be killed under criminal law, while innocent persons, including children, must be protected.[73]

If the three moral principles restrict a large part of the punishment measures, what types of punishments are still allowed in post-war law? Vitoria gives concrete examples: Criminal killing is allowed in principle on condition that it follows the three moral principles. He does not completely rule out the possibility of a complete extermination of the opposing collective, assuming that only guilty people are among the opposing side and that their initial wrongdoing was large enough for drastic countermeasures.[74] Reparations can also be implemented according to *jus post bellum* principles through taxes, looting or transitional governments. Vitoria argues that imposing fiscal levies on

[70] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 605.

[71] 'Merely to punish injustice, it is not always permissible to kill all the guilty. The sentence is proved because it would also not be permissible to kill all offenders among the citizens, even if the whole citizenry were guilty of an offence.' Vitoria *De iure belli*, 590–583.

[72] Furthermore, only crimes that have been committed may be punished, not those that merely have a high probability of being committed. Vitoria stresses that it is not permissible to kill someone for their future sin (Vitoria, *De Indis*. 584–585). This principle makes pre-emptive wars impossible, as sometimes advocated by contemporary philosophers. Brian Orend, *The Morality of War*, 17.

[73] Vitora, *De iure belli*, 583 (j*us in bello*); Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 591 (*jus post bellum*).

[74] Therefore, it is not always permitted to kill all the guilty, but the sentence should be proportional to the crime. Following Vitoria, it may not always be permitted to kill all the guilty just in the sake of punishing injustice. Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 591.

the enemy also serves to compensate and punish for damage.[75] This, he argues, is an appropriate form of punitive justice. A more extreme approach to raising funds is plunder. Unjust combatants would have to return all property confiscated during the war, while the victorious party could retain property as part of a war estate as compensation for costs incurred during the war. With regard to Vitoria's last punishment measure concerning a regime change, the winners are allowed to change the political ruler of the opposing party if the preservation of order cannot otherwise be ensured.[76] The implementation of transitional governments after the end of the war may be necessary as a last resort to prevent the parties from reverting to a state of war.[77] However, the occupation of cities is only justified if the inhabitants have previously committed a corresponding grave injustice. It that case, deterrence may be necessary to not fall back into warfare.[78]

From the last paragraphs, it became clear that the opposing side must be treated with respect, (not only) after war has ended. Punishments are restricted by three normative principles which Vitoria derives from Christian virtues like humility, moderation, and charity.[79] In summary, punitive justice should only be exercised after an armed conflict when it responds to an injustice inflicted on the entire *totus orbis*. The goal here is to restore security and integrate the former enemy collective into the global community of peoples. Even harsh forms of punishment are potentially legitimate if they respect the normative principles proportionality, necessity, and discrimination.

4. The Role of the Ruler

In the second chapter, I shorty described the responsibility to punish the wrongdoers befall the ruling powers after the end of a war. However, further investigations are necessary to outline the rulers' tasks and functions. I further stated that punitive measures primarily serve to redress the injustice inflicted by the enemy state, thus fulfilling a higher

[75] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 590.
[76] Cécile Fabre, *Cosmopolitan Peace*, 14.
[77] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 565.
[78] Vitoria also employs this argument to rationalize the expansion of the Roman Empire. He draws a parallel: The Romans expanded their dominion by means of martial law, occupying cities that had previously wronged the Roman Empire. Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 599.
[79] Vitoria, *De iure belli,* 602–603.

purpose by ensuring the reintegration of the enemy commonwealth into the *totus orbis*. Nevertheless, the exact role that falls upon the ruling powers after war remains unclear. This fourth chapter explains in more detail how the rulers of a commonwealth ought to act and decide after war has ended.

An Executive Power of Totus orbis

It was already argued that there exists no special executive power within the *totus orbis* in the contemporary sense of a shared military or an executive body. Initially, in the scope of 16th-century politics, it is not implausible that another commonwealth within the *totus orbis*, on behalf of the aggrieved peoples, may engage in warfare to stop the committed injustice. But it is not the most evident outcome that another nation assumes the executive authority of the *totus orbis*. Additionally, forming alliances among nations could be another option to wage war to collectively punish the *totus orbis*' injustices through coalition wars. However, Vitoria does not address these two possibilities in his lectures. He primarily focuses on the perspective of the winning party. The responsibilities for punitive justice are bestowed upon the ruling powers of the winner, to exert the *totus orbis*' will.

Wars constitute a state of exception that significantly threatens the usual state of a peaceful global community. The emergency arising from this acute threat necessitates an adaptation of the legal framework to ensure social order and security. In this context, fundamental rights of citizens can be restricted, such as the limitation of freedom of movement by the involvement of armed forces, for example through a compulsory military service. Such a state of exception facilitates temporary changes in the legal system. As a result, new tasks and responsibilities emerge for certain segments of society, particularly for the political powers in a state of war but also for soldiers and civilians. In this chapter, it is argued that the ruling powers have a dual role during times of war.

According to Vitoria, with the switch from international to martial law, rulers get new tasks, which involve the observation of the morality of war. On the one hand, they are responsible for upholding the morality of war in the interest of the *totus orbis*, and on the other hand, they act as the political leaders of their own people. In their dual role

as the political leaders of a nation and as the executive body of the *totus orbis*, they represent a neutral entity that must consider the moral aspects of warfare. When a political and legitimate authority wages war, it operates in two capacities. On the one hand, the ruling powers are the heads of their own people, and on the other hand, they assume the role of a neutral entity as the executive body of the *totus orbis*. In several instances in *De iure belli*, Vitoria emphasizes the necessity of absolute neutrality on the part of the ruling powers: A high-ranked ruler and lawful judge[80] possesses the power of punishment, bestowed upon them by the emergency of the law of war. He asserts the neutrality of the ruling powers in relation to the *jus post bellum*. Vitoria suggests that the winner assumes the role of a judge, positioned between two communities: the harmed community and the community responsible for the wrongdoing. Instead of acting as an accuser, the winner acts as a judge, aiming to offer satisfaction and restitution to the aggrieved community (being his own nation).[81]

An Impartial Judge

According to Vitoria's understanding, the victorious powers have a special role. After the conclusion of an armed conflict, they are called upon as neutral entities to make decisions regarding further actions as objectively as possible.

> 'Parta victoria et complete bello oportet moderate et modestia Christiana voctoria uti. Et oportet victorem existimare se iudicem sedere inter duas res publicas: alteram, quae laesa est, alteram, quae iniuriam fecit, ut non tanquam accusator sententiam ferat, sed tanquam iudex satisfaciat quidem lease'[82]

[80] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 599.
[81] Vitoria, *De iure belli,* 603.
[82] 'After achieving victory and after the end of the war, one must use one's own victory prudently and with Christian moderation. The victor must see himself as a judge who sits between two communities: between the one that was wronged and the other that committed the wrong. Consequently, he does not pass sentence as a prosecutor, but as a judge he provides satisfaction to the wronged community.' Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 602–603.

Vitoria implies that the victorious powers should not be tempted into unlawful actions.[83] Due to their neutrality, they are obligated to treat all peoples equally and grant them equal rights.[84] The just judge must carefully examine the situation and make determinations with certainty about the actual actions. In doing so, he must accurately examine the legal situation and seek to ascertain the truth.[85] The objectivity of their actions poses a great challenge to the ruling powers, not least because they simultaneously entail moral decisions.[86]

Secular rulers, such as princes, dukes, and kings, bear the responsibility for conducting warfare justly and ensuring the morality of war.[87] They must not only uphold the morality of their actions but also enact laws for implementation and ensure their compliance. However, in this task, they are not alone. Rulers possess the personal means to meet the demanding political and moral requirements. They are provided help in their two areas of responsibility: 1. Their officials are responsible for the implementation of laws,[88] while 2. a consultative body of theologians is entrusted with examining the morality of wars. They, along with other knowledgeable experts, are tasked with assessing the legality of wars.[89]

For the explanation of the morality of post-war actions, the second body is more interesting for this investigation. Rulers establish a consultative body consisting of theologians, jurists, and other experts.[90] Vitoria conceives of this body, possibly, as a contemporary form of advisory bodies such as the Council of the Indies, which since 1492 served as advisors to the Spanish rulers. It was a place for discussing political and moral issues, such as the treatment of slaves from overseas territories and questions of warfare, including the legitimacy of armed conflicts. The Junta de Burgos from 1512 as well as the Junta de

[83] Brian Orend, *The Morality of War.* (Peterborough: Broadview Press 2006), 17.

[84] As emphasized in an earlier chapter about the equality of the *totus orbis* members. Vitoria, *De Indis*, 509.

[85] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 573.

[86] Brian Orend, *The Morality of War*, 16.

[87] Francisco de Vitoria, 'De bello,' Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Joachim Stüben (ed.): *Kann Krieg erlaubt sein? Eine Quellensammlung zur politischen Ethik der Spanischen Spätscholastik*. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 2006), 80.

[88] Vitoria, *De Indis*, 509.

[89] Vitoria, *De iure belli*, 547; Brian Orend, *The Morality of War*, 17.

[90] Vitoria probably envisions a consultative body composed of both theologians and jurists. Historians like Pagden emphasize that in the historical reality, these kinds of discussions were mostly held by theologians. Anthony Pagden, *Conquest and the Just War*, 32.

Valladolid served similar purposes – to discuss the indigenous rights for salary, and the more humane treatment of slaves among other things. These discussions and consultative bodies served to inform the rulers but also had the role of holding them accountable to act morally, which had long-term effects on Spanish colonial politics and the treatment of indigenous peoples in the 16th century.[91]

On a political level, the dual role of the ruling powers presents a complex and problematic issue that Vitoria may not fully capture. By acting in their dual role, the ruling powers expose themselves to the risk of morally elevating and justifying their acts of war. Within the framework of *jus ad bellum*, the ruling powers begin by seeking to redress the injustice committed by them. In *jus post bellum*, however, they act as judges in their own cause, as they not only consider the injustice committed prior to the onset of war but also determine the morality of their own actions throughout the course of the war. In doing so, they can hardly escape subjectivity, even if they rely on the alleged neutrality of the consultative body, which also consists of scholars from the victorious side.

Concluding Remarks

Vitoria has often been referred to as the 'father of international law', or at least as a significant proponent of the laws of war and international relations within the framework of the Just War Theory.[92] He established and systematized important moral foundations relating to martial and international law that are still relevant today. Some have depicted Vitoria's ideas on international law and disputes as secular. However, I find this portrayal somewhat exaggerated, especially when considering his historical background as a Dominican monk who provides a deep understanding of missionary law in some of his lectures. Most of his law principles can be traced back to Christian origins, for instance, exemplified by the values of modesty, mercy, or fraternity.[93] This profound influence serves as a cornerstone for his legal philosophical framework.

[91] Anthony Pagden, *Conquest and the Just War*, 33.
[92] Ulrich Horst, 'Leben und Werke Francisco de Vitorias', 73-74.
[93] Larry May, *After War Ends*, 46.

Although this designation as a pre-secular founder of international law has been somewhat relativized in the academic debates of the 20th and 21st centuries, there remains a consensus that some ideas such as the concept of *totus orbis* and his idea of the equality of peoples within international law were ahead of its time. Furthermore, Vitoria argued for humanitarian interventions based not on religious differences but on violations of international law.[94] Likewise, parts of his law of war are still relevant today, as the three moral principles of war continue to shape the debates within Just War Theory.[95] His *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* contain fundamental principles that are still used to justify wars, not only in academic discussions but also in political speeches or legal frameworks such as the UN Charter.[96]

The introductory first chapter highlighted the necessity to read Vitorias *jus post bellum* within the scope of his lecture *De potestate civili*. Herein, I firstly assumed that Vitoria's post-war law is based on the concept of *totus orbis*. In the second chapter, it was emphasized that the *totus orbis* is responsible for restoring justice. Punitive measures serve primarily to redress the wrongs of the hostile state and thus serve a higher purpose by ensuring the reintegration of wrongdoers back into the *totus orbis*. In summary, Vitoria's conception of the global community of peoples, the *totus orbis,* envisages a punitive power that, in the name of compensatory justice, ensures that members of the *totus orbis* are punished for their violations of international law and subsequently reintegrated as equal members of the global community of peoples – ensuring negative peace, the absence of military force. The third chapter established the connection between the *jus post bellum* and the *totus orbis*. It showed that punitive measures within the post-war period are determined by the executive of the *totus orbis*, (de facto) the victorious side. The fourth chapter provided the rationale for the rulers acting as commanders of the *totus orbis*. Since the *totus orbis* has no decision-making or executive power, political state powers, i.e., princes and

[94] James Muldoon, 'Francisco De Vitoria and Humanitarian Intervention,' 130; Johann Schelkshorn, *Entgrenzungen. Ein europäischer Beitrag zum Diskurs über die Moderne*, 286.

[95] Michael Walzer, in his most influencial work *Just and Unjust Wars* has not specifically mentioned the *jus post bellum* in his work but pointed the connection between the *ad bellum* and *post bellum*. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books 1992), 123.

[96] Alex Bellamy, *World Peace (And How We Can Achieve It)*. Oxford/NY: Oxford University Press 2019, 209.

kings, are entrusted with both tasks. In their role, they must determine the morality of war. I argued that rulers have a dual role during times of war – as holders of political power and as representatives of the restorative justice power of the *totus orbis*. It is the ruler's responsibility to exercise restorative justice on behalf of the global community. In their role, rulers must determine the morality of punitive justice based on the aforementioned moral criteria proportionality, necessity, and discrimination.

Summing up, Francisco de Vitorias *jus post bellum* that he develops maily in his *relectio De iure belli* (1539), while focusing mainly on the rights of the winning side, is not to be equated with unrestricted victor's justice. While Vitoria mainly advocates for collective punitive measures, he also stresses in *De iure belli* that the winners should not engage in unreasonable acts of domination or exploitation by considering the moral principles of war. I argued that the post-war law must be read with the political foundations of the *relectio De potestate civili (*1527). All actions after the end of war serve to reintegrate the losing side back into the *totus orbis*. The highest goal of the post-war period is the restoration of negative peace within the global community of peoples.

War and Peace in the Hesychast Theology and Pastoral Practice of St Gregory Palamas

STAVROS YANGAZOGLOU
Associate professor, Faculty of Theology, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

'Whoever is insensitive to history would hardly be a good Christian'.
Fr Georges Florovsky

In this paper, our interest and focus will be on the first inaugural address of St. Gregory Palamas as Archbishop of Thessaloniki, which he delivered in 1350, three days after his arrival in the city, following the cessation of the Zealot revolution. This homily contains an excellent theological and political approach to peace and was delivered at a hiμstorical juncture that clearly showed the successive internal and external dangers for waning Byzantium. Above all, however, this homily is of great interest to us in order to reconstruct elements and examples for our own time and experience. These highlights show that beyond barren antagonisms and sterile ideological debates, through a genuine, critical and creative dialogue of all the trends and currents of Orthodox theology of the 20th and 21st centuries, we ought to move forward and ultimately develop a contemporary and ecumenically fuller example of updated and discerning theology within our difficult and complex times.

The Age of St Gregory Palamas

After a millennium of prosperity for the Eastern Roman Empire, the fourteenth century marked its complete decline. The Empire's wounds from the fall of 1204 remained open. At the end of the thirteenth century, various Ottoman tribes overran Asia Minor and many Greeks

or Romans were forced to leave their homes and migrate to the European part of the Empire. This is the period when Gregory Palamas' parents settled in Constantinople. Although the fourteenth century marks a new beginning, especially in letters, sciences, arts, and intellectual life, the Roman Empire literally became a shadow of its former self, as the political and economic structures and the territory of the empire rapidly disintegrated and shrunk.

Declining population, increasing taxes, devaluation of the currency, devastation of the countryside, weakening of agriculture, impoverishment of the population, dramatic reduction of state financial resources, and excessive spending on foreign mercenaries formed prohibitive conditions and prerequisites for the recovery of lost grandeur. In addition, the split of the already shrunken empire into three states (Constantinople, Trebizond, and the Despotate of Epirus) completely weakened the once mighty central authority. Enemies almost surrounded Constantinople on all sides. Latin kingdoms dominated mainland Greece and the islands of the Greek archipelago as far as Cyprus. Trade and sea routes had for two centuries been in the hands of the great Italian cities. In the north, the raids of the Albanian tribes became more frequent, while the Serbs of Stefan Dusan invaded Macedonia and, with the fall of Serres in 1345, cut the Byzantine territory in half. The ambitious plan of the Serbian ruler was to create a Byzantine-Serbian state with Thessaloniki as its capital. The opportunity presented itself in the civil war among the Byzantines (1341–1347).[1] In the East, the Turks of Asia Minor were stationed just across the European coast from Constantinople, waiting for the opportunity to advance westward. Kallipolis in the Dardanelles fell into the hands of the Ottoman Turks in an orgy of plundering and raiding. It was there that Gregory Palamas was captured and began his misadventure of captivity in Asia Minor.

The fourteenth century was the period of civil wars in Byzantium. The first civil war between Andronicus II Palaiologos and his grandson Andronicus III Palaiologos took place between 1321–1328. The second civil war broke out around the middle of the fourteenth century. Apart from the conflict between specific personalities, it was caused by the political and economic disintegration of the central power and the

[1] See George Christos Soulis, *The Serbs and Byzantium During the Reign of Tsar Stephen Dušan (1331–1355) and His Successors*, Dumbarton Oaks Library and Collection, 1984.

cohesive forces that constituted the very structure of the state. On the one side were the supporters of nine-year-old John V: Empress Anna Palaiologina (princess of Savoy), Duke Alexios Apokaukos, and Patriarch John Calekas. On the other was the powerful Grand Domestichos John Kantakouzenos. In the whirlwind of the new civil war, the Zealot revolt (1342–1349) broke out in Thessaloniki. Surprisingly, the Zealots[2] allied themselves with the aristocratic landowners who supported the legitimacy of the Palaiologues on the throne of the empire rather than with Kantakouzenos who promoted the strengthening of central power.

However, in the last two hundred years of Byzantium's lifespan, and especially in the fourteenth century, centered on Constantinople and Thessalonica,[3] and despite the shrinkage of the empire and the multiple dangers that threatened it, an extremely intense intellectual and cultural renaissance developed. The main features of this renaissance were the intense flourishing of letters, arts and sciences, which never ceased in Byzantium, and of course the outstanding artistic movement, especially in painting, in the two characteristic schools of Palaiologian and Macedonian art.[4] At the same time, hesychastic theology, with St Gregory Palamas at the forefront, and sacramental theology, with Nicolas Cabasilas as its main representative, expressed in a particular way the centuries long patristic tradition of the East, often in fruitful dialogue or even in opposition to Western theology. If the old glory of the Justinian period was emblematically expressed by the church of Agia Sophia with its splendour, opulence, light and graceful size, now the Monastery of Chora, small, elegant, simple but also full of artistic masterpieces, expresses a new dynamic radiance, which is inversely proportional to the complete weakening of the empire. In parallel with the last Byzantine Renaissance, as Steven Runciman[5] called this period, another historical paradox appeared. Despite the territorial shrinkage of the empire, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople continued

[2] Yannis Smarnakis, "Thessaloniki during the Zealots' Revolt (1342-1350): Power, Political Violence and the Transformation of the Urban Space", *Scandinavian Journal of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 4/2018, pp. 119-147.

[3] Oreste Tafrali, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle, Topographie de Thessalonique, Thessalonique des origines au XIVe siècle*, reprint of the Institute of Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1993.

[4] For the question of the effect of hesychasm on art, see the work of Anita Strezova, *Hesychasm and Art. The Appearance of New Iconographic Trends in Byzantine and Slavic Lands in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, Australian National University Press, Canberra 2014.

[5] Steven Runciman, *The Last Byzantine Renaissance*, Cambridge University Press 1970.

to exert great influence even beyond the territories of the empire. The two main theological currents expressed by Gregory Palamas and Nicolas Cabasilas summarize the Orthodox Tradition of the Church. These theological currents of the fourteenth century will nourish and sustain the Orthodox Church spiritually in the adverse times ahead. Attempting to interpret this phenomenon, Russian scholars such as John Meyendorff[6] and Gelian Prokhorov[7] spoke of a 'political hesychasm' that extended to the Balkans and the Slavic North through a series of reforms carried out by hesychast patriarchs, and Nicolae Jorga[8] already spoke of 'Byzantium after Byzantium'. If the anti-Hesychasts turned one after another to the Christian West, like the last Byzantine emperors seeking to save the empire at any cost, the hesychasts became the exponents of the Orthodox commonwealth and the 'New Rome', extending the hesychastic tradition to Georgia, Russia, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe. The practice of hesychasm in the Balkans will curb the influence of the West and the Pope, restoring a sense of unity and cohesion within Orthodoxy and promoting, beyond hesychastic spirituality, key political and cultural priorities.

In this paper, our interest and focus will be on the person and work of St Gregory Palamas, in order to present his stance towards peace in an age of successive wars, intense changes, and upheavals that were slowly bringing a taste of modernity that was beginning to show its first tentative signs more obviously in the West and less so in the East.

[6] For John Meyendorff, 'political hesychasm' is defined as follows: 'Finally, one finds today the concept of "political hesychasm", designating a social, cultural, and political ideology, which originated in Byzantium and had a decisive impact on social and artistic development among the Southern Slavs and Russians', see John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Hesychasm: historical, theological and social problems*, Variorum Reprints London 1974, pp. 8-9 of the Introduction. See also, John Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteenth Century*, St Vladimir's Seminary Press, New York 1989. On the newer uses of 'political hesychasm' in Modern Greek theology and ideology see, Daniel Payne, *The revival of political hesychasm in greek orthodox thought: A study of the hesychast basis of thought of John S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras*, PhD Thesis approved by the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University, Baylor 2006. https://baylor-ir.tdl.org/bitstream/handle/2104/4847/daniel_payne_phd.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed July 19, 2023.

[7] Gelian Prokhorov, "Isikhazm i obscestvennaja mysV v vostocnoj Evrope v XlV-m veke. Trudy otdela drevne-russkoj literatury", vol. 21, Akademija Nauk SSSR Moskva 1968.

[8] Nicolae Iorga, *Byzance après Byzance, Continuation de l'«Histoire de la vie byzantine»*, Edition de l'Institut d'Études Byzantines, Bucarest 1935, εκδ. Balland 1992.

St Gregory Palamas, a march in the midst of conflict

Gregory Palamas lived and developed his great theological teaching in a particularly turbulent time. In his time, the factor of the schism between Rome and Constantinople combined with the problem of the survival of the empire would shape an almost warlike atmosphere between East and West. Indeed, if we take into account the traumatic experience of the Francocracy, the intense anti-Latinism, the continuing Filioque controversy, the emergence of Unionists and anti-Unionists in Byzantium, the great geopolitical losses and strategic weaknesses of the empire, the ideas of a fully autonomous humanism from the theology of the Greek Fathers of the Church, in conjunction with a sterile and scholastic theology of repetition, unable to authentically express the Orthodox Tradition in its time, then we have the broader framework in which the theological work of Gregory Palamas appeared and developed. Although originally a monk and abbot, Gregory Palamas was not marginalized either in Byzantine society and imperial power or in the ecclesiastical hierarchy and monastic polity of his time. As archbishop of Thessaloniki, he would then become a leading figure in the theological events of his time and, ultimately, the hesychastic councils of the fourteenth century would undeniably vindicate his teaching as an anatomy, development, and recapitulation of the previous patristic theology. He and his hesychast disciples, assuming important positions in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, would play a key role in the last pre-Captivity revival of Orthodox theology, shaping the appropriate conditions and prerequisites for the historical survival of Orthodoxy against the Turkish danger, as well as for the expansion of hesychast theology and ascetic life in the Balkans and the Slavic North.

Gregory Palamas was born in 1296 in Constantinople, where his family fled from Asia Minor because of the Turkish invasion. His father, Constantine Palamas, would become a senator and pedagogue at the court of Andronicus II. The young Gregory, soon to be orphaned, would have the privilege of growing up in the imperial court and pursuing an excellent education at royal expense under the great scholar and politician Theodore Metochites. At the age of twenty, Palamas abandons the imperial court's proposals for a career in public life and departs for monastic life on Mount Athos via the Papikion Mountains of Thrace. He initially lives as a monk at Megisti Lavra and the old Lavra's Skete

of Glossia. Due to frequent pirate raids by the Turks, he took refuge in Veroia and settled as a recluse in a hermitage by the river Aliakmonas, coming on Saturdays and Sundays to the community for Eucharistic communion and contact with his fellow monks. A little later and for a short time he would become abbot of the monastery of Esfigmenos in Athos. Returning to Thessaloniki, the hesychastic controversy broke out because of the positions of Barlaam the Calabrian,[9] which continued with other anti-hesychastics such as Gregory Akindynos and Nikiforos Gregoras.

In Thessaloniki, confronted with the peculiar agnosticism and apophaticism of Barlaam, as well as with the attacks of the Calabrian monk on monastic asceticism and the mental prayer of the hesychasts, Gregory Palamas wrote his first works on the Holy Spirit and the Triads in Defense of the Holy Hesychasts. At the Council of Constantinople in 1341, Barlaam is condemned, but without fully vindicating Palamas. And whereas Barlaam returned to Italy in disappointment, a new civil war broke out, which would influence the continuation of the hesychast controversy. Gregory Palamas, although he was on friendly terms with Anna Palaiologina, became involved in the civil war because he was considered by the patriarch John Calekas to be a friend and supporter of the Grand Domestichos John Kantakouzenos. It is significant that during this period Palamas suffered a series of persecutions and spent most of the civil war in prison writing and arguing with various persons who visited him, according to the testimony of Philotheos Kokkinos.[10] Patriarch John Calekas openly promoted the 'conservative' Gregory Akindynos and Palamas' theological opponents in general. The victory of John Kantakouzenos, who becomes co-emperor, would result in new councils being held in Constantinople between 1347–1351, which would fully justify the hesychastic theology against the positions of Akindynos and the philosopher and historian Nikiforos Gregoras. In

[9] See John Meyendorff, "Un mauvais théologien de l'unité au quatorzième siècle: Barlaam le Calabrais", in *L'église et les églises, 1054–1954*, vol. 2, pp. 47–65, Chevetogne 1955. Robert Sinkewicz, "A new interpretation for the first episode in the Controversy between Barlaam the Calabrian and Gregory Palamas", *The Journal of Theological Studies* 31, no. 2/1980, pp. 489-500. "The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the Early Writings of Barlaam the Calabrian", *Medieval Studies* 44/1982, pp. 181–242.

[10] Filotheos Kokkinos, *Enkomion to the Life of our Father among the Saints Gregory Palamas* 6, 32, ed. P. Christou, "Greek Fathers of the Church", Gregory Palamas Patristic Publications, Thessaloniki 1984, p. 274.

1347, Gregory Palamas was elected Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, but in the general turmoil and disorder caused by the Zealots, the leaders of the city did not accept him at the time. During his stay on Mount Athos, Stefan Dusan attempted to win him over to occupy Thessaloniki. Gregory Palamas refused to cooperate. In 1350, after three and a half years, the people of Thessaloniki finally welcomed Palamas with enthusiasm. After the end of the Zealots' rule, he entered Thessaloniki as a peacemaker with the city's new elders, who travelled by boat to Lemnos, where Palamas had been a locum tenens, to accompany him out of honour. As metropolitan of Thessaloniki, Gregory Palamas would reframe his hesychast and dogmatic theology at the level of pastoral and liturgical ministry, leaving as a legacy the corpus of his Homilies, in which his biblical and patristic theology is coherently linked to his continuous attention to the spiritual edification of his flock.

The Homilies of the Archbishop of Thessaloniki render completely unfounded the positions that insist on interpreting hesychasm as a mystical movement of escape from the world, caused by anxiety for the survival of Byzantium with obvious signs of insecurity and social impoverishment. Hesychasm was not born in the fourteenth century as a circumstantial phenomenon but pre-exists and, already from the time of St Anthony the Great, it seals the Orthodox mystical tradition of the ascetic life, which remains particularly social and influential in the piety of the Byzantines. At the same time, the Homilies of the hesychast theologian show not only the pastoral popularization of hesychasm and its appropriate application to the wider life of the Church in the world, but also the complete theological coincidence and concordance of Gregory Palamas with the teachings of Nicolas Cabasilas—especially with regard to the absolutely common sacramental and eucharistic background of these great theologians and Fathers of the Orthodox Church in the fourteenth century.

In 1354–1355, the Archbishop of Thessaloniki travelled to Constantinople, mediating peacefully between Kantakouzenos and the Palaiologians so that a definitive peace could finally be achieved in their conflict. Passing through Kallipolis, he was captured by the Turks and was taken prisoner in Asia Minor. Living in the arduous conditions of captivity and being shuffled between Prussa (Bursa) and Nicaea, Gregory Palamas dialogued peacefully with Muslim theologians and

the Chiones, an Islamised group of scholars of Christian or Jewish origin, handing down to us excellent examples of this pre-modern inter-religious dialogue on the issue of peaceful coexistence of religions and the avoidance of intolerance. After a whole year of captivity, Gregory Palamas would be released by the Turks on payment of an exorbitant ransom, probably by Stefan Dusan or John Kantakouzenos. After four years of peaceful pastoral ministry, Gregory Palamas died at the age of 63 in November 1359.

'On peace towards one another'

We will focus mainly on the first inaugural address of the Archbishop of Thessaloniki, which he delivered in 1350, three days after his arrival in the city, following the cessation of the Zealot movement. In a mass procession through the city that ended at the Church of Agia Sophia, Gregory Palamas won over with his message even those who had rebelled against and opposed his enthronement.[11] This homily contains an excellent theological and political approach to peace and was delivered at a historical juncture that clearly showed the successive internal and external dangers for waning Byzantium. Above all, however, this homily of St Gregory Palamas is of great interest to us in order to reconstruct elements and examples for our own time and experience, for nowadays Orthodox Christians are currently engaged in a violent and fratricidal war, since behind the military conflicts in Ukraine an ideological war is raging, which is attempting to instrumentalize Orthodoxy and place it within the grip of nationalism and the thirst for secular domination.

The Archbishop of Thessaloniki starts from the fact that all human beings are brothers and sisters as children of the common Father. All human beings are in the image of God and have a common mother, the Church, whose head and leader is Christ. In the body of Christ, which is the Church, the God-Man Christ is not only God but also a brother and father, who unites us into one body and makes us members of one another and of himself. Christ calls people brothers and sisters and becomes their father in the Church as he regenerates every human being by the divine grace of baptism. Referring to the Apostle Paul, Gregory

[11] Filotheos Kokkinos, *Enkomion to the Life of our Father among the Saints Gregory Palamas* 6, 32, ibid., p. 312.

Palamas speaks of the Christocentric and the unity in Spirit of the one body based on the Holy Eucharist. Throughout the whole breadth of the homily and in the rest of his works, Gregory Palamas' teaching on the Church never falls into ideology, into a Byzantine nationalism, or into an Orthodox culturalism. If among humanist scholars there is a strong revival of Hellenism in the fourteenth century, among the hesychast theologians traditionally the ecumenical dimension of the theology of the Greek Fathers of the Church is expressed. In this first contact and homily of Gregory Palamas as archbishop to the Thessalonians, after seven years of incredible anarchy, pillage and terrorism, there are no references to opponents and perpetrators or dividing lines for victors and losers but only exhortations for peace and reconciliation for all.[12]

For the Archbishop of Thessaloniki, the cause of evil is the dissolution of love, which is the work of the devil and can extend from individuals to the common things of the city. By dividing people of the same race into rival sections, this demonic manifestation of evil causes civil strife and unrest. Ultimately, in civil war the city itself fights and opposes itself. In this confrontation, the brutal and the vicious predominate, who with fury and inhumanity engage in plunder, robbery, and murder.[13] Gregory Palamas not only seeks the cause of the disease but also suggests its treatment. Common sin, by driving out love, is the cause that turns people into enemies. When love is completely chilled, then God's grace is also removed from people.[14] The Archbishop of Thessaloniki uses the eloquent example of the lampstand. The soul of every human being is like a lamp. Its oil is charity and its wick is love. This love is warmed and sustained by the grace of the Holy Spirit. When charity, the doing of good works, ceases, and love necessarily grows cold and the grace of the Holy Spirit is removed from man. Lack of love leads to sin, and sin leads to unrest and civil war and all kinds of evil. The absence of love turns humans into demonic beasts. Man becomes misanthropic and homicidal and ultimately an adversary to the Life-Giving Christ.[15]

[12] Gregory Palamas, *Homily* 1, 1–2 [*On Peace With one Another, Delivered three days after his arrival in Thessaloniki*], ed. Vasilios Pseftongas, in Grigoriou Palama Syggrammata, Volume VI, pp. 39–40.

[13] Gregory Palamas, *Homily* 1, 3-4, ibid., pp. 40–41.

[14] Gregory Palamas, *Homily* 1, 5-6, ibid., pp. 41–42.

[15] Gregory Palamas, *Homily* 1, 7, ibid., pp. 42–43.

Gregory Palamas, as a bishop and ambassador of the peace of Christ, calls all to return to the way of the Gospel of Christ, which means reconciliation, recognition of the corporal and spiritual kinship between all persons, and a return to Christ and the grace of the Holy Spirit. Evil is overcome by good, by love, by which love of God is also acquired. Those who do not love their brothers and sisters cannot have love for God. The role of the bishop as pastor is to bring together the scattered and warring parties by preaching peace, removing the disease of hatred and sickliness from the body of the Church of Christ.[16]

As a bishop, Gregory Palamas asks everyone for cooperation in deeds for peace. Ultimately, peace is Christ himself who abolished the wall of enmity by his death on the cross. The whole work of his divine economy lies precisely in peace, and that is why he became flesh.[17] The legacy of his earthly economy is the preservation of peace, which is the love and unity of all. If we lose peace, we lose our adoption by God and as the cause of hatred, enmity, and mischief we will be excluded from his Kingdom.[18] Gregory Palamas concludes by pointing out what is the heart and the quintessence of life in Christ, the vision of God and the deification of man. In the biblical texts, peace is a prerequisite for the vision of God in the future century of the Kingdom of the Holy Trinity.[19]

In the pastoral homilies of St Gregory Palamas, his hesychast theology is expanded to include also the political dimension, certainly in its pre-modern version. Mystical theology does not constitute an escape from history and everyday life, but on the contrary, it organically includes and connects the ecclesial experience of *theosis* with the ethos of the polis and the politics of a structured community of people. Long before the emergence of modernity or modern anti-war movements and peace organizations, Gregory Palamas as bishop of Thessaloniki articulated responsible public discourse, expressing the theological conditions and ecclesiological framework for personal and political peace—and that in a state that for almost seven years had been living in an unbelievable regime of plunder, intolerance, and murder in an extremely turbulent political and geopolitical era. Oddly enough, the ascetic theological

[16] Gregory Palamas, *Homily* 1, 8-9, ibid., p. 43.
[17] Gregory Palamas, *Homily* 11, 26, ibid., pp. 145–146.
[18] Gregory Palamas, *Homily* 1, 10-11, ibid., pp. 43–44.
[19] Gregory Palamas, *Homily* 1, 12-14; 12, 15, ibid., pp. 42–43, 172.

tradition contains the caring for the social and political element and when combined with the pastoral ministry of a hesychast bishop it can bring out its full dimensions, and even in conjunction with ecclesiology, which is the predominantly political and social dimension of the Church. It is also significant that even in the fourteenth century in Byzantium important scholars, such as Nicolas Cabasilas[20] and Demetrius Kydonis, were engaged in theology and politics, while John Kantakouzenos himself, after his abdication from his reign, pursued a monastic life and wrote as the monk Ioasaph.[21] The combination of theology and politics has a long tradition in Byzantine society and culture.

Mystical theology and politics

Aristotle Papanikolaou, in an extremely interesting study on the relationship between Orthodox mystical theology and politics, speaks of the political dimension of *theosis* as the transfiguration of man, which has concrete consequences in the historical and social field of political life.[22] The *mystical* can also be *political*; the transfiguration of man in Christ does not constitute an escape from history, society, politics and culture, but takes on every aspect of human life and society. The question, of course, is whether the political dimension of *theosis* as the ideal of life in Christ can meet modern man, the modern pluralistic world and culture as it emerged through the course of modernity in the West, or is it merely an exotic image of Orthodoxy, which insists on living in a pre-modern social, cultural, and political context, constantly recalling the Byzantine paradigm of a closed society in which the political was inseparable from the theological element. In other words, is the political and social dimension of *theosis* compatible with the modern liberal and pluralistic world and with the secularized conception of the public sphere, or is it a situation that personally concerns the mystery

[20] See Eugenia Russell, "Nicholas Kavasilas Chamaëtos (c. 1322–c. 1390): A Unique Voice Amongst his Contemporaries", *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 54/2010, σσ. 121-135. Myrra Lot-Borodine, *Un maître de la spiritualité byzantine au quatorzième siècle, Nicolas Cabasilas*, Paris 1958. Ihor Ševčenko, "Nicolas Cabasilas' 'Anti-zealot' Discourse: A Reinterpretation", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 11/1957, pp. 79–171. Jean Vafiadis, *L'humanisme chrétien de Nicolas Cabasilas: L'*épanouissement de la personne humaine dans le Christ, Strasbourg, 1963.

[21] Günther Weiss, *Joannes Kantakuzenos-Aristocrat, Staatsmann, Kaiser and* Mönch-in der Gesellschaftsentwicklung von Byzanz im 14. *Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden 1969.

[22] Aristotle Papanikolaou, *The Mystical as Political: Democracy and Non-Radical Orthodoxy*, University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.

of salvation without implications for the political and social ethos? Possibly, we are facing new challenges for the creative re-emergence of Christianity in the forefront of history in a more meaningful and in any case, a non-authoritarian way. The public sphere as a space of public and open deliberation is also a challenge for Orthodox theology to move from its protected and inactive position as the bearer of national, cultural, and traditional values and to become once again the salt of people's lives and culture, bearing its witness publicly and on equal terms in the contemporary pluralistic world. Indeed, a pluralistic and dialectical outlook of the public sphere can prevent any instrumentalization of the Christian faith through political power.

It may be necessary to re-explore elements of political and social theology across the whole breadth of the patristic tradition and to attempt a dynamic updating and adaptation to contemporary political and social conditions. We must also explore aspects of political theology in modern Orthodox thought and pastoral practice, possibly starting from Russian religious thought (Komiakov, Solovyov, Bulgakov, Berdyaev), from Fr Georges Florovsky's vision of the need for a neo-patristic synthesis in Orthodox theology, and certainly utilizing the theology of the person, otherness, and eucharistic ecclesiology, which clearly entail implications for common and organized life. Indeed, these Orthodox approaches seem to be closer and more relevant to the democratic and liberal principles of contemporary pluralistic societies than to the totalitarian and autarchic Christian empires of the past. In our time, Orthodox theology needs to be open and to dialogue with the contemporary world and culture, and not shut itself up in self-sufficiency, historical inertia, and the introversion of other times and political situations where politics and theology were necessarily confined. With a courageous interpretive stance, Orthodox theology can detect in the principles of freedom, diversity, equality, peace, justice, dignity, human rights, protection and care of the natural environment, the avoidance of violence and dialogue, elements of its own theological and ecclesiological tradition and contribute to these achievements of modernity, disentangling any individualism or their unequivocal linkage with the liberal market economy and the geopolitics of power in modern mass democratic societies. Above all, however, theology must contribute to the effort of dialogue and to give meaning to personal

and social life, since contemporary pluralistic societies are suffering from a tendency towards practical nihilism, constant deconstruction, lack of social solidarity, cohesion and authentic identity. In the post-modern and post-secularized society, there is an increasing number of voices calling for the return of religion to the public sphere as a source of meaning and social cohesion for the very existence of the liberal and democratic state.

The return to the Fathers and the problem of 'political hesychasm'

Following the breakdown of communism, the global dominance of the liberal economy, the rise of political Islam and the emergence of various types of religious fundamentalism, the phenomenon of the so-called clash of civilizations between East and West is emerging. In post-Soviet Russia, the ideological vacuum inherited from communism is being filled by an attempt to reconstruct an Orthodox political theology. Initially, the work of the Russian philosopher, Nicolas Berdyaev was enlisted.[23] It seems that the political use or abuse of Nicolas Berdyaev was not sufficient to form a modern Russian anti-Westernism. This task was now taken over by the Eurasian ideology of the 'Russian World'.

Recently, Andrei Siskov[24] has argued that the Russian intellectuals who participated in the Russian religious renaissance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shaped the axes and conditions of a new relationship between politics and Orthodox theology, beyond the Byzantine model of consonance. Personalities such as Nicolas Berdyaev, Fr Sergius Bulgakov, Semyon Frank, and Mother Maria Skombtsova, shattering the idols of the Church's subordination to the state, offered with their lives and work new, authentic, and promising models of Orthodox political theology. Andrei Siskov draws these thoughts from Paul Gavriluk's book, 'Fr. Georges Florovsky and the Russian Religious

[23] See Michel Eltchaninoff, *Dans la tête de Vladimir Poutine*, Actes Sud, 2022. Looking for a modern path to Russia between the Tsarist and Soviet periods, in an effort to trace the relevance of Nicolas Berdyaev to modern Russia, conferences and presentations of the work of the Russian philosopher are often organized in Moscow and various Russian cities, and there is a permanent forum entitled 'Berdyaev Readings'. The idea of organizing the Berdyaev Readings' forum came from the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPR) after President Putin's Speech to the Federal Assembly of Russia in December 2012.

[24] For these positions of Andrei Syskov, see https://publicorthodoxy.org/2021/02/09/the-na-valny-protests-and-orthodoxys-a-political-theology/

Renaissance'. In this extremely interesting work, it is argued that Fr Georges Florovsky's program and idea of the 'neo-patristic synthesis' systematically undermined the multifaceted liberal political current of the religious renaissance, calling it simply 'religious philosophy', which contained heretical tendencies.

For Andrei Siskov, neo-patristic theology, by sacralizing the Byzantine past of Orthodoxy, signified a kind of untimely 'return to the Fathers', displaying anti-historical forms such as 'political hesychasm, Byzantinism and the theory of "Moscow as the Third Rome" (in its modern version)'. Indeed, what is happening in Russia now, Andrei Siskov argues, is a restoration of imperial power with Byzantine overtones. These critical remarks seem to be vindicated, as other scholars, such as Vladimir Petrunin, argue that the political hesychasm of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries returned to post-Soviet Russia and was expressed through the text on the Social Doctrine of the Church of Russia (2000), particularly in terms of church-state relations and the fight against Western influence, as Byzantine hesychasm once did in the fourteenth century. According to Vladimir Petrunin, Orthodox culture is proclaimed as the bulwark of the new ideology of the Russian state against the secularized West. 'Orthodoxy alone is the guarantee of Russia's independent existence in the modern world. Today the Moscow Patriarchate is the one and only organization that has maintained its millennial continuity throughout Russian history'.[25] The political history and fall of Byzantium remain a great lesson for modern Russia. Byzantium lost because its political leaders and humanist scholars submitted to the demands of the West. The Church, retaining its independence from the Emperor, opposed the West and thus Orthodoxy was saved. According to Vladimir Petrunin, the Social Doctrine of the Moscow Patriarchate clearly manifests the opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church to the liberalization, democratization, and secularization of the Russian state. Petrunin uses this ecclesial text to support an ideological and domestic political agenda that perceives the Russian Orthodox Church as the main political and ideological force in the Russian state. Vladimir Petrunin believes that the Russian Orthodox Church is legitimized to freely articulate its moral and social

[25] Vladimir Petrunin, *Politiceskij isikhazm i ego tradicii v social'noj koncepcii Moskovskogo Patriarkha*, Sankt Peterburg: Aletheia, 2009, p. 82.

principles in the public sphere of a pluralistic society, as Habermas[26] would have wanted. However, as Kristina Stöckl[27] points out, the Russian Church is not merely dialoguing, acknowledging the pluralism of the public sphere, but identifying itself with the public sphere of Russia. From this point of view, the Church can coercively list its support to the state, since it effectively denies the rest of civil society the opportunity to participate equally in public debate. Kristina Stöckl rightly concludes that for Petrunin the text of the Social Doctrine ultimately expresses a neo-Byzantine, anti-liberal, and anti-Western agenda, in which political hesychasm is ideologically upgraded and instrumentalized by the Moscow Patriarchate.[28] We note, however, that these positions of Petrunin cannot be based on Meyendorff's work on Palamas' hesychasm, but are ideological acrobatics in an extreme attempt to instrumentalize and essentially misrepresent the theological teaching of the hesychast theologian.

Andrei Siskov believes that somehow, the 'neo-patristic synthesis' has brought back the monastic spirit of traditional ascetic Orthodoxy, which is indifferent to the great moral dilemmas in the modern world, re-sacralizing political power in Russia and often feeding a rampant conspiracy theory. This situation has eroded consciences to such an extent that fundamentalist and zealous groups now within the walls are questioning even the orthodoxy of younger theologians working with the hermeneutical principles of the 'neo-patristic synthesis'.[29]

[26] See his classic work "Religion in the Public Sphere", *European Journal of Philosophy* 14:1/2006, pp. 1-25. See also, his articles, "What is Meant by a 'Post-Secular Society'? A Discussion on Islam in Europe: The Faltering Project", tr. C. Cronin, Polity Press, Cambridge 2009, pp. 59–77. "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", *New perspectives quarterly* 25/2008, pp. 17–29. "Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the Public Use of Reason by Religious and Secular Citizens", in *Between Naturalism and Religion: Political Essays*, by Jürgen Habermas, Polity Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 114–148. "The Boundary between Faith and Knowledge: On the Reception and Contemporary Importance of Kant's Philosophy of Religion", in *Between Naturalism and Religion: Political Essays*, ibid., pp. 209–248.

[27] Kristina Stöckl, «Political Hesychasm? Vladimir Petrunin's Neo-Byzantine Interpretation of the Social Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church», *Studies in East European Thought*, March 2010, Vol. 62, No. 1, Polish Studies in Russian Religious Philosophy, pp. 125–133, here p. 130.

[28] See Kristina Stöckl, "Political Hesychasm? Vladimir Petrunin's Neo-Byzantine Interpretation of the Social Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church", ibid., pp. 131–132.

[29] See in particular the article by Matthew Baker "'Theology Reasons'-in History: Neo-Patristic Synthesis and the Renewal of Theological Rationality", Θεολογία (*Theologia*) 4/2010, pp. 81–118.

It may be that the aforementioned issues are being raised with intensity in the context of the post-Soviet Russian reality. However, addressing them at the pan-Orthodox level need not be done through a process of rejecting or obscuring the important work of Fr Georges Florovsky and the 'neo-patristic synthesis' as a whole, in order to bring out the current of a more political and social Orthodoxy. It is important to emphasize that Fr Georges Florovsky's work completely deconstructs the ideological confrontation between East and West, speaking of two Churches that are Siamese sisters, considering that the problems of the West today need to become ours as well in order to make their solution possible, and that the audience of Orthodox theologians should be the whole world and not just the East.[30] After all, Florovsky, despite his contrasts and differences with the leaders of the Russian religious renaissance, attempted to stand united by extending a hand of friendship to its leaders in his 1948 speech at the opening of St Vladimir's in New York, praising, among other things, Berdyaev and the work of the philosophers.[31] Beyond barren antagonisms and sterile ideological debates, through a genuine, critical and creative dialogue of all the trends and currents of Orthodox theology of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, we ought to move forward and finally develop a contemporary and ecumenically fuller example of updated and discerning theology with our difficult and complex times.

The need for reconciliation and peace among the Orthodox

It is a fact that nationalism, isolationism, and the self-sufficiency of the local Orthodox Churches formed a 'closed' and external synodality, in which each local or national Orthodox Church seemed to have no need

[30] See the classic work of Georges Florovsky, *Christianity and Culture*, Collected Works 2, Belmont-Massachusetts 1974, chap. "Antinomies of Christian History: Empire and Desert" especially pp. 77 and 92-100. Florovsky concludes his study as follows: 'Byzantium had failed, grievously failed, to establish an unambiguous and adequate relationship between the Church and the larger Commonwealth. It did not succeed in unlocking the gate of the Paradise Lost. Yet nobody else has succeeded, either. The gate is still locked. The Byzantine key was not a right one. So were all other keys, too. And probably there is no earthly or historical key for that ultimate lock. There is but an eschatological key, the true "Key of David." Yet Byzantium was for centuries wrestling, with fervent commitment and dedication, with a real problem. And in our own days, when we are wrestling with the same problem, we may get some more light for ourselves through an impartial study of the Eastern experiment, both in its hope and in its failure'.

[31] Βλ. Georges Florovsky, "The Legacy and the Task of Orthodox Theology", *Anglican Theological Review* 31/1949, pp. 65–71.

for a relationship and communion with the other Orthodox Churches. Worse still, during the last preconciliar conferences and preparations for the Pan-Orthodox Synod in Crete in 2016, a clear tension between Constantinople and Moscow emerged. The issue of autocephaly, which seemed to be the subject of consensus and unanimous decision of the local Orthodox Churches, was eventually excluded from the agenda of the Synod. The Patriarchate of Moscow, while having endorsed all the synodal texts for discussion and approval, ultimately did not participate in the Holy and Great Synod because it did not recognize the primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarch in the presidency of the Synod, including three other local Orthodox Churches. The Pan-Orthodox Synod of Crete, after six decades of diligent theological and ecclesiastical preparation, revealed that the unity and synodality of the Orthodox had been damaged in practice. The epilogue of this tragic outcome did not stop here. It continued with the failure to reach an agreement on the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the creation of a unilateral schism by the Moscow Patriarchate towards the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Church of Greece, the Patriarchate of Alexandria and the Church of Cyprus in retaliation for the recognition of Ukrainian autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Moscow is now pressuring the other local Orthodox Churches not to recognize the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine, threatening those Churches that have done so with retaliation, and is already penetrating the Patriarchate of Alexandria by creating a Russian Exarchate on the canonical territory of another Church, thus dangerously undermining pan-Orthodox unity. Is it possible to detect in this attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church elements of patristic or hesychastic theology or even of a political hesychasm?

The geopolitical and geo-ecclesiological parameters of this crisis culminated in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and in a continuous and ruthless war between Orthodox brethren. The justification and argumentation of this war on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate goes back to Russia's alleged right to defend the unified 'Russian World', considering Ukraine to be an inalienable part of this

'Russian World'.[32] In addition, the close cooperation of the Moscow Patriarchate with the Russian political regime considers the 'Russian World' as a wider Eurasian cultural tradition to be collectively opposed to the culture of the West, which, with its eroded values and priorities for human rights and the rights of various minorities, is consistently the ideological opponent of modern Russia.[33] After the catastrophic invasion and bloodshed in Ukraine, Orthodox Christians around the world face the difficult question: How can a nation, the majority of which embraces Orthodox Christianity, justify attacking and killing the inhabitants of a fraternal nation, almost all of whom share the same faith? Certainly, the ideology of the 'Russian World', like every ethno-racial ideology in all ages, in all nations, and in all cultures, can have nothing to do with the Gospel and the Church of Christ.

Despite the geopolitical and geo-ecclesiastical parameters of this crisis and despite the adversities of this fratricidal war, we hope that, once the current tensions subside, the synodal ethos will be revived through the initiative and creativity of the local Orthodox Churches. We do believe, however, that efforts to restore unity and cooperation among the local Orthodox Churches are possible and that inspiring initiatives should be undertaken that could bear fruit once the frightening

[32] See the *Declaration on the "Russian World" (Russkii mir) Teaching* (March 13, 2022): 'The speeches of President Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill (Gundiaev) of Moscow (Moscow Patriarchate) have repeatedly invoked and developed Russian world ideology over the last 20 years. In 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimea and initiated a proxy war in the Donbas area of Ukraine, right up until the beginning of the full-fledged war against Ukraine and afterwards, Putin and Patriarch Kirill have used Russian world ideology as a principal justification for the invasion. The teaching states that there is a transnational Russian sphere or civilization, called Holy Russia or Holy Rus', which includes Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (and sometimes Moldova and Kazakhstan), as well as ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people throughout the world. It holds that this "Russian world" has a common political centre (Moscow), a common spiritual centre (Kyiv as the "mother of all Rus"), a common language (Russian), a common church (the Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate), and a common patriarch (the Patriarch of Moscow), who works in "symphony" with a common president/national leader (Putin) to govern this Russian world, as well as upholding a common distinctive spirituality, morality, and culture'. See the full text of this Declaration at the following link: https://publicorthodoxy.org/2022/03/13/a-declaration-on-the-russian-world-russkii-mir-teaching/

[33] See the Declaration on the "Russian World" (Russkii mir) Teaching: 'Against this "Russian world" (so the teaching goes) stands the corrupt West, led by the United States and Western European nations, which has capitulated to "liberalism", "globalization", "Christianophobia", "homosexual rights" promoted in gay parades, and "militant secularism". Over and against the West and those Orthodox who have fallen into schism and error (such as Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and other local Orthodox churches that support him) stands the Moscow Patriarchate, along with Vladimir Putin, as the true defenders of Orthodox teaching, which they view in terms of traditional morality, a rigorist and inflexible understanding of tradition, and veneration of Holy Russia', on the ibid. website 'Public Orthodoxy'.

intensity of the war has subsided. The witness and unity of the Orthodox Church in today's world is at stake. Nonetheless, in accordance with the optimistic message of the Holy and Great Synod, which is addressed 'to the Orthodox people and to every man of good will', we hope that the synodal spirit will be revived vigorously and authentically in the twenty-first century on a pan-Orthodox level. Nevertheless, we need to work vigorously and decisively to inaugurate new processes of authentic synodality as an inspired theological and prophetic witness to the faith and life of the Church in the contemporary world. There is a need, therefore, for the synodal spirit and contemporary theological witness to be revived at all levels of the life of the Church. We have a long and important task ahead of us.

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